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Abstract 
This thesis aims to develop a new way for port authorities to predict, analyse and make 
decisions in Port State Control (PSC) inspections. Under the New Inspection Regime (NIR), it 
is necessary to not only figure out the influence of new regime to the PSC system, but also 
provide some technical tools capable of predicting the inspection results and supporting the 
decision-making of port authorities when regulating the inspection policy.  
The study consists of analysis from multiple perspectives, both qualitative and quantitative. 
The risk factors influencing the inspection results and the decision-making of port authorities 
under NIR are identified through the practical inspection records and related literature. The 
Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) offers the historical inspection records within the 
region of Europe and the North Atlantic basin, reflecting different conditions in different 
periods. Given the different inspection system since 2011, port authorities require a brand new 
perception of the new inspection regime to estimate the inspection results, and further make 
decisions when making their own inspection policy. 
To achieve the objective, an incorporation of two types of models that have proved popular 
and superior is applied in this study. One is the risk assessment model of Bayesian network 
(BN), the other is the decision-making model of game theory.  
The BN models in this research utilize a data-driven approach called Tree Augmented Naïve 
(TAN) learning to derive the structure of the models. Based on the inspection reports collected 
from Paris MoU, two BNs that represent the situations of Paris MoU inspection system in 
different periods are constructed. Company performance, the new indicator, is viewed as one 
of the important factors influencing the inspection results for the first time and considered in 
the models. The BN model after the implementation of NIR can serve as the prediction tool for 
estimating inspection results under dynamic situations. Additionally, a comparative analysis 
between two models is conducted to clarify the influence on PSC inspection system brought 
by NIR. 
When constructing the non-cooperative strategic game model between port authorities and 
ship owners under NIR, the BN model outcomes play a crucial role in this process, highlighting 
the novelty of this model. Through the analysis and calculation on the payoff matrix, a Nash 
equilibrium solution representing the theoretical optimal inspection rate for port authorities is 
obtained. 
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To validate the feasibility and practical significance of the game model, an empirical study 
is conducted. The statistics are quantitative and collected from different sources, i.e. Basic 
vessel information from the World Shipping Encyclopaedia (WSE), casualty information from 
IMO and Lloyd's Register of Shipping, PSC Inspection records from Paris MoU online 
inspection database, and the estimated value of different cost types from Drewry Shipping 
Consultants Ltd. The empirical study illustrates the insights of the optimal inspection policy 
for port authorities (i.e. with the increase of punishment severity, the optimal inspection rates 
experience a decreasing trend whatever the vessel condition), as well as providing suggestions 
for them when formulating the optimal inspection policy under various situations.  
Based on the BN model and the strategic game model after the implementation of NIR, the 
thesis eventually proposes a decision-making framework for port authorities to prioritise and 
select the strategies under different situations. The six-step framework incorporates a risk 
assessment approach and decision-making approach to provide a novel way to rank the 
candidate options of port authorities in terms of their resources, which enables decision-makers 
to find optimal strategies to improve the performance of the PSC inspection system under 
dynamic business environments. 
In general, this thesis provides important insights for port authorities to ensure that optimal 
inspection actions are taken to improve safety at sea in a cost effective manner. The two 
technical tools (i.e. the dynamic prediction tool for inspection results & the optimal inspection 
strategy), and the decision-making framework proposed in this project are helpful for port 
authorities within the Paris MoU region when regulating their inspection policy under NIR. 
Meanwhile, the comparative analysis in this study further clarifies the influence of NIR on new 
inspection system from different angles for the first time, demonstrating the introduction and 
implementation of NIR is a wise and positive decision.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis is the result of a three-year PhD research project. It has been a long journey and 
would certainly have not been possible without the help and support of many people. I would 
like to take this opportunity to express my special debt of gratitude to them. 
First and foremost, I would like to thank with heartfelt gratefulness my principle supervisor, 
Professor Zaili Yang. During my PhD work, he cared a lot about my research and he was 
always there whenever I needed him. His patience, guidance, encouragement and advice to 
deal with encountering research problems have been priceless and helpful. More importantly, 
his passion towards the academic research has inspired me to keep moving and not be afraid 
of any difficulties. Additionally, he offered me plenty of opportunities to communicate with 
the researchers in the same field at various conferences, for example, the conference of the 
International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), and the IEEE International 
Conference on Logistics, Informatics and Service Sciences (LISS). It is really a great honour 
for me to be one of his students in my life. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor in 
Liverpool John Moores University (LJMU), Dr Rob Darlington, for his kind assistance and 
fruitful advice to help me complete the thesis.  
I owe special thanks to Dr Jingbo Yin at Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU), who is also 
my co-supervisor. Without his help, I could have not started my PhD at LJMU. As my 
supervisor at Bachelor degree, he suggested me to continue my research and contacted 
Professor Zaili Yang to give me an opportunity to start my PhD programme at Liverpool 
Logistics, Offshore and Marine (LOOM) research institute. He also helped me a lot throughout 
the duration of my PhD research and I deeply appreciate what he has done for me. 
I would like to thank my friends and colleagues at LJMU for their support and suggestions, 
especially Dr Chaoyu Li, Dr Min Ho Ha, Dr Xiao Yang, Mr Lei Wang, Mr Chengpeng Wan, 
Mr Aymen, and Miss Shiqi Fan. Many thanks to them for enriching my study and life in 
Liverpool, making it filled with laughter. 
I am grateful to my friends in China, who always supported me and gave me a hand when I 
met difficulties, in particular, Mr Chenzhe Zhu, Mr Xiaoteng Zhang, Mr Xi Chen, Miss Yang 
Gao and Miss Tianyue Li, to name just a few.  
Last but not least, I am very grateful to my parents for their financial and spiritual support 
during my time of study in the UK. Over twenty years, they have been sacrificed so much and 
iv 
 
always been my lifelong mentors. The mental strength from them helped me to overcome the 
challenges and difficulties I have faced in my life. To them, I can only return with the gratitude 
for their love and faith.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my family 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ……………………………………………………………………….i 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................. iii 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................. vi 
List of Figures .....................................................................................................xii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................... xiiii 
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................... xv 
 
CHAPTER 1    INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND ........................................................................................... 1 
1.1.1 Port state control................................................................................................. 3 
1.1.2 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on PSC ............................................... 4 
1.1.3 New Inspection Regime (NIR) .......................................................................... 6 
1.1.4 Summary ............................................................................................................ 7 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ......................................................................................... 8 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................................... 9 
1.4 RESEARCH STRUCTURE ......................................................................................... 9 
1.5 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION ................................................................................. 11 
 
CHAPTER 2    LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................... 14 
2.1 RISK STUDIES ON MARITIME SAFETY .............................................................. 14 
2.2 RISK STUDIES ON PSC INSPECTION ................................................................... 16 
2.3 BN IN MARITIME SAFETY AND PSC INSPECTION .......................................... 19 
2.3.1 The occurrence of ship-ship collisions ............................................................. 20 
2.3.2 Navigational risk analysis ................................................................................ 20 
2.3.3 Maritime accidents analysis and prevention .................................................... 21 
2.3.4 Offshore safety management ........................................................................... 21 
2.3.5 Risk based vessel design .................................................................................. 22 
2.3.6 Oil spill in maritime accidents & oil spill recovery ......................................... 22 
2.4 CPT CALCULATION APPROACHES IN BN ......................................................... 24 
vii 
 
2.5 DATA-DRIVEN APPRAOCHES TO CONSTRUCT BN ........................................ 26 
2.6 GAME THEORY APPLICATIONS IN TRANSPORTATION ................................ 30 
2.6.1 Development of research topics ....................................................................... 31 
2.6.2 Development of different transportation modes .............................................. 37 
2.7 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 38 
 
CHAPTER 3    REALISING ADVANCED RISK-BASED PORT STATE 
CONTROL INSPECTION USING DATA-DRIVEN BAYESIAN 
NETWORK……………………………………………………………………40 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 40 
3.2 METHODOLOGY-THE CONSTRUCTION OF DATA-DRIVEN BN ................... 41 
3.2.1 Data acquisition ............................................................................................... 41 
3.2.2 Variable identification ..................................................................................... 44 
3.2.3 Structure learning through data-driven approach ............................................ 45 
3.2.4 CPT distribution of the risk-based PSC BN .................................................... 48 
3.2.5 Generation of posterior probabilities and risk prediction ................................ 50 
3.2.6 Sensitivity analysis........................................................................................... 51 
3.2.7 Model validation .............................................................................................. 53 
3.3 BN MODEL FOR PSC INSPECTION BEFORE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
NIR IN 2008 – ‘PRE-NIR BN MODEL’ ......................................................................... 54 
3.3.1 Data .................................................................................................................. 54 
3.3.2 Risk variables ................................................................................................... 54 
3.3.3 A new risk analysis BN model for PSC ........................................................... 57 
3.3.4 CPT and prior probabilities for each node ....................................................... 65 
3.3.5 Model result ..................................................................................................... 68 
3.3.6 Sensitivity analysis........................................................................................... 70 
3.3.7 Model validation .............................................................................................. 73 
3.4 BN MODEL FOR PSC INSPECTION AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NIR 
– ‘POST-NIR BN MODEL’ ............................................................................................. 75 
3.4.1 Data acquisition ................................................................................................ 75 
3.4.2 Variable identification ..................................................................................... 75 
3.4.3 BN construction ............................................................................................... 78 
viii 
 
3.4.4 CPT distribution and risk prediction ................................................................ 80 
3.4.5 Model result ..................................................................................................... 80 
3.4.6 Sensitivity analysis and model validation ........................................................ 82 
3.4.7 Model validation .............................................................................................. 85 
3.5 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS - ANALYSIS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF ISM 
COMPANIES ................................................................................................................... 87 
3.6 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS - MODEL APPLICATIONS IN REAL CASES ..... 91 
3.6.1 Case I ............................................................................................................... 91 
3.6.2 Case II .............................................................................................................. 92 
 
CHAPTER 4    THE IMPACT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NIR ON PSC 
INSPECTION SYSTEM .................................................................................... 96 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 96 
4.2 MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS - THE INFLUENCE OF NIR ON PSC 
INSPECTION…………………………………………………………………………...97 
4.2.1 General analysis ............................................................................................... 98 
4.2.2 Influence of NIR on different vessel types .................................................... 109 
4.2.3 Summary ........................................................................................................ 113 
4.3 MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS - THE INFLUENCE OF NIR ON PSC 
INSPECTION………………………………………………………………………….114 
4.3.1 Sensitivity to detention -The influence degree of risk factors under different 
periods ..................................................................................................................... 115 
4.3.2 Company performance impact ....................................................................... 117 
4.3.3 Prior probability change ................................................................................. 118 
4.3.4 The role of ‘vessel group’ and ‘inspection group’ ......................................... 120 
4.3.5 Summary ........................................................................................................ 121 
 
CHAPTER 5    A RISK-BASED GAME MODEL FOR RATIONAL 
INSPECTIONS IN PORT STATE CONTROL ............................................... 124 
5.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 124 
5.2 BASIC CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY .............................................................. 127 
5.2.1 Strategic games .............................................................................................. 127 
ix 
 
5.2.2 Payoff matrix ................................................................................................. 129 
5.2.3 Nash equilibrium ............................................................................................ 130 
5.2.4 Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium................................................................... 131 
5.3 THEORETICAL GAME MODEL BETWEEN PORT AUTHORITIES AND SHIP 
OWNERS ....................................................................................................................... 132 
5.3.1 Assumptions ................................................................................................... 133 
5.3.2 Parameter identification ................................................................................. 134 
5.3.3 The payoff matrix .......................................................................................... 138 
5.3.4 Nash equilibrium solution .............................................................................. 143 
5.3.5 Further improvement of the game model....................................................... 147 
 
CHAPTER 6    AN EMPIRICAL STUDY TO DEMONSTRATE THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THEORETICAL GAME MODEL ................................ 149 
6.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 149 
6.2 DETERMINATION OF THE PARAMETER VALUES ........................................ 150 
6.2.1 Detention rate through BN ............................................................................. 150 
6.2.2 Maintenance cost and accident loss ............................................................... 152 
6.2.3 Accident rate .................................................................................................. 153 
6.2.4 Detention cost ................................................................................................ 159 
6.3 OPTIMAL INSPECTION RATE ............................................................................. 160 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PORT AUTHORITIES .......................................... 167 
6.4.1 Suggestions when formulating inspection policy .......................................... 167 
6.4.2 The decision-making framework for the port authority ................................. 168 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................... 172 
 
CHAPTER 7    SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS ......................................... 174 
7.1 RESEARCH IMPLICATION ................................................................................... 174 
7.1.1 Discussions of the advanced risk assessment model for PSC inspections under 
NIR using data-driven BN approach ....................................................................... 174 
7.1.2 Discussions of the influence of the implementation of NIR on PSC inspection 
system ...................................................................................................................... 177 
x 
 
7.1.3 Discussions of the optimal inspection policy of port authorities after the 
implementation of NIR using risk-based game model ............................................ 179 
7.2 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION ............................................................................... 182 
7.3 FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS ................................................................................ 183 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 185 
APPENDICES .................................................................................................. 205 
Appendix One Conditional Probability table of ‘Pre-NIR’ BN model ........................... 205 
Appendix Two Conditional Probability table of ‘Post-NIR’ BN model ......................... 222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1 The grounding of Exxon Valdez .............................................................................. 2 
Figure 1.2 The capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise ........................................................ 2 
Figure 1.3 The MS Estonia Ship disaster................................................................................... 3 
Figure 1.4 Research Structure .................................................................................................. 11 
Figure 2.1 Trends of main topics ............................................................................................. 35 
Figure 2.2 Developments in international seaborne trade, selected years (Millions of tons 
loaded).............................................................................................................................. 38 
Figure 3.1 Paris MoU inspection search interface ................................................................... 43 
Figure 3.2 An example of PSC inspection online report ......................................................... 44 
Figure 3.3 An example of naïve BN ........................................................................................ 46 
Figure 3.4 Bulk carrier categories ............................................................................................ 55 
Figure 3.5 Age distribution of bulk carriers 2016.................................................................... 55 
Figure 3.6 Original BN ............................................................................................................ 59 
Figure 3.7 TAN structure of vessel group ............................................................................... 62 
Figure 3.8 TAN structure of inspection group ......................................................................... 63 
Figure 3.9 Improved BN .......................................................................................................... 63 
Figure 3.10 Proposed BN for PSC inspection ......................................................................... 64 
Figure 3.11 Results of BN model ............................................................................................ 69 
Figure 3.12 The structure of BN .............................................................................................. 79 
Figure 3.13 ‘Post-NIR’ BN ...................................................................................................... 81 
Figure 3.14 Low vessel-related risk level vessels .................................................................... 88 
Figure 3.15 High vessel-related risk level of vessels ............................................................... 89 
Figure 3.16 Vessels at 0-5 years .............................................................................................. 90 
Figure 3.17 Vessels over 20 years ........................................................................................... 90 
Figure 3.14 Inspection result prediction of Case I ................................................................... 92 
Figure 3.15 Perspective of Gibraltar Port authority ................................................................. 94 
Figure 3.16 Perspective of the ship owner ............................................................................... 95 
Figure 4.1 Number of inspections and individual vessels in 2005-2016 ............................... 101 
Figure 4.2 Deficiency rate and detainable deficiency rate in 2005-2016 .............................. 103 
Figure 4.3 Trend of detention rate in 2005-2016 ................................................................... 105 
Figure 4.4 The trends of average number of inspections/vessel ............................................ 107 
Figure 4.5 The trends of refusal rate of vessel access ............................................................ 108 
xii 
 
Figure 4.6 Number of inspections of different vessel types in 2005-2016 ............................ 110 
Figure 4.7 Percentage of inspections with deficiencies of different vessel types in 2005-2016
........................................................................................................................................ 111 
Figure 4.8 Detention rate of different vessel types in 2005-2016 .......................................... 112 
Figure 6.1 The detention rate of standard vessels .................................................................. 151 
Figure 6.2 Detention rate of sub-standard vessels ................................................................. 152 
Figure 6.3 Trend of optimal inspection rate........................................................................... 162 
Figure 6.4 Decision-making framework for the port authority .............................................. 169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 The number of possible BN structures .................................................................... 26 
Table 2.2 Trend of transportation mode .................................................................................. 37 
Table 3.1 The prior probability of each root node ................................................................... 65 
Table 3.2 CPT of RO ............................................................................................................... 66 
Table 3.3 CPT of ‘type of inspection’ ..................................................................................... 66 
Table 3.4 CPT of ‘number of deficiencies’ ............................................................................. 66 
Table 3.5 CPT of ‘Vessel group’ ............................................................................................. 67 
Table 3.6 CPT of ‘Inspection group’ ....................................................................................... 67 
Table 3.7 CPT of ‘Detention’ .................................................................................................. 68 
Table 3.8 Sensitivity of other nodes to ‘Detention’ ................................................................. 70 
Table 3.9 TRI of risk variables ................................................................................................ 72 
Table 3.10 Detention rate of minor change in variables .......................................................... 74 
Table 3.11 Company performance classification standard ...................................................... 76 
Table 3.12 Identified variables in PSC inspections from 2015-2017 ...................................... 77 
Table 3.13 Mutual information between other nodes and ‘Detention’ .................................... 82 
Table 3.14 TRI of risk variables .............................................................................................. 84 
Table 3.15 Detention rate of minor change in variables .......................................................... 86 
Table 3.16 Mutual information between ‘Company performance’ and other variables .......... 87 
Table 4.1 The facts of PSC inspection from 2015 to 2016 ...................................................... 99 
Table 4.2 The results of inspection-related rates in 2005-2016 ............................................. 100 
Table 4.3 Results of sensitivity analysis (Pre-NIR) ............................................................... 115 
Table 4.4 Results of sensitivity analysis (Post-NIR) ............................................................. 116 
Table 4.5 Effect of company performance ............................................................................ 117 
Table 4.6 Comparison of prior probability before and after NIR .......................................... 119 
Table 4.7 The change on ‘vessel group’ and ‘inspection group’ ........................................... 121 
Table 5.1 An example of a payoff matrix .............................................................................. 130 
Table 5.2 An example of obtaining Nash equilibrium ........................................................... 131 
Table 5.3 Payoff matrix of PSC inspection game .................................................................. 142 
Table 5.4 An example of how to calculate Nash equilibrium ................................................ 145 
Table 5.5 The simplified payoff matrix ................................................................................. 145 
Table 6.1 Database and sources ............................................................................................. 149 
xiv 
 
Table 6.2 Estimated approximate repair and maintenances under different conditions (US$)
........................................................................................................................................ 153 
Table 6.3 Estimated accident loss under different conditions (US$M) ................................. 153 
Table 6.4 Coefficients of the model ....................................................................................... 156 
Table 6.5 The accident rate of bulk carriers under different situations ................................. 158 
Table 6.6 Accident rates of bulk carriers ............................................................................... 159 
Table 6.7 Optimal inspection rate with different punishment severity levels ....................... 161 
Table 6.8 The standard deviation of small bulk carriers ........................................................ 164 
Table 6.9 Effect of vessel age and vessel size ....................................................................... 166 
Table 6.10 Improvements on PSC practice ............................................................................ 172 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xv 
 
Abbreviations 
ABN Augmented Naïve Bayesian Network 
ACO Ant Colony Optimisation 
ADR Average Detention Rate  
AIS Artificial Immune System 
BBN Bayesian Belief Network 
BN Bayesian Network 
CB Conditional independence and Bayesian learning 
CI Conditional Independence 
CIC Concentrated Inspection Campaign 
CONAR Construct and Repair 
CPD Conditional Probability Distribution 
CPT Conditional Probability Table 
DWT Dead Weight Tonnage 
EDA Estimation of Distribution Algorithms 
EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency 
EU European Union 
FBN Fuzzy Bayesian Network 
FSA Formal Safety Assessment 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
GA Genetic Algorithms 
HRI High Risk Inference 
HRS High Risk Ship 
IAME International Association of Maritime Economists 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
ILO International Labour organization 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
ISM International Shipping Management 
ITS Intelligent Transportation System 
KPI Key Performance Indicator 
LISS Logistics, Informatics and Service Sciences 
LRI Low Risk Inference 
xvi 
 
LRS Low Risk Ship 
MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
MLC Maritime Labour Convention 
MLE Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
MRRA Model based on Relative Risk Assessment 
NO.N Naïve Bayesian Network 
NIR New Inspection Regime 
PID Percentage of Inspections with Deficiencies 
PMI Percentage of Mutual Information 
PSC Port State Control 
PSCO PSC Officer 
PSO Particle Swarm Optimization 
REST Restricted Structure 
RO Recognized organization 
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
SRP Ship Risk Profile 
SRS Standard Risk Ship 
STCW 
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
SVM Support Vector Machine 
TAN Tree Augmented Naïve 
TRI True Risk Influence 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
VLCC Very Large Crude Carrier 
WGB White, Grey and Black 
WSE World Shipping Encyclopaedia 
IACS International Association of Classification Societies  
  
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the background of the research and explains the principal objectives that 
are developed through investigating and browsing related literature. The applied methods 
constitute the final models, as well as highlighting the research question in this thesis. Further, 
the contribution of the research is illustrated, demonstrating the role of the proposed models in 
real practice.  
 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Over the last decades, Maritime transport has played an increasingly important role in the 
world’s economy as over 90% of international trade is carried by sea and it is, by far, the most 
cost-effective way to move mass goods and raw materials around the world (Ducruet, et al., 
2016). Take the maritime transport conditions in Europe for example; the coastline of the 
European Union is many thousands of kilometres in length and contains well over 1,000 
individual ports. Every year, these ports handle 3.5 billion tons of goods and transport over 350 
million passengers on thousands of ship journeys, accounting for around 90% of EU external 
trade and around 40% of trade between EU countries.  
However, back to about 20 years ago, Perrow (1999) pointed out that ‘Tankers carrying 
LNG have the potential to blow up a whole city’, demonstrating the severity of maritime 
accidents from an academic perspective. The unprecedented growing rate of maritime 
transportation in recent years on the one hand contributes to industrial prosperity and individual 
benefits, but on the other hand renders threats and risks to the maritime industry, indicating it 
is a high-risk transportation mode having high potential to cause catastrophes (Hetherington, 
et al., 2006). A small mistake of the ship owner or a deficiency of the vessel quality may result 
in different types of severe maritime accidents, including but not limited to ship collisions, 
stranding, fire, and oil spill that could cause large property losses, environmental pollution and 
casualties. For instance, the grounding of the Exxon Valdez (Figure 1.1), the capsizing of the 
Herald of Free Enterprise (Figure 1.2) and the Estonia passenger ferry (Figure 1.3) are well-
known major accidents in maritime transportation. These maritime accidents attracted the 
attention of the world on maritime safety (Li, et al., 2014; Yang, et al., 2013; Yang, et al., 2014). 
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Figure 1.1 The grounding of Exxon Valdez 
(Source: The Atlantic) 
 
 
Figure 1.2 The capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise 
(Source: BBC NEWS) 
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Figure 1.3 The MS Estonia Ship disaster 
(Source: Marine Insight) 
Hence, it is of vital importance that maritime transport should be operated in a safe, secure 
and environmentally friendly way. Traditional flag state control has its limits in terms of 
ensuring the implementation of maritime safety regulations by ship owners, particularly those 
choosing open registration. In the past, the responsibility for ensuring vessels comply with the 
provisions of national and international rules rests upon the owners, masters and the flag states. 
Some flag states failed to fulfil their commitments contained in agreed international legal 
instruments, and subsequently, some vessels sailed in an unsafe condition, threatening the lives 
of the crew as well as the marine environment. Therefore, Port State Control (PSC), which was 
originally intended to be a backup to flag state implementation in 1982, is gradually becoming 
a system of harmonized inspection procedures designed to target sub-standard vessels with the 
main objective being their eventual elimination. 
 
1.1.1 Port state control 
Specifically, PSC is an internationally agreed regime for the inspection of foreign vessels in 
other national ports to verify that the condition of a vessel and its equipment complies with the 
requirements of international regulations. The relevant regulations include International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), International Convention for the Prevention 
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of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers (STCW), and Maritime Labour Convention 
(MLC). PSC renders port authorities the ability to inspect the vessels in their own ports to avoid 
illegal actions of ship owners and maritime accidents. The inspections involve checking 
whether the vessel is manned and operated in compliance with applicable international laws 
and regulations, and verifying the competency of the ship's master and officers (IMO). It is 
noteworthy that PSC inspections are restricted to merchant vessels and do not include fishing 
vessels and military craft. Meanwhile, every nation has the right to enact its own laws to impose 
requirements on foreign vessels trading in its waters based on its national conditions. 
In order to provide a better environment for PSC inspection, the European Union (EU) has 
put in place specific maritime legislation: the port state control Directive 2009/16/EC as 
amended and its three implementing regulations (Commission Regulation No 428/2010, 
Commission Regulation No 801/2010 and Commission Regulation No 802/2010). This 
legislation aims at ensuring that there is effective control of compliance with international 
standards by vessels in EU ports and, thereby, ensuring that vessels sailing in EU waters have 
been appropriately constructed and are adequately maintained. Acting as the last safety line of 
defence against sub-standard vessels, PSC effectively restricts the appearance of the vessels 
not fully following the relevant safety regulations with the help of this legislation.  
 
1.1.2 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on PSC 
MoU on PSC is the administrative agreement between maritime authorities, which aims at 
increasing maritime safety, protecting the marine environment, and improving living and 
working conditions on board ships. It formulates the rules and regulations to ensure the 
effectiveness of PSC.  
Back to 1978, an agreement called the 'Hague Memorandum’ signed by a number of 
maritime authorities in Western Europe was developed. It dealt mainly with enforcement of 
shipboard living and working conditions as required by International Labour Organization 
(ILO) Convention No. 147. However, when the memorandum was about to come into effect in 
March 1978, a massive oil spill occurred off the coast of Brittany (France) because of the 
grounding of the VLCC ‘Amoco Cadiz’. This maritime disaster caused a strong political and 
public outcry in Europe for more stringent regulations with regard to the safety of marine 
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shipping. The pressure from public opinion resulted in a more comprehensive memorandum 
that covered: 
1) Safety of life at sea 
2) Prevention of pollution by ships 
3) Living and working conditions on board ships 
Subsequently a new ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in Implementing 
Agreements on Maritime Safety and Protection of the marine Environment’ (MoU 1982) was 
approved in January on 1982 by fourteen European countries at a Ministerial Conference held 
in Paris. It then entered into operation on July 1st, 1982. The introduction of MoU 1982 marked 
the implementation of PSC.  
Since that date, the Memorandum has been amended several times to accommodate new 
safety and marine environment requirements stemming from the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) and requirements related to working and living conditions of seafarers. 
Several regional PSC organisations have been established over the decades, containing various 
regions including Europe and the north Atlantic (Paris MoU), Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo 
MoU), Latin America (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar), Caribbean (Caribbean MoU), West and 
Central Africa (Abuja MoU), the Black Sea region (Black Sea MoU), the Mediterranean 
(Mediterranean MoU), the Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU) and the Riyadh MoU. The 
United States Coast Guard maintain the tenth PSC regime. 
Among these regional organisations, the Paris MoU is the oldest and has the widest range 
of jurisdiction. It is set in order to eliminate the operation of sub-standard vessels through a 
harmonized system of PSC covering the waters of the European coastal States and the North 
Atlantic basin from North America to Europe. The current member states of the Paris MoU 
includes Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. 
Annually more than 18,000 inspections take place on board foreign vessels in the Paris MoU 
ports, ensuring that these vessels meet international safety, security and environmental 
standards, and that crewmembers have adequate living and working conditions. There is no 
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doubt that the number of inspections executed within the Paris MoU region is the highest of 
any region.  
In this study, the inspection records used for analysis are derived from the Paris MoU online 
inspection database (https://www.parismou.org/inspection-search). 
 
1.1.3 New Inspection Regime (NIR) 
The New Inspection Regime (NIR) was developed by a task force led by the EC and adopted 
by the Paris MoU at its committee meeting held in Reykjavik, Iceland (May 2009). It was also 
the core content of the Port State Control Directive 2009/16/EC, which had been published in 
the Official Journal on 28/05/2009. 
With the introduction of the NIR, the 25% quota for inspections to be performed by each 
individual member state is abandoned. As an alternative, a 'fair share' scheme is developed. 
The fair share scheme takes account of individual ship calls in a member state versus the 
individual ship calls of all member states. The port call information must be provided by the 
member states through SafeSeaNet, and will then be transferred to the information system of 
PSC. 
The targeting of vessels is based on a ‘Ship Risk Profile’ (SRP). The SRP Calculator can be 
used to evaluate if a ship is viewed as High Risk Ship (HRS), Standard Risk Ship (SRS) or 
Low Risk Ship (LRS). The company performance criteria for the calculation of the Ship Risk 
Profile is a new parameter in the Paris MoU. The Paris MoU has established a formula called 
‘Company Performance’ that takes into account the historical events such as deficiencies, 
detentions and good inspections in the last 36 months of the International Shipping 
Management (ISM) Company’s fleet, and compares it to the average level of all vessels 
inspected within the Pars MoU regions to determine the performance level of this ISM 
company.  ISM Companies are ranked as having a very low, low, medium or high performance. 
The new database for PSC, named THETIS, replaces the former system ‘SIReNaC’ and is 
managed, hosted and operated by European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). The THETIS 
serves as a platform to guide the inspectors based on the complicated targeting procedures, and 
as a central archive for storing inspection results and presenting a comprehensive overview of 
all inspected vessels. Considering the latest inspection information, it automatically 
recalculates the SRP on a daily basis.  
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In general, the introduction of NIR improved the PSC system from the following aspects:  
1) Risk-based targeting 
2) Less flexibility for port authority in selecting vessels for inspection 
3) Adjust national commitment to regional commitment 
4) Further refusal of access provisions 
5) Benchmarking of vessel flag, recognized organization (RO) and International shipping 
management (ISM) company 
6) Widened scope from ports to ports and anchorages 
7) The introduction of ‘Company Performance’ index  
Since being implemented in 2011, NIR has transformed and modernized the PSC inspection 
system in the Paris MoU region. The main objective during the development of NIR has been 
to reward quality shipping and to intensify control and sanctions on vessels with poor 
performance. It introduces several radical changes compared with the old system, which was 
based on the agreement 30 years ago. These changes are necessary to bring the Paris MoU in 
line again with the global maritime developments, the introduction of new IMO instruments 
and a better-balanced method of targeting and inspection of vessels.  
 
1.1.4 Summary 
In the past decades, PSC, the last safety line of defence against sub-standard vessels, has 
contributed a lot in preventing the illegal actions of ship owners and ensuring maritime safety. 
It is however well noted that although risk analysis approaches, qualitative or quantitative, have 
been widely used to enhance maritime safety in recent years, they have been insufficiently 
utilized in the PSC inspection area in the literature. 
Meanwhile, the PSC system has experienced several changes in ways both large and small 
since it came into effect. However, none of them equalled the one in 2011. The change of 
inspection regime delivered a message to the world that sub-standard vessels are no longer 
tolerable in the regions and with the new refusal of access measures in place, repeated offenders 
will be banned from the ports. Hence, it is necessary for us to analyse whether the introduction 
of NIR has had such a remarkable influence on PSC inspections as expected.  
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In this thesis, a comprehensive analysis on PSC inspection is conducted. First, based on the 
Paris MoU inspection records, the factors influencing the inspection results and the regulations 
of port authorities are identified. Second, several approaches are applied to accomplish our 
work, including Bayesian Network, TAN learning, gradient descent, game theory and mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium solution. Third, the influence brought by NIR on PSC inspection 
system is clarified through a comparative analysis in this project. Fourth, the framework of this 
research aims at developing a real-time risk prediction tool and a decision-making tool for port 
authorities under dynamic situations. Finally, the proposed models are validated by an 
empirical study to demonstrate their practical significance  
 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this research project is to develop a novel methodology incorporating BN and 
game theory to propose a dynamic prediction tool to determine the detention rate for port 
authorities and ship owners, analyse the impact of the implementation of NIR on PSC 
inspection, as well as help port authorities in decision-making when regulating the inspection 
policy. The results of the research will provide important insights for port authorities to ensure 
that optimal inspection actions are taken to improve safety at sea in a cost effective manner. 
To achieve the aim, the integrated objectives are defined as follows: 
1) Review the risk assessment and decision-making techniques that have been widely 
applied in maritime safety and PSC inspection, particularly those capable of dealing with 
unavailability and incompleteness of risk data.  
2) Distinguish the different data-driven approaches to construct BN structure. 
3) Develop a risk assessment model using BNs to reveal the degree of importance of 
different risk factors influencing PSC inspection results in different periods, as well as predict 
the detention rate of individual vessels under dynamic situations.  
 4) Clarify the influence of the implementation of NIR on PSC inspection results through a 
two-part comparative analysis. One is the macro-level analysis based on the historical 
inspection records obtained from the Paris MoU, the other is the micro-level analysis between 
‘Pre-NIR’ BN model and ‘Post-NIR’ BN model proposed in this research.  
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5) Develop a risk-based game model based on the outcomes from BN models to determine 
the optimal inspection strategy of port authorities under different circumstances after the 
implementation of NIR.  
6) Propose a decision-making framework for port authorities to help them make optimal and 
rational inspection decisions based on the dynamic prediction tool from BNs and the optimal 
Nash solutions from the game model.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The designed analytical logic follows the related questions of ‘what to model’, ‘how to 
model’ and ‘how to analyse and improve’ PSC inspections. In this regard, the research 
questions are showed as follows: 
 Q1.What are the factors influencing the result of a PSC inspection? 
 Q2.How to quantify the relationships between different risk factors and the inspection 
results, as well as the influencing degree of these risk factors before and after NIR? 
 Q3.How to evaluate the influence of the implementation of NIR on PSC inspection 
system? 
 Q4.How to model the inherent relationships between port authorities and ship owners 
when executing a PSC inspection efficiently and accurately? 
 Q5.How can the risks and uncertainties hidden behind the relationships between port 
authorities and ship owners in a PSC inspection be quantified? 
 Q6.What are the suggestions and strategies provided to help port authorities when 
making decisions during a PSC inspection? 
 
1.4 RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
Chapter 1 introduces the basic information of the research, including the background, 
objective, framework, novelty and contribution. This brief introduction outlines the whole 
research project, and demonstrates the necessity of conducting this research.   
10 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the related works in this field. Among the risk assessment approaches 
that have been applied in maritime safety, BN shows its superiority over other approaches from 
literature and is thus selected as the method to analyse the risks in PSC inspection. In order to 
construct the BN objectively, different data-driven network construction approaches are 
summarized from the past studies. Additionally, the application of game theory in 
transportation is also revealed.  
Chapter 3 develops two data-driven BN models of PSC inspection system based on the Paris 
MoU online inspection database, one is ‘Pre-NIR’ BN from 2005 to 2008, the other is ‘Post-
NIR’ BN from 2015-2017. The sensitivity analysis of the models reveals the degree of 
importance of different risk factors influencing PSC inspection results in different times. 
Further, it is applicable that the BNs can serve as the risk prediction tools for port authorities 
to make decisions in a cost effective manner under dynamic situations.  
Chapter 4 clarifies the influence of NIR on PSC inspection results. Through the comparative 
analysis on two BN models and the statistics derived from the Paris MoU annual reports, the 
influence of NIR is proved significant and positive. The changes brought by NIR has 
transformed the PSC inspection system a lot, making NIR act as a big step in the Paris MoU 
history. 
Chapter 5 develops a risk-based model to determine the optimal inspection strategy of port 
authorities after the implementation of NIR. The components and parameters required to build 
the game model are identified from previous related works and the ‘Post-NIR’ BN model. The 
Nash solution of the game model eventually reveals the theoretical optimal inspection policy 
for port authorities under different circumstances. 
Chapter 6 illustrates the optimal inspection policy of port authorities by an empirical study. 
Through analysing the optimal inspection rates of bulk carriers under different situations, 
several research implications are derived. In addition, it comes up with some suggestions for 
port authorities to help them make optimal decisions during PSC inspections, as well as a 
decision-making framework to help port authorities make rational and optimal decisions under 
NIR.  
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Figure 1.4 Research Structure 
(Source: Author) 
 
1.5 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
This research provides important insights and contributions for port authorities and ship 
owners, both academic and industrial.  
Academic contributions 
1) In this research project, the risk assessment model of PSC inspections is constructed 
completely from objective data, which is different from former risk assessment research in this 
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objective data. The application of objective data-driven network construction approach 
provides a new way to build risk assessment model for researchers in PSC inspection area.  
2) The incorporation of BN and game theory exploits a rational and novel way to quantify 
the relationship between port authorities and ship owners. Meanwhile, the application of BN 
to represent the uncertainties and risks existing in the game model highlights another 
contribution to the academic field.  
3) To the authors’ best knowledge, since NIR went into effect in 2011, company 
performance is, for the first time, viewed as an important factor influencing the decisions of 
port authorities in PSC inspection practice and scientific research. 
4) Unlike the risk assessment research on PSC inspections before, the methodology applied 
in this research project is advanced and comprehensive. Compared to the most used methods 
in this area, i.e. risk matrix, the risk-based game model method can explore and analyse the 
PSC inspections more thoroughly, developing a new idea to conduct research on PSC 
inspections. 
Industrial contributions 
1) The proposed BN model can served as a dynamic risk analysis and prediction tool in PSC 
inspection. For port authorities it is used to ensure that optimal inspection actions are taken to 
improve safety at sea in a cost effective manner; and for ship owners it works as an early-
warning system to identify and address the potential deficiencies of the vessel in advance. 
2) The proposed optimal inspection policy from the game model is able to provide real-time 
PSC decisions for port authorities in dynamic situations accordingly, where the risks constantly 
change. 
3)  The influence brought by NIR is clarified through a comparative analysis between ‘Pre-
NIR’ period and ‘Post-NIR’ period from two different perspectives. The results indicate the 
introduction and implementation of NIR is proved reasonable and significant to PSC inspection 
system. This positive revolution has transformed the whole system a lot. 
4) Suggestions are proposed to help port authorities of different economic constrains to 
make rational decisions. For instance, when a port authority has limited economic constrains, 
it should choose the optimal inspection rate as suggested by the game model; otherwise it can 
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increase the punishment to an appropriate level as suggested by the model, to tackle the sub-
standard effort and illegal actions of ship owners.  
Further, the decision-making framework could play an important role in helping port 
authorities to make rational decisions under different environments and constraints. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews corresponding works related to the research topics. Among the risk 
assessment approaches that have been widely applied in maritime safety, Bayesian network 
has proved the most appropriate one for PSC inspection research from literature. Additionally, 
the existing data-driven approaches for BN construction are summarized and described as well. 
Another major methodology applied in this project, game theory, also shows its diversity and 
significance when applied in the transportation field.  
 
2.1 RISK STUDIES ON MARITIME SAFETY 
Maritime safety analysis is essentially a process of utilizing formalized approaches for the 
quantification of risks in probabilistic terms. Actually, in the past decades, the way of 
quantifying risks in the maritime industry has undergone great transformation. Among the early 
work on risk assessment in maritime safety, qualitative analysis was largely used (Lee & 
Sanquist, 2000; Sii et al., 2001; Vieites et al., 2004). For instance, in a score method, the 
selected evaluation factors are scored according to subjective experience. It provides the basis 
of the target factor method employed by the Paris MOU and the Tokyo MOU. Meanwhile, 
most research in this academic field was based on the accident statistics (Fowler & Sørgård, 
2000; Soares & Teixeira, 2001), showing great influence on the maritime safety management 
and providing significant practice for the industry.  
However, over the years researchers realized that it is hard to achieve the best risk 
assessment results by qualitative or quantitative analysis separately. The former way to assess 
maritime safety was inadequate to cope with the uncertainty in data, resulting in partial and 
impractical consequences. Fuzzy comprehensive evaluation (Akhtar & Utne, 2014; Pillay & 
Wang, 2002), grey system theory evaluation (Deng, 1989), neutral network evaluation (Li, et 
al., 2000), evidential reasoning (Liu, et al., 2004; Wang, et al., 2006), data environment analysis 
model (Wu, et al., 2015), Monte Carlo simulation (Goerlandt, et al., 2012; Montewka, et al., 
2010), Markov chains (Kolowrocki & Soszynska, 2011), genetic algorithm (Montewka, et al., 
2010; Nwaoha, et al., 2011; Nwaoha, et al., 2013)  and some other risk assessment approaches 
are gradually used to complement qualitative analysis in maritime safety studies. Meanwhile, 
risk analysis is moving away from accident investigation to the analysis of risk factors, 
resulting in the creation of advanced methods on risk diagnosis and prediction, such as BN 
(Eleye-Datubo, et al., 2006; Eleye-Datubo, et al., 2008; Ren, et al., 2009). 
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It is noteworthy that the fast development of maritime safety analysis since the 1990s is 
attributed, at least in part, to the adoption and approval of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) by 
the IMO. FSA can be described as a systematic method of enhancing maritime safety that is 
done through a careful process of risk assessment and evaluation. The IMO defines FSA as a 
‘rational and systematic process for assessing the risks associated with shipping activity and 
for evaluating the costs and benefits of reducing the risks’. It is of great importance to the 
marine industry because 1) It helps make a transparent decision-making process; 2) It helps 
justify the candidate measures selected through this process 3) It ensures the decision is the 
best choice under a particular situation after a thorough understanding and comparison of all 
other available options. Given this, a large number of publications and  a large amount of 
literature relating to FSA application on maritime safety have been published in recent years, 
including risk estimation of maritime transportation (Yang, et al., 2008), decision-making of 
maritime administration (Yang, et al., 2009), maritime security (Yang, et al., 2012; Yeo, et al., 
2013),  and the threat of terrorism and piracy (Pristrom, et al., 2013).   
Besides the risk assessment approaches applied in maritime safety, the topics in maritime 
safety also changed greatly. In the 1990s, the research orientation focused on the safety of 
individual vessels (Stiehl, 1977), and their structure and designs (Guedes Soares, 1997; Guedes 
Soares, 1998). Pate-Cornell (1990) conducted a probabilistic risk analysis research considering 
organisation aspects to describe the relationship between the component failures and the 
offshore system safety.  However, after entering the 21st century, the topics in maritime safety 
area have presented its diversification.  
Ship navigation safety showed an upward trend among these topics (Chen & Fang, 2005; 
Fang & Hu, 2006; Chen & Fang, 2009). Through the model based on the relative risk 
assessment (MRRA) approach, Hu et al. (2007) put forward a novel model considering the 
detailed information about accident characteristics to assess the pilotage safety in Shanghai, 
China. Consequently, it was proved that the model is useful to solve the problems in the risk 
assessment of ship navigation safety in practice.  
Being supported by a large number of different risk assessment approaches, vessel collision 
is another hot topic in this field. In order to acquire a thorough description of the influences on 
collision causation probability of different risk factors, Hanninen & Kujala (2012) proposed a 
Bayesian belief network (BBN) model on the Gulf of Finland. The results indicated that 
changing course played the dominating role in a vessel encounter situation. Similarly, Merrick 
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& van Dorp (2006), Hu et al. (2008) also applied BNs to analyse the influence of safety 
variables on vessel collision probabilities in San Francisco Bay and Shanghai Harbour, 
respectively. In 2012, Montewka et al. (2012) defined a new, proactive BBN model for 
estimating the consequences of vessel collisions. Additionally, Monte Carlo Simulation 
(Montewka, et al., 2010; Goerlandt, et al., 2012), Fuzzy method (Celik & Akyuz, 2018) and 
FSA (Endrina, et al., 2018) showed their ability when analysing the vessel collisions.   
Evidence showed that 80–85% of the recorded maritime accidents are directly caused by 
human error or attributed to a degree to human error (Harati-Mokhari, et al., 2007), indicating 
most risks and hazards in maritime transportation are closely related to human and 
organisational factors, i.e. misjudgement of pilot, lack of communication and inattention of 
pilot. It is widely recognised that human elements play the major role in most accidents 
involving modern ships, for example, oil tanker grounding (Ung, 2018), maritime grounding 
(Akhtar & Utne, 2014), maritime environmental pollution (Celik & Akyuz, 2018) and maritime 
operation problem (Lin & Tsai, 2014). Despite this fact, studies on human factors started 
relatively late and remained at a level of qualitative analysis with much focus on the training 
of seafarers and enforcement of the associated regulations of a prescriptive nature. Efforts in 
the pioneering work in this field started in 2008. Trucco et al. (2008) presented an innovative 
approach combining the BBN model and fault tree analysis (FTA) to integrate human and 
organisational factors into maritime risk analysis. The approach has been applied to a case 
study in the maritime industry, and eventually utilised in many other sectors. Other works, like 
Martin & Maturana (2010), El-Ladan and Turan (2012), Chauvin et al. (2013) and Yang et al. 
(2013), were also considered significant in guiding this new research direction in the maritime 
safety field.  
It is interesting to see that a much broader range of topics have been studied in the recent 
decades, e.g. policy evaluation & recommendation, spill & pollution (Goerlandt & Montewka, 
2014), vessel structure (Montewka, et al., 2017), and safety culture, indicating that researchers 
are trying to protect maritime safety from many different perspectives.   
 
2.2 RISK STUDIES ON PSC INSPECTION 
Since PSC inspections play an increasingly important role in maritime safety, more and 
more researchers have conducted related studies from both qualitative to quantitative 
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perspectives. Various risk assessment approaches have been developed and applied in the past 
decades, demonstrating the diversity of this research field. 
Kasoulides (1993) stressed how flag state enforcement has diminished in the face of the 
proliferation of open registries and why coastal states have reacted by asserting their rights 
through the resultant regime of PSC at the regional level. Similarly, Bell (1993) did a study 
analysing the nature of flag and port state control in the UK, a comparison between two 
inspection forms indicated that the effectiveness of PSC required to be improved not only in 
the UK, but also in Europe, and even throughout the world. Based on the view from practice, 
Kiehne (1996) focused on the sanctions available to PSC authorities in respect of the foreign 
ships being inspected, ranging from instructions to rectify deficiencies (i.e., with immediate 
effect before departure, within two weeks, or at the next port of call) to outright detention. The 
sanctions that port authorities have should help them eliminate the operation of substandard 
vessels in the ports of Europe. In 2001, Özçayır (2001) reviewed the practice of PSC in different 
jurisdictions and pointed out the issues existing in the practice of European PSC, such as the 
pivotal role of the ISM Code and the function of classification societies. Chiu et al. (2008) 
investigated the implementation of the PSC system in Taiwan and further discussed some in-
depth issues about the system including the difficulties of the implementation and the 
inadequacies of the system. Chang (2001), Chiu & Chiou (2005), Chiou (2006) did similar 
research. 
Payoyo (1994) assessed the PSC regime by analysing inspection statistics generated by the 
Paris MoU from 1982 to 1992. Although substandard vessels still posed a threat to maritime 
safety, the inspection regime achieved several significant accomplishments such as the 
collection of baseline data on substandard ships in the region, increased effectiveness in the 
enforcement of international standards, and closer regional cooperation resulting in the more 
efficient employment of maritime safety enforcement resources. This conclusion was sound in 
line with the work conducted by Mejia (2005). As one of the first contributions on the 
effectiveness of PSC, Owen (1996) described the practice of PSC in the Paris MoU in detail 
and discussed the limitations inherent in the PSC regime connected with the fact that the port 
state has no direct influence over the design and construction of vessels that are being inspected. 
One year later, Hare (1997) showed how the proliferation of regional MoUs has significantly 
diminished the potential for substandard ships to participate in international commerce. In 2000, 
McDorman (2000) examined the contribution of regional PSC agreements and harmonized 
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inspection procedures, and then pointed out that the playing field among different ports has 
been improved.   
When entering the 21st century, the studies related to PSC were restricted to not only 
qualitative analysis, but also quantitative analysis. However, use of quantitative risk 
approaches in PSC was limited to risk diagnosis, waiting for new solutions on real time risk 
prediction to be explored.   
Shen & Chen (2003) and Yang (2004) both proposed risk assessment PSC systems, which 
had been proved to have better performance than traditional PSC inspection mechanisms. 
Knowing that intense maritime traffic may cause significant navigational challenges in the 
Istanbul Strait, Kara (2016) applied a weighted point method to assess the risk level of each 
vessel experiencing the PSC inspection under Black Sea MoU. However, the weighting and 
scoring methods adopted in these studies are in large part based on subjective expert 
judgements, which may cause arguments on the results.  
Avoiding subjectivity in weighting has been extensively studied. Xu et al. (2007) presented 
a risk assessment system based on support vector machine to estimate the risk of candidate 
vessels according to historical data before conducting on-board inspections. Evaluations 
showed that the proposed system could improve the accuracy of risk assessment. Furthermore, 
Gao et al. (2008) combined support vector machine and K-nearest neighbour approaches to 
develop a new risk assessment model capable of coping with noisy data. Consequently, this 
method significantly improved the accuracy of the results. Although showing attractiveness, 
such methods still reveal problems in their practical applications in tackling dynamic risk 
prediction (e.g. ship detention probability) in different environments. This problem hinders the 
practical contribution of risk assessment approaches in PSC inspections. To solve this issue, 
Yang et al. (2018) utilized the BN to develop a detention rate prediction tool for port authorities. 
The advantages of BN over other risk assessment approaches in dynamic prediction provides 
important insights for us to seek the optimal inspection policies under different environments 
in NIR. However, Yang et al. (2018) only addressed risk analysis and did not conduct further 
studies on how the dynamic risk results can realise the optimization of inspection policy 
making of port authorities in PSC.  
Collected from the Swedish maritime administration database, Cariou et al (2008) used 
4,080 observations in 1996 – 2001 to build Poisson models to test the effectiveness of PSC. 
The estimation showed that some vessels’ characteristics (e.g. vessel age, vessel type, vessel 
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flag) have significant influence on the number of deficiencies detected during PSC and length 
of time between two successive PSC inspections. Subsequently, the analysis also pointed out 
that following a PSC inspection, the reported deficiencies during the next inspection are 
reduced by 63%, demonstrating the effectiveness of PSC in controlling vessel safety.  
Based on 183,819 PSC inspection records, Knapp & Franses (2007) applied binary logistic 
regression to measure the effect of inspections on the probability of casualties, especially for 
the very serious cases. Meanwhile, the model determined the magnitude of improvable areas 
for substandard vessels. Later in the same year, they did a further econometric analysis about 
the influence on the detention probability of different risk factors, and the results indicated only 
vessel types and PSC regimes were influential elements. Knapp & Franses (2007) incorporated 
quantitative risk analysis to ship inspection to improve its effectiveness. The studies revealed 
that the age of the vessel, ship type, and flag of registry appear to be significant predictors. 
In 2014, Li et al. (2014) built a bi-matrix game between the port authorities and ship 
operators in PSC inspection to decide on the optimal inspection policy with an aim to save 
costs on inspection whilst keeping deterrence pressure on potential wrongdoers. Through a 
numerical case study, it is shown that the optimal inspection rate obtained from the model can 
yield a significant saving, as well as prevent potential violations by ship operators.  
In general, the research on PSC inspections has developed towards a diverse and popular 
academic research field. More approaches, whether qualitative or quantitative, have been 
applied to a broader range of topics, showing that PSC inspection is attracting more and more 
attention. 
 
2.3 BN IN MARITIME SAFETY AND PSC INSPECTION 
Taking advance of causal inference, BN can be used to analyse the degree of importance of 
risk factors and the relationships between them. Compared to pure Bayesian theory, BN is more 
visualized; while compared to other graphic models, it has a foundation of mathematical 
knowledge. Because of its advantages, BN has been increasingly applied in maritime safety in 
the past decade. When summarizing the topics of the publications in this area, it is not 
surprising to find various aspects are covered.  
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2.3.1 The occurrence of ship-ship collisions 
As mentioned above, collision is one of the major types of maritime accidents around the 
world. It has two forms: one is the collision between one vessel and a floating or still object 
such as an iceberg, the other is the collision between two or more vessels. In local sea areas 
with high traffic intensities, such as the Gulf of Finland and the Singapore Strait, ship–ship 
collision is one of the most frequently occurring accident types (Kujala, et al., 2009; Weng, et 
al., 2012; Klanac, et al., 2010).  
Goerlandt & Montewka (2015) proposed a framework for risk analysis of maritime 
transportation systems. In order to quantify the probabilistic risk, BN was used to form the 
model serving as an evidence assessment tool. Through applying to a case study of an oil tanker 
ship-ship collision in the Gulf of Finland, the model was proved plausible. From a different 
angle, Hänninen & Kujala (2012) utilized BN to estimate the role of human factors on ship 
collision probability in the Gulf of Finland for discovering the variables with the largest 
influences and for examining the validity of the network. Changing course in an encounter 
situation is the most influential variable in the model, followed by variables such as the 
situation assessment, danger detection, personal condition, maintenance routines and the 
officer's fatigue. Later in 2014, they further presented an expert knowledge-based preliminary 
assessment of how the deployment of Enhanced Navigation Support Information navigation 
service would affect the ship collisions and groundings in the Gulf of Finland. The result was 
positive, as the implementation of the system effectively decreased the number of accidents. 
The proposed model can be updated and improved when more evidence is available and the 
service is widely used (Hänninen, et al., 2014). 
 
2.3.2 Navigational risk analysis 
With increased vessel traffic, it is imperative that any potential obstacles to navigation 
should be assessed in advance. Hazards to the crew, the environment and social assets should 
be avoided at all times. 
In order to improve the navigational safety in the Yangtze River, Zhang et al. (2013) used 
the FSA concept and a BN technique to estimate the navigational risk of the Yangtze River. A 
scenario analysis was conducted to demonstrate the application of the model and the way it can 
improve the navigational safety in the Yangtze River. Similarly, Banda et al. (2016) adapted 
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the FSA into a BN model to manage the risk of winter navigation in the Gulf of Finland. The 
results indicated that ship independent navigation and convoys are the operations with higher 
probability of oil spills.  
 
2.3.3 Maritime accidents analysis and prevention 
As a quantitative modelling tool, one of the advantages of BN is its function to predict and 
prevent the maritime accidents. Sometimes this function can even be utilised to help users make 
decisions under different conditions.  
Based on the maritime accident database of the Portuguese Maritime Authority, Antao et al. 
(2009) selected 857 validated accidents to develop a BBN for maritime accident analysis. The 
results showed that it is possible to develop a model derived from real data to analyse the 
influence of major risk factors on maritime accidents, even to support decision-making for 
maritime authorities.  
Hanninen (2014) discussed the contribution of BN to maritime accident prevention and 
safety modelling, as well as some challenges in real practice. Compared to other dynamic 
modelling tools, BN is a rather well suited tool for maritime safety management and decision-
making. Li et al. (2014) also worked on this topic and reached similar conclusions.  
 
2.3.4 Offshore safety management  
The operation of an offshore installation is associated with a high level of uncertainty 
because it usually operates in a dynamic environment in which technical and human and 
organizational malfunctions may cause possible accidents. New regulations, such as the EU 
directive, mirror society’s zero tolerance for offshore accidents. The offshore oil and gas 
industry has achieved an outstanding improvement in occupational safety over the past three 
decades. Although it has learned much from major accidents in the past, such accidents are still 
occurring.  
Associated with a high level of uncertainty, offshore safety is another concern that can be 
solved by BN. Eleye-Datubo et al. (2008) proposed a framework based on fuzzy BN (FBN) to 
analyse maritime and offshore safety. It acted as a bridge in the probabilistic setting of the 
domain. Its implementation has been demonstrated in a maritime human performance case 
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study that utilizes performance-shaping factors as the input variables of this groundbreaking 
FBN risk model. Further, Ren et al. (2009) employed the FBN approach to model causal 
relationships among risk factors that may lead to possible accidents in offshore operations. The 
FBN model explicitly represented cause-and-effect assumptions between offshore engineering 
system variables and made the risk and safety analysis of offshore engineering systems more 
functional and easier in many assessment contexts. A case study of the collision risk between 
a floating production, storage and offloading unit and the authorized vessels due to human 
errors during operation was used to illustrate the application of the proposed model. 
 
2.3.5 Risk based vessel design 
Considering the drainage and leakage of fluids during the process of vessel design, Lee & 
Somemerfeld (1994) developed some equations related to the drainage times for a variety of 
geometrical vessel shapes, which can be used as the guidelines for shipyards in the design of 
vessels to reduce the risks and hazards when sailing on the sea. 
Yuan & Wang (2010) applied both the Monte-Carlo method and the stochastic method to 
study the structural reliability of the pressure vessels. The combination of two methods was 
efficient and practical, leading to an accurate numerical simulation that can help make the 
vessel design more reasonable. 
In order to analyse the effect of global design factors (e.g. ship motion, body vibration) on 
the human performance, Montewka et al. (2017) introduced a BBN to link the effect of these 
factors with the human performance suitable for the process of vessel design. Validated by the 
promising results, the model was useful for facilitating risk-based ship design for naval 
architects and vessel designers.  
 
2.3.6 Oil spill in maritime accidents & oil spill recovery 
Oil spill accidents have been one of the major concerns of maritime industry for a long time. 
They are commercial and environmental catastrophes that may cause huge losses to the society, 
e.g. the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Because the accidents involve vessels or oilrigs, the ocean 
water becomes contaminated by liquid petroleum hydrocarbon, causing damages to the 
environment taking decades to recover. In addition to killing fish, marine mammals and birds, 
oil spill accidents will destroy beaches and wildlife habitats as well. When an oil slick reaches 
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the beach, it also affects human settlement on the beaches and mangrove forests. Moreover, it 
takes months-long oil cleaning operations to bring back the areas around the accident back to 
normality.  
Due to limited data, Goerlandt & Montewka (2014) proposed a BN model for reasoning 
under uncertainty for the assessment of accidental cargo oil spill in ship-ship collisions from 
product tankers. It provided a platform to assess the uncertainty about the possible oil outflows 
in maritime traffic scenarios, as well as enabling an insight into the probabilistic nature of 
possible oil outflows conditional on the impact conditions.  
From another perspective, Lehikoinen et al. (2013) developed a BN to examine the recovery 
efficiency and optimal disposition of the oil spill accidents in the Gulf of Finland, and the 
process seemed to be strongly controlled by certain random factors independent of human 
actions, e.g. wave height.  
Besides the above-mentioned topics, there are still other research orientations that should 
be paid more attention. For example, the wastewater treatment (Bagley David & Sahely Brian, 
2001), sea wave overtopping issue (Tolo, et al., 2015), etc. The variety of topics indicates the 
popularity of BN in the maritime safety area and the expansion of the range of topics will 
continue.  
However, few researchers investigated its effectiveness and potential in analysing the risks 
relating to PSC inspections. Hänninen & Kujala (2014) explored the dependencies of PSC 
inspection findings and vessels’ involvement in accidents and incidents by using two learning 
algorithms to train BNs based on inspection, accident and incident data. The results showed 
that vessel type, inspection type and the number of structural conditions related deficiencies 
are among the most important factors influencing accident involvement. Later in the same year, 
Hanninen et al. (2014) presented another BN model to analyse the maritime safety management. 
According to the model, some sub-areas of maritime safety management, for example, the Port 
state control, still have room for improvement. Further, a good IT system would be beneficial 
for PSC inspection. 
Focusing on the increasing threats from smuggling by sea, Wen et al. (2016) applied 
classification trees and Bayes algorithms to improve the recognition rate of smuggling vessels. 
The paper presented a selection method for vessels that could not only be applicable in 
smuggling activity, but also in other maritime instances, for example, PSC inspection.  
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In addition, Yang et al. (2018) proposed a data-driven BN model involving multiple risk 
factors, to analyse their individual and combined effect on PSC inspections, and to develop a 
real-time prediction tool for port authorities to rationalize their inspections under dynamic 
situations. The results of the study provide important insights for both stakeholders to ensure 
that optimal inspection actions are taken to improve safety at sea in a cost effective manner and 
check whether their actions are beneficial.  
However, such studies focused on the PSC inspection system before the implementation of 
NIR, meaning the influence of company performance on inspection results is overlooked. As 
an important factor in new PSC inspection system, company performance is introduced when 
building BN for PSC inspections in this study. Furthermore, none of them had ever undertaken 
further studies to look at how the dynamic risk analysis result can assist port authorities in the 
development of rational inspection policies in their PSC practice. 
 
2.4 CPT CALCULATION APPROACHES IN BN  
Despite such applications, a common criticism of BN is that it requires too much data in the 
form of prior probabilities, and such data is hard to collect, even inaccessible sometimes (Yang, 
et al., 2008). Meanwhile, the size of the conditional probability table (CPT) grows quickly in 
size as more parent nodes are added, leading to complexity and difficulty in computation. 
Normally the traditional way to obtain the CPT is to calculate the frequency directly from the 
data. Nevertheless, the scarcity of empirical data makes the work impossible to achieve 
sometimes. In addition, Gaarder et al. (1997) pointed out that statistics describe only the past, 
which may not be of much use in predicting the occurrence probability of an event happening 
in the future. Due to these reasons, CPTs are often generated based on experts’ judgements in 
many publications. Mkrtchyan et al. (2015) analysed the BBN uses for human reliability 
analysis applications. During the process for building the model, expert judgment is utilized in 
the assessment of the CPTs of the model. 
However, there also exist some problems in terms of using the subjective probability 
provided by experts. Experts may fail to take into consideration every condition with respect 
to human errors (Slovic, et al., 1979), as well as being restricted by their professional mode of 
thinking and corresponding experience (Skjong & Wentworth, 2001). Meanwhile, for large-
scale BN models, the use of expert judgment is time-consuming, impractical and inconsistent 
(Mkrtchyan, et al., 2015).   
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To address such concerns, Wettig et al. (2005) and Rijmen (2008) both introduced the 
logistic regression techniques to calculate the conditional probabilities of BN for discrete 
variables. Li et al. (2014) further improved the approach through combining the logit model 
and binary logistic regression to generate a relative risk score covering most of the world 
vessels. This safety index was provided as an important input for constructing a BN model for 
maritime risk analysis (Li, et al., 2014). However, it is available only when a large dataset is 
obtained.  
Another approach is called Noisy-OR. Through the Noisy-OR approach, the elicitation of 
full CPTs is simplified to the assessment of individual parent-child Conditional Probability 
Distributions (CPD) while the missing relationships are derived by combining the estimated 
CPDs disjunctively (Pearl, 1988). It was originally proposed by Pearl in 1988 and experienced 
several extensions (Diez, 1993; Onisko, et al., 2001). Yang & Ning (2007) proposed non-
impeding noisy-AND tree and improved it later in 2012, which enhanced BN’s capability of 
dealing with multi-state and dependent nodes. Yet, its limitations on how to derive the tree 
topology and the fact that not all causal interactions can be expressed by the method affects its 
popularity (Xiang, 2012; Xiang, et al., 2011; Xiang, et al., 2009). 
Through applying ranked nodes to BNs, Norman et al. (2007) presented a novel but effective 
approach. The approach is based on the doubly truncated Normal distribution with a central 
tendency that is invariably a weighted function of parent nodes. The results of case studies 
proved that the elicitation burden is much reduced by using ranked nodes. It is naturally an 
evolutionary approach of expert judgments.  
By incorporating Monte Carlo simulation with expert judgment, a novel way to learn BN 
has been proposed in recent years to avoid the elicitation of prior distributions. Involving 
Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation, Tebaldi & West (1998) applied the method when 
analysing the network traffic flow. The explored model was able to cope with the uncertainty 
in route selection and provide specified route choice probabilities. Cano et al. (2011) explained 
this method in detail and validated the model through alarm networks. Gui et al. (2011) applied 
this method to investigate the impacts of time and weather on animal-related outages in 
overhead distribution systems. From the literature, it is not surprising to find the application of 
Monte Carlo simulation in learning BN is widely applied in many disciplines, e.g. electrical 
industry (Torres & Santos, 2006). 
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Other approaches, like interpolation of anchor inputs (Cain, et al., 1999; Wisse, et al., 2008), 
function based methods (Vinnem, et al., 2012), and expectation maximization (EM) (Attias, 
2000; Sun, et al., 2006; Nessler, et al., 2013) also provide different ways to cope with the 
drawbacks of BN in terms of high demand on prior probabilities.  
 
2.5 DATA-DRIVEN APPRAOCHES TO CONSTRUCT BN  
Normally, the structure of a BN is constructed using human expert knowledge or common 
sense. However, this type of approach is time consuming, and heavy emphasis is placed on 
experts to provide both the local probability parameters and dependency among the parameters. 
An alternative approach for BN construction is to induce the network structure from data, 
namely the data-driven approach, which can greatly reduce the dependence on human experts 
and in some cases increase the accuracy of the model. However, the primary drawback of the 
data-driven approach is that the number of possible structures for a given problem grows super-
exponentially with the number of employed variables in the problem domain. For a problem 
consisting of n variables, Robinson (1973) calculated the complexity of the search space and 
provided a formula to compute the number of possible BN structures for various values of n. 
The table below lists the possible number of structures for each value. 
Table 2.1 The number of possible BN structures 
n Number of BN structure 
1 1.0*100 
2 3.0*100 
3 2.5*101 
4 5.4*102 
5 2.9*104 
10 4.2*1018 
20 2.3*1072 
50 7.2*10424 
100 1.1*101631 
(Source: New Directions in Graph Theory, 1973) 
To reduce such complexity, a large number of algorithms and efforts have been proposed, 
however the problem remains complex and hard (Chickering, et al., 1994). Given that the 
number of possible structures for a given problem domain grows super-exponentially, exact 
and exhaustive approaches for BN learning become unfeasible. Many algorithms can be found 
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in the literature, which can be classified into two broad categories: 1) dependency analysis 
approach and 2) search and score approach. 
Dependency analysis, which is based on performing conditional independence (CI) test on 
tuples of variables, was developed by Spirtes et al. (1991) and improved by Cheng et al. (1997; 
1997) and Thomas (2005). Through statistical tests or information theoretic measures (e.g. 
mutual information), the approach can determine whether the relationships between variables 
in the network are independent or not. Based on an iterative process, the final relationships 
between each pair of variables are confirmed, thus the optimal BN structure is generated. 
However, Singh & Valtorta (1995) reported three drawbacks of this method: 1) extensive 
testing of independence relations to derive the final network structure; 2) CI test relies on an 
enormous volume of data when condition sets are large; 3) it is unrealistic when the given 
domain grows exponentially as the number of variables grows. Although there exist several 
drawbacks, it is still recognised as a good attempt to deal with computational complexity 
problems in network construction. In order to improve the efficiency of the approach with 
sparse networks and limited data, Spirtes and Glymour (1991) developed a new CI based 
dependency analysis algorithm. 
Unlike the dependency analysis approach, the search and score approach is more popular 
and presents a better result. It seeks to explore a search space of candidate BN structures for 
the one that best represents the causality and dependency relationships. In other words, the 
approach aims to discover the probabilistic dependency network that most likely generated the 
data set (Cooper & Herskovits, 1992). It is more like an optimization problem in nature. It 
consists of three components: search engine, search space and scoring function. In contrast to 
the dependency analysis, the search and score approach employs a search heuristic to search 
the space of the candidate structure solutions for one that maximises the score by making 
perturbations to the solution. The search continues until an optimal solution is found or some 
predefined stopping criterion is met.  
Many search engines have been proposed to do the search work, and can be divided into 
two categories: sequential algorithms (those that iteratively build upon a single network 
structure) and population based algorithms (those that develop a series of possible network 
structures in parallel).  
Sequential algorithms 
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Cooper and Herskovits (1992) derived K2 scoring metric based on Bayes theorem, starting 
with an empty network and iterating through each node to get the best structure. An assumption 
for this algorithm is that it requires an order among the variables. If one node A comes before 
another node B in the ordering, then B can have A as its parent but not conversely. For each 
node, K2 search heuristic first assumes that a node has no parents, and then adds incrementally 
the parent nodes that can maximise the probability of the resulting structure. When there is no 
single parent that can increase the probability, the algorithm stops adding new parents to this 
node. By parity of reasoning, the parents of all nodes can be obtained, resulting in the final BN 
structure. The main drawback with this algorithm is the order required. Different order will 
lead to different network structure. In some cases if the domain knowledge is not sufficient, 
the quality of the network structure is hard to guarantee (Singh & Valtorta, 1995). 
In contrast to Cooper and Herskovits, Buntine’s (1991)‘B’ algorithm does not require a 
variable order. It also starts with an empty structure. A link will be added at the end of each 
iteration if it can maximize the score and does not lead to a cycle, until the score no longer 
increases or all nodes in the order have been visited. However, once local optima occurs, the 
algorithm could not give reasonable results.  
By cherry picking the best properties of the algorithm described above, Singh & Valtorta 
(1993; 1995) combined them and proposed a conditional independence and Bayesian learning 
(CB) algorithm. It executes in two phases: first, all nodes in the set are linked to form an 
undirected graph, CI test are conducted to remove the links between adjacent nodes that are 
unconditionally independent. The remaining links in the graph are oriented to form an order. 
Secondly, the order derived is fed into K2 to construct the network. The process is iterated until 
the termination criteria are met.  
Population based algorithms 
The population-based algorithms, which referred to as ‘nature inspired’ search heuristics, 
are loosely relied on systems found in nature. Given the dimensionality and complexity of the 
BN search space, these nature inspired algorithms operating on groups of candidate structures 
in parallel are helpful in BN learning. Many of these algorithms have been utilised as search 
algorithms in the BN structure learning.  
Originally developed by John Holland (1992), genetic algorithm (GA) is derived from the 
principles of Darwinian evolution, and later widely used as a common approach to tackle the 
optimization problem. From a BN perspective, the strength of GA lies in its ability to evolve 
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near optimal or optimal solutions to complex problems, as well as achieving multiple goals 
with minimal information and without searching the entire search space (Deb, 2001). However, 
as the GA is stochastic, therefore sometimes it may result in a network that consists of cycles. 
To solve this problem, Novobilski (2003) improved the genetic operators that guarantee 
acyclicity. 
Normally, when exploring the entire space of structures, the scoring function associated 
with the GA is K2 scoring metric (Larra˜naga, et al., 1996). Clearly, the combination of K2 
and GA is computationally expensive, thus not appropriate for the current research. Hence, 
instead of using the K2 algorithm to evaluate the quality of the order, Chain genetic algorithm 
is applied to making use of chain structure to reduce the computational expense. The reduction 
mainly reflects at the point that only the chain structure is evaluated rather than the whole order 
because ‘a chain order is a sufficiently good model to local node orderings from which good 
BN structures can be build’ (Kabli, et al., 2007). Kabli et al. (2007) demonstrated that this 
approach is superior and computationally more efficient to the original GA when learning the 
structure of BN. In addition, he validated this point of view through conducting several 
experiments. There are also other similar research on this approach (Larra˜naga, et al., 1996; 
Larra˜naga, et al., 1996; Larra˜naga, et al., 1997; Novibilski & Kamangar, 2003). 
In recent years, a novel application for BN construction from data, named Particle Swarm 
Optimization (PSO), is seeking to address some of the issues found in data-driven BN 
construction work. First proposed by James Kennedy & Russel Eberhart (1995), PSO is a 
nature-inspired and population-based stochastic search and optimisation heuristic. Operated in 
a continuous and real number space, it requires primitive mathematical operators and minimal 
use of computational resources such as memory and processing power. Sometimes in order to 
reduce the calculation work, it can be executed through the codes from computer programmes 
(Eberhart & Kennedy, 1995). For some certain problems, previous literature has demonstrated 
that PSO is superior to GA. Petrovski et al. (2004) compared two approaches when applied in 
medical systems. The results indicated that PSO was a faster way to find the proper solutions 
than GA and had a higher chance to find the optimal solution to the problem. The same also 
applied to the design of aircraft (Mouser & Dunn, 2005). Kennedy & Spears (1998) conducted 
several experiments on different randomly generated problems. The result of experiments 
proved that PSO was able to find the global optimum no matter what the situations were, 
however, GA was not that effective. Hassan et al. (2005) focused on another aspect and claimed 
that PSO was a more computational efficient approach than GA. Throughout the literature, 
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PSO has shown its advantages in many areas recent years, therefore, it is not surprising to find 
PSO has already been an important approach to learn BN structure.  
There are two major PSO-based approaches currently. Based on binary PSO, construct and 
repair (CONAR) serves to demonstrate that binary PSO can be used as a search heuristic for 
BN construction and there is no need to specify an order among the nodes. However, it requires 
expensive validation and repair operators to ensure the integrity of candidate solutions. To 
alleviate this problem, Restricted Structure (REST) algorithm was proposed. It is an advanced 
approach of CONAR, which is improved to guarantee generation of only legal solutions, 
therefore eliminating the need for validation and repair steps compared to CONAR.  
Other data-driven approaches, like estimation of distribution algorithms (EDA) (Romero, et 
al., 2004), Artificial immune system (AIS) algorithm (Castro & von Zuben, 2005), and Ant 
Colony Optimisation (ACO) (de Campos, et al., 2002; Daly, et al., 2006), also show their 
ability in coping with some BN data-driven structure learning problems.  
In general, data-driven approaches provide important insights in BN construction, as well 
as more objective and precise results. Although based on large volumes of data, they are still 
important alternatives to subjective network learning from professional knowledge and 
experience.  
 
2.6 GAME THEORY APPLICATIONS IN TRANSPORTATION  
Game theory, a mathematical tool to study the conflicts and cooperation between rational 
decision-makers, has become a popular and powerful methodology over the decades. The basic 
assumptions that underlie the theory are that decision-makers pursue well-defined exogenous 
objectives and take into account their knowledge or expectations of other decision-makers’ 
behaviour. One reason for the popularity of game theory is that its associated quantitative 
models and hypothetical examples can help researchers understand real competitive situations 
better even if the defined situations are unrealistically simplified (Myerson, 1991). 
Therefore, it is not difficult to find that many transportation related issues, involving 
multiple stakeholders, are essentially of conflict and cooperation characteristics, which can be 
well modelled by the game theory. The applications of game theory in transportation attract 
the attention of many scholars, forming a connected pool of research with abundant topics, 
multi-disciplinary knowledge, various transportation modes and novel methodologies. Sorting 
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how such research was developed in this academic field can help scholars better understand 
the current development of game theory in transportation. 
To help the review work, 112 papers are systematically reviewed from 60 academic journals 
and 13 conference proceedings from 1983 to 2017, covering multiple transportation modes. 
 
2.6.1 Development of research topics 
Game theory has been widely applied to stimulate policy making in transportation. Among 
different transportation modes, road transportation shows a dominating position in terms of use 
of game theory (Alberto & Alberto, 1995; Hideyuki, 1999; Chidambaram, et al., 2014) and sea 
transport has taken a back-seat role in this aspect.  
Most of the researchers in road transportation focus on transportation network issues. Cost 
and benefit is always the focus of attention for governments and individuals in road 
transportation. Bell (2000) proposed a two-player non-cooperative game between the users (e.g. 
road user and government) in transportation networks. One the one hand, the road user seeks a 
path to minimise the expected trip cost, on the other hand, however, the government would 
choose linking performance scenarios to maximise the cost road users have to pay. The Nash 
mixed strategy equilibrium developed would help to achieve a balance between two entities, 
as well as measure the performance reliability of the transportation network. Levinson (2005) 
developed the congestion theory and congestion pricing theory from micro-foundations. 
Through game theory, it is found that the road congestion depends on the road users’ relative 
valuations of early arrival, late arrival, and journey delay. Further, the congestion pricing would 
be determined via a cooperation mechanism to minimize the total costs (Levinson, 2015). In 
order to find out the optimal choice of a fare collection system, Sasaki (2014) considered game-
theoretic interactions between the transit agency and passengers for the barrier-free system. 
The Nash equilibrium revealed the optimal choice of fare collection system, and a comparative 
static analysis examined how each parameter can affect the choice.  
The network design problem is of vital importance to maximize the profit of carriers, 
especially the hub network design. It consists of two parts: the strategic decision on hub 
locations, and the operational decision on demand paths. In recent years, many researchers 
adopted game theory to analyse this strategic problem (Laporte, et al., 2010). Lin & Lee (2010) 
developed an integral-constrained game theoretic model for time-definite less-than-truckload 
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freight services in an oligopolistic market. The stable Cournot-Nash equilibrium solution of 
the model indicated that all carriers possess similar dense hub networks, which are robust even 
with uneven changes happening in the cost structure of carriers.  
Normally the roads in a transportation system are viewed as public goods. However, in some 
countries part of the road system is privately owned. Because of the nature of privately owned 
roads, the owners have to pay the maintenance cost and make decisions. Hence, how to split 
the costs of roads among the users is a strategic and tough problem. Sofia (2012) presented a 
cooperative game model analysing the practical problem of how a privately owned road 
association can divide the costs for the road network among the members in an efficient and 
fair way. Making use of the Shapley value, this cost allocation issue therefore has an appealing 
solution.  
Intuitively, the traffic-responsive signal control is the most efficient control policy in public 
review. However, Evers & Proost (2015) pointed out it is not always consistent. Through a 
Stackelberg game model, the study proved anticipatory control outperforms traffic-responsive 
signal control for an intersection of two routes connecting one origin-destination pair because 
of first mover advantage and externalities. Further analysis on the game model indicated the 
superiority of anticipatory signal control over other control systems. 
Other topics of publications related to transportation networks like the cost allocation 
(Rosenthal, 2017), Hazardous goods transportation (Chen, 2012), and green transportation 
(Bae, et al., 2011), also demonstrate the diversity and popularity of game theory application in 
road transportation.  
In the maritime transportation field, inspection games are mainly presented from a 
quantitative orientation. Avenhaus et al. (1996) pointed out an inspection game is a 
mathematical model of a situation in which an inspector verifies the adherence of an inspectee 
to some legal obligation, such as an arms control treaty, where the inspectee may have an 
interest in violating that obligation. When applied in maritime transportation, Von Stengel 
(1991) defined it as ‘The port authorities try to minimize the impact of such violations by means 
of inspections that uncover them. A detected violation is costlier to the ship owner than legal 
behaviour. The resources of the port authorities are usually limited and complete surveillance 
is not possible. Then, inspections have to be randomized and the inspection game typically has 
a mixed equilibrium.’  Canty et al (2001) and Rothenstein & Zamir (2002) conducted similar 
research on maritime inspection game.  
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In order to analyse the policies of PSC inspections, Li and Tapiero (2010) outlined a random 
payoff game-theoretical framework for vessel inspections at ports considering two kinds of 
error prone decisions (e.g. detaining a standard vessel or releasing a sub-standard vessel). The 
authors presented some particular Stackelberg solutions given different scenarios to highlight 
the effects and the implication of inspection costs and their derivatives. They paid enough 
attention on the inspections of potentially non-complying ship operators to regulations and sub-
standard performance. Based on this research, Li et al. (2015) further developed a game model 
to decide on the optimal inspection level and the target of the inspection. A bi-matrix game 
between port authorities and ship owners was built based on the same two types of error prone 
decisions discussed in 2010. Different from the previous studies, this time the authors generated 
a Nash equilibrium solution representing the optimal inspection rate for port authorities. A 
numerical study was conducted to illustrate the optimal inspection strategy, which yielded 
significant savings for port authorities, as well as prevented potential violations of ship owners. 
Although showing significant insights for port authorities, there are still several deficiencies 
existing in both studies , i.e. 1) both studies were conducted before the implementation of NIR, 
not taking into account company performance as an important factor influencing the decision-
making of port authorities in today’s PSC practice; 2) when carrying out the numerical studies 
in the two works, the authors assumed that the work of the authorities was perfect and had no 
inspection risk exists, which was obviously idealized and thus had limited practical 
contributions. Hence, when establishing the new game model in this thesis, both the 
contribution of company performance and the influence of inspection risk on the decisions of 
port authorities are investigated and considered, highlighting the main differences with and 
improvements from the two most related papers in the existing literature. 
Environmental control problem is another form of the inspection game in transport studies. 
Bird and Kortanek (1974) explored various theoretical cooperative n-person games in order to 
aid the formulation of regulations concerning sources of pollutants in the atmosphere subject 
to the given least cost solutions. Russell (1990) introduced a specific type of stochastic model 
by allowing for errors of inference on the part of the agency due to imperfect monitoring 
instruments. Gueth & Pethig (1990) analysed a signalling game between a polluting firm that 
could save costs by illegal waste emission and a monitoring agency whose responsibility was 
to prevent such pollution. 
As one of the hot topics in the maritime safety area, the terrorist threat draws the attention 
of many studies. Baston & Bostock (1991) improved the two-person zero-sum game model 
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derived from Thomas & Nisgav (1976) to address the problem of a patrol trying to stop 
smugglers who are attempting to ship a cargo of perishable contraband across a strait in one of 
m time units. Meanwhile, a comparison between the two models and the results was discussed. 
Reilly et al. (2012) used the game theory to model the interactions between a government 
agency, a carrier and a terrorist. A heuristic solution procedure is constructed to identify 
effective prohibitions and validated by a realistic case study in the continental US. The model 
was also suitable for rail network. Sandler & Arce (2003), Sandler & Enders (2003) utilized 
game theory to model terrorism as well.  
Based on the dynamic game theory and agent theory, Yuan (2008) studied the relations 
among different stakeholders (e.g. the authority, the ship owner and the transportation company) 
in the safety supervision of dangerous chemicals’ transportation. In 2014, Chen & Hu (2014) 
built a game model between maritime regulators and ship owners to analyse a ship overload 
problem. Through an equilibrium analysis, the factors that influenced the decision-making of 
the administrators and the optimal numerical intervals of ship overloads were revealed to help 
disclose the governance of this issue. 
In the other maritime transport related areas, among the game studies are port competition 
(Ishii, et al., 2013; Song, et al., 2016) and hazardous material transport.  
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Figure 2.1 Trends of main topics 
(Source: Author) 
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Figure 2.1 shows how the research topics evolved from 1983 to 2017. The number behind 
each topic is the frequency of occurrence. Before 2000, because of the small number of 
publications, the topics proposed were limited and paid equal attention, such as traffic 
equilibrium model and dynamic traffic flows (Wie, 1995). Later profit optimization (Adler, 
2001) gradually became the focus during 2000-2005. At this time, the range of topics expanded, 
indicating more newcomers in this research field.  
In the past decade, route selection (Bell, 2006) emerged as the most popular topic, along 
with some other new-born valued topics such as congested transportation network (Zhang, et 
al., 2008), passenger transport (Chiou, et al., 2013),  collaborative transportation network 
(Millera, 2011) and transportation mode choice (Saeed, 2013). Some topics, like pricing model 
(Cardinal, et al., 2009) and hazardous material transportation/shipment (Rahman, et al., 2012), 
which was among the hot topics in ‘2006-2011’ period, experienced a descending trend during 
2012-2017. However, for topics like Intelligent Transportation System (Malandrino, et al., 
2012), public transportation (Lodi, et al., 2015) and security game (Baykal-Gürsoy, et al., 2014), 
things were just the opposite. Besides these major topics, more than 80 other topics have been 
discussed during this period. The alternation of major topics, as well as the emergence of 
multiple topics indicates a broader and diverse research field, corresponding to the multi-
disciplinary property. 
Among these topics, Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) gained increasing popularity. 
Consisting of advanced technologies, ITS has already been applied to many areas, such as 
analysis of driver behaviour (Malandrino, et al., 2012), transportation infrastructure 
construction (Malandrino, et al., 2014) and traffic flow guidance system (Wang & Hu, 2014). 
As more and more countries have noted the importance of ITS and applied ITS into 
transportation networks, it will surely become a potential research direction. Meanwhile, the 
expansion of the range of topics will continue. It is predictable that more and more 
comprehensive topics are going to appear, i.e. the application of new technologies in 
transportation systems, risk/safety assessment, novel transportation network modelling 
approach, and policy evaluation and regulation. Researchers from different research 
backgrounds are encouraged to cooperate when working on these topics. 
The focus of game theory application in transportation varies in different periods, and more 
and more research topics have been explored and analysed, reflecting the diversity and 
popularity of the application of game theory in transportation field. 
37 
 
2.6.2 Development of different transportation modes 
Table 2.2 lists the evolution of the number of publications of different transportation modes 
from 1983 to 2017. Transportation mode is categorized into five types: road transportation, air 
transportation, maritime transportation, rail transportation and general transportation. The first 
four types are easy to define, but for the last one, it refers to research papers that do not set a 
specific transportation mode as their targets. For example, the studies focus on transportation 
network analysis (Schmoecker, et al., 2009; Cardinal, et al., 2009), cooperation and 
competition between transportation stakeholders of different transportation modes (Audy, et 
al., 2012; Saeed, 2013), and routing & optimization problem (Crippa, et al., 2009; Krichene, et 
al., 2014). 
Table 2.2 Trend of transportation mode 
Transportation 
mode 
Before 2000 2000-2005 2006-2011 2012-2017 Total 
General 
transportation 
2 6 12 15 35 
Road 
transportation 
2 4 16 31 53 
Air transportation  2 3 4 9 
Maritime 
transportation 
 1 6 4 11 
Rail transportation   2 2 4 
(Source: Author) 
From Table 2.2, road transportation was the most discussed transportation mode, reaching 
nearly half of the total number of papers.  General transportation analysis was also preferred 
among researchers, accounting for 31.25% of the database. On the contrary, rail transportation, 
air transportation and maritime transportation only had a small portion. It was mainly due to 
the high utilization rate of road transportation and its resulting transportation issues.  
Although compared to road transportation, the number of publications focusing on maritime 
transportation was relatively small, and even experienced a slight decrease from ‘2006-2011’ 
period to ‘2012-2017’ period, maritime transportation has the potential to attract more attention 
in the future.  
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Figure 2.2 Developments in international seaborne trade, selected years (Millions of tons 
loaded) 
(Sources: UNCTAD 2016 REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT) 
According to Figure 2.2, the world maritime transportation volumes maintained a high 
growth rate over the past decades, and even exceeded 10 billion tons in 2015. However, the 
unprecedented growing rate of maritime transportation on one hand contributes to industrial 
prosperity, but on the other hand renders many problems, like optimal ship route selection, 
cost/profit optimization, maritime safety/security and risk assessment. As game theory is 
effective against these problems, more researchers in this field will begin to apply game theory 
into maritime transportation in the future. 
 
2.7 SUMMARY 
From the reviewed literature, several conclusions can be made: 
1) When applied in risk-based PSC inspection study, according to the reviewed literature, 
BN shows its superiority (e.g. bi-directional analysis) over risk assessment approaches, 
presenting a novel way to analyse PSC inspections for ship owners and port authorities. In 
other words, whenever the information about a specific ship concerning the defined nodes is 
obtained, its ship owner/operator or the authority of the port that the ship visits can use the BN 
based PSC model to analyse the detention probability of the ship in a forward risk prediction. 
If the ship is detained, the owner/operator can use it again to analyse the most probable causes 
leading to the detention in a backward risk diagnosis. Furthermore, it combines the visualized 
graph with mathematical knowledge, enabling it to analyse the inner relationship between 
39 
 
different variables influencing PSC inspection results. However, because of the research 
challenges on CPTs and network construction, BN’s advantages in risk-based PSC have not 
yet been appropriately explored, revealing the major research gap to be fulfilled. 
2) The nature of PSC inspection is a strategic problem between different stakeholders (e.g. 
port authority and ship owner), and the inspection policies demand to be settled properly and 
optimally. Game theory, as a mathematical tool to study the conflicts and cooperation between 
decision-makers, is validated by historical research on transportation, whether road or marine 
transport. Meanwhile, because of the scarcity of related papers on this academic field, game 
theory is a proper method to analyse the relationship between different stakeholders in PSC 
inspection.  
In addition, the implementation of NIR in 2011brought PSC inspection to a new level, as 
stated by the chair and many senior executives of the Paris MoU. On this occasion, the optimal 
inspection policies and the decision-making framework for port authorities need to be clarified. 
However, none of the publications focuses on this topic.  
3) Due to the implementation of NIR, company performance becomes a key influencing 
variable and indeed needs to be considered as a major risk factor in the decision-making process 
of PSC inspections, revealing a new research gap to be filled. 
4) When searching the literature from various sources (e.g. Web of Science, Google Scholar), 
there is no research related to the implementation of NIR in PSC inspection or the analysis of 
the impact of the implementation of NIR on PSC inspection. Since the Paris MoU propagated 
that the introduction of NIR is the most important change in PSC history, it is necessary to 
figure out whether the implementation of NIR brings positive and significant changes to the 
PSC inspection system. 
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CHAPTER 3 REALISING ADVANCED RISK-BASED PORT 
STATE CONTROL INSPECTION USING DATA-DRIVEN 
BAYESIAN NETWORK 
In this chapter, a data-driven Bayesian Network (BN) based approach is proposed to analyse 
risk factors influencing PSC inspections, and predict the probability of vessel detention. To do 
so, inspection data of bulk carriers in several major European countries in the Paris MoU is 
collected to identify the relevant risk factors, and categorised into two groups: ‘2005-2008’ 
(corresponding to the period before NIR implementation) and ‘2015-2017’ (corresponding to 
the period after NIR implementation). Meanwhile, the network structure is constructed via Tree 
Augmented Naive (TAN) learning and subsequently validated by sensitivity analysis. The 
model exploits a novel way to predict the detention probabilities under different situations, 
which effectively help port authorities to rationalise their inspection regulations as well as 
allocation of their resources.  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The past decades witnessed an unprecedented growing rate of maritime transportation 
demand, which on one hand contributes to industrial prosperity, but on the other hand renders 
threats and risks to the maritime industry, including but not limited to, ship collisions, stranding, 
fire, and oil spill causing large property losses, environmental pollution and casualties. For 
instance, the grounding of the Exxon Valdez, the capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise 
and the Estonia passenger ferry are well-known accidents in maritime transportation. These 
accidents attracted the attention of the world on maritime safety (Yang, et al., 2013; Yang, et 
al., 2014; Li, et al., 2014) and Port State Control (PSC) inspections have been implemented as 
an administrative measure to reduce the occurrence of maritime accidents and ensure maritime 
safety (Viladrich-Grau, 2003; Li & Zheng, 2008). 
PSC inspections, which render port authorities the ability to inspect vessels in their own 
ports, are set up in order to prevent illegal actions of ship owners and maritime accidents. The 
PSC officers select high-risk vessels for inspection according to the risk estimation mechanism 
suggested by the regional PSC organizations (Xu, et al., 2007). If a vessel fails to pass the 
inspection, it will face a certain level of detention based on its safety status. Actually, PSC 
inspections are regarded as the last line of defence in coping with substandard vessels that may 
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cause maritime accidents. It is however well noted that although risk analysis approaches, 
qualitative or quantitative, have been widely used to enhance maritime safety in recent years, 
they have been insufficiently utilized in the PSC inspection area in the literature. 
This chapter aims to develop the risk assessment models using Bayesian Networks (BNs) 
to reveal the degree of importance of different risk factors influencing PSC inspection results, 
as well as predict the detention rate of individual vessels under different situations. Because of 
the implementation of NIR in 2011, the PSC inspection conditions before and after the NIR are 
different, indicating two BN models are needed, one for each period, respectively. In order to 
build the models, the bulk carrier data of some major European countries from 2005 to 2008 
and 2015 to 2017 has been collected from the Paris MoU online inspection database 
(www.parismou.org/inspection-search). Meanwhile, the causal factors related to PSC 
inspections are also identified from this database. Due to the implementation of NIR and 
database system update, the factors identified from two periods are slightly different, which is 
illustrated in detail in a later section. The dependency among these factors and the causal 
relationships between them are simulated using a qualitative diagram in BN while the 
quantitative configuration of such dependency (i.e. conditional probabilities) is obtained using 
a gradient descent approach based on the collected dataset (Jensen, 1999). In fact, the BNs 
induced from the data-driven approach can reduce the disturbance of experts’ judgements on 
the accuracy of the model results. 
 
3.2 METHODOLOGY-THE CONSTRUCTION OF DATA-DRIVEN BN 
Normally, the process of developing a data based BN model consists of four phases: data 
acquisition, BN structure learning, BN monitoring and analysis, and model validation (Zhang, 
et al., 2013). When applying it in the context of risk-based PSC inspections, a new conceptual 
methodology to analyse PSC inspections is developed including the following six steps in this 
study.  
3.2.1 Data acquisition 
To determine if a vessel is more likely to be detained, a list of historical PSC inspection 
records is necessary. The data used in this study is derived from the Paris MoU online 
inspection database (www.parismou.org/inspection-search, 2005-2008 and 2015-2017), which 
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presents the details of inspections and provides a comprehensive and support dataset for this 
study.  
There are two reasons for collecting the inspection records of these two periods: First, during 
the process of collecting data before the implementation of NIR, the Paris MoU online 
inspection database updated to a new system. In the new system, some information and risk 
factors existing in the old system were missing, i.e. dead weight tonnage and recognised 
organisation. Hence, in order to maintain consistency, only the data in 2005-2008 were 
collected. Second, the initial plan for the research project was to collect all the data after the 
implementation of NIR. However, because of the heavy workload on data collection work, 
only part of the data could be collected currently. Although compared to ‘2011-2014’, ‘2015-
2017’ was a worse period according to the statistics provided by Paris MoU, it could provide 
us with more valuable information about the risks and uncertainties of PSC inspections under 
NIR, as worst cases are always given high priority in risk assessment. 
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 illustrate the interface of the Paris MoU inspection database and 
an example of one Paris MoU online inspection report.
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Figure 3.1 Paris MoU inspection search interface 
(Source: Paris MoU) 
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Figure 3.2 An example of PSC inspection online report 
(Source: Paris MoU) 
 
3.2.2 Variable identification 
Based on the inspection records from the Paris MoU database, the variables of different 
periods are identified. Because of the heavy workload to collect inspection records manually 
from the Paris MoU inspection database1, it is impossible for us identify all the factors and 
information presented in inspection records (Figure 4.2). Hence, only the factors shown at the 
interface and some important factors in inspection reports are counted, including: 
                                                          
1 The Paris MoU inspection related data can only be viewed online, but not downloaded since it has been restricted by the 
Paris MoU Committee. Hence, the data in this study is collected manually or with the help of web crawler software. 
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1) 2005-2008: vessel flag, Recognized Organization (RO), dead weight tonnage (DWT), 
vessel age, type of inspection, port of inspection and number of deficiencies. 
2) 2015-2017: vessel flag, vessel age, company performance, type of inspection, port of 
inspection, date of inspection, number of deficiencies 
It is noteworthy that the factors concerned are those influencing detention, rather than 
inspections. In this study, the risk variables are set as the ‘root variables’, or ‘first level risk 
variables’ influencing detention rates of vessels. The inspection result ‘Detention’ is the 
target node. However, the size of the relevant CPT table would have been enormous if all 
root variables are defined as the parent nodes of inspection results in terms of ‘detention’.  
To solve this issue, two intermediate level risk variables are introduced based on the 
principle of divorcing approach (Jensen, 2001), one is ‘vessel group’, and the other is 
‘inspection group’. Vessel-related root variables (i.e. vessel age, flag, RO, DWT) and 
inspection-related root variables (i.e. type of inspection, port of inspection, and number of 
deficiencies) are connected as the parent node of the two intermediate level variables, 
respectively. Then the two intermediate level risk variables will act as the parents of the node 
‘detention’.  In fact, they are two dummy variables to help reduce CPT calculation work. 
‘Vessel group’ is the child node of vessel-related variables, while ‘Inspection group’ is the 
child node of inspection-related variables. They are at the same level in the network and 
jointly act as the parent nodes of ‘Detention’. The hierarchical BN structure can significantly 
reduce the CPT calculation work (Huang, et al., 2006). 
The detailed information and idea evolution of solving this issue will be presented in 
section 4.3.  
 
3.2.3 Structure learning through data-driven approach 
After identifying risk variables in the second step, a qualitative BN representing their 
interactive dependencies can be constructed through a data-driven approach, called Tree 
Augmented Naive (TAN) learning (Friedman, et al., 1997; Carvalho, et al., 2007). 
3.2.3.1 Naïve BN (NBN) 
In data analysis and pattern recognition, a classifier is a function that assigns a class label 
to evidence described by a set of attributes. As one of the most effective classifiers, naïve 
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Bayesian classifier is popular among the classifiers because of its predictive performance. 
The classifier learns from training data to compute the conditional probability of each 
attribute variable 𝐴i given the class label C. Based on the assumption that all the attributes are 
conditionally independent given the value of C, the probability of C given the particular 
evidence can be calculated through Bayes rules. According to the value, the evidence is 
classified into a certain state of the class label.  
When presented as a Bayesian network, the naïve BN is described as follows in Figure 
3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 An example of naïve BN 
(Source: Bayesian Network Classifiers, 1997) 
The naïve BN was named by Titterington et al. (1981). It is a network where each target 
node is independent from other nodes and the target node is connected with all other nodes. 
The target node has no parents in this type of model. Although the assumption of NBN is 
unrealistic because the correlations among the factors exists in most problems, it is a still 
basic network of many other derived approaches and their networks, i.e. augmented naive BN 
and tree augmented naïve BN. Sun & Shenoy (2007) applied NBN to predict the bankruptcy, 
as well as help related stakeholders to make business decisions.   
 
3.2.3.2 TAN learning 
In order to improve the performance of NBN to comply with the reality, the NBN 
structure is augmented with links among the attributes or factors. This kind of structure that 
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does not require independence among attributes is called augmented naïve BN (ABN). 
Further, if the class variable has no parents and each attribute has the class variable and at 
most one other attribute as parents, the ABN under this condition is called tree-augmented 
naïve (TAN) BN. The process of learning and constructing TAN model is named TAN 
learning. 
The essence of TAN learning is actually an optimization problem. Let 𝐴1… 𝐴𝑛 be the 
attribute variables (e.g. the first level root variables) and C be the class variable (e.g. ‘Vessel 
group’) in PSC inspection. 𝛱𝐶 represents the parent variables of C.  B is defined as a TAN 
model if 𝛱𝐶 =  Ø and there is a function 𝜋 that defines a tree over 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 such that 𝛱𝐴𝑖 =
{𝐶, 𝐴𝜋(𝑖)} if 𝜋(𝑖) > 0, and 𝛱𝐴𝑖 = {𝐶} if 𝜋(𝑖) = 0. The optimization problem consists on 
finding a tree defining function 𝜋 over 𝐴1… 𝐴𝑛 such that the log likelihood is maximized, 
and the TAN model under this function is the structure of the target BN model. One 
difference between BN model and TAN model lies in class variables. Class variables in a 
normal BN model always have at least one parent node, meaning it is an intermediate-level 
variable, but in the TAN model it is the ‘terminal’ of the structure. Additionally, the TAN 
model is a diverging model, which is different from normal recognition of converging BN.  
The procedure called Construct-TAN can solve this optimization problem. This procedure 
follows the general outline proposed by Chow and Liu (1968), except that instead of using 
the mutual information between two attributes, it uses conditional mutual information 
between attributes given the class variable. This function is defined as 
 𝐼𝑃(𝑨𝒊; 𝑨𝒋|𝑪) =  ∑ 𝑃(𝒂𝒊𝒊, 𝒂𝒋𝒊, 𝒄𝒊)𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑃(𝒂𝒊𝒊, 𝒂𝒋𝒊|𝒄𝒊)
𝑃(𝒂𝒊𝒊|𝒄𝒊)𝑃(𝒂𝒋𝒊|𝒄𝒊)
𝒂𝒊𝒊,𝒂𝒋𝒊,𝒄𝒊
 (3-1) 
where 𝐼𝑃 represents the conditional mutual information, 𝒂𝒊𝒊 is the ith state of attribute 
variable 𝑨𝒊, 𝒂𝒋𝒊 is the ith state of attribute variable 𝑨𝒋, 𝒄𝒊 is the ith state of class variable 𝑪𝒊. 
This function measures the information that 𝑨𝒊, 𝑨𝒋 both have when the value of C is 
known.  
The Construct-TAN procedure of PSC inspection consists of five main steps: 
a) Compute 𝐼𝑃(𝐴𝑖, 𝐴𝑗| 𝐶) between each pair of attribute variables in PSC inspection, i ≠ 
j. 
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Attribute variables in PSC inspection: vessel flag, Recognized Organization (RO), dead 
weight tonnage (DWT), vessel age, type of inspection, port of inspection and number of 
deficiencies. 
Class variables in PSC inspection: vessel group, inspection group 
b) Build a complete undirected graph in which the vertices are the attributes 𝐴1,…, 𝐴𝑛. 
Annotate the weight of an edge connecting 𝐴𝑖 to 𝐴𝑗 by 𝐼𝑃(𝐴𝑖, 𝐴𝑗| 𝐶).  
c) Build a maximum weighted spanning tree. 
Spanning tree: A spanning tree is a connected subgraph containing no cycles. 
Maximum weighted spanning tree: The maximum weighted spanning tree is a spanning 
tree that has a larger sum of weights on its edges than any other spanning tree. 
Therefore, the maximum weighted spanning tree in our study is the tree that has a 
maximum sum of  𝐼𝑃(𝐴𝑖, 𝐴𝑗| 𝐶). 
d) Transform the resulting undirected tree to a directed one by choosing a root variable 
from the attribute variables and setting the direction of all edges to be outward from it. 
e) Construct a TAN model by adding a vertex labelled by class variable C and adding an 
arc from C to each 𝐴𝑖. 
Compared to other data-driven network construction approaches, like naive BN (Langley, 
et al., 1992) and C4.5 (Quinlan, 1995), TAN is proved to be more competitive and accurate 
(Murphy & Aha, 1995).   
 
3.2.4 CPT distribution of the risk-based PSC BN 
When the structure of the PSC BN is confirmed, the conditional probabilities of the nodes 
are required to model the uncertainties of risk variables. In this thesis, the CPTs are 
formulated by using a gradient descent approach (Jensen, 1999; Bottou, 2010).   
In the developed PSC BN, there exists evidence e, for example, the inspection database 
from 2005-2008. For a particular variable V, take ‘Vessel age’ as an example, we have 𝒙 =
𝑃(𝑉 | 𝑒) = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛), which reflects the conditional probabilities of different states of 
‘Vessel age’. Meanwhile, we have a prior request 𝒚 = (𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑛) for 𝑃(𝑉 | 𝑒). If the 
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structure of BN is determined, the conditional probabilities associated with ‘vessel age’ are 
described by a set 𝒕 = (𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑚), for example, 
𝑃(𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 =′ ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘′|𝑉 = ′𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛20′). Set 𝒕 has an initial 
value 𝒕0, which is based on the estimation or related experience. According to Bayes’ rules, 
the conditional probability of ‘vessel age’ can be calculated as a function of set 𝒕, denoted 
as 𝒙 = 𝑃(𝑉 | 𝑒) = 𝐹(𝒕). The objective of gradient descent approach is to adjust the 
conditional probability set 𝒕 so that 𝑃(𝑉 | 𝑒) is sufficiently close to y. Once this objective is 
satisfied, the value of set t at this time is the corresponding conditional probabilities in the 
BN model of PSC.  
A distance measure approach is introduced, called Euclidean distance (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸):  
  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸(𝒙, 𝒚) =∑(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖)
2
𝑖
 (3-2) 
It is a metric, having the following characteristics: 
1.  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸(𝒙, 𝒚) = 0 if and only if x = y 
2.  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸(𝒙, 𝒚)  ≤   𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸(𝒙, 𝒛) +  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸(𝒛, 𝒚) 
3.  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸(𝒙, 𝒚) =  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸(𝒚, 𝒙) 
The task is to set the conditional probability set 𝒕 such that the distance is as small as 
possible. If it is possible to determine  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸(𝒙, 𝒚) as a function of t, then the problem can be 
solved directly. However, usually the problem cannot be solved directly even when the 
function is known, and a gradient descent method can be used: 
a) Calculate grad 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸(𝒙, 𝒚) with respect to set t. 
b) Give 𝒕0 a displacement ∆𝒕 in the direction opposite to the direction of the grad 
 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸(𝒙, 𝒚)(𝒕0), which is denoted as:  
∆𝒕 =  −𝛼 𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐝 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸(𝒙, 𝒚)(𝒕0) 
Where the step size 𝛼 > 0. 
c) Iterate this procedure until the gradient is close to 0. 
From the definition above, the following is obtained: 
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 𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐝 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐸(𝒙, 𝒚)(𝒕) =∑2(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖)𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐝𝒙𝒊(𝒕)
𝑖
 (3-3) 
Once the adjustment process stops, the latest values of set t are defined as the conditional 
probabilities in BN model of PSC.  
 
3.2.5 Generation of posterior probabilities and risk prediction 
Once the BN structure and CPTs are properly constructed, the unobservable situations 
associated with PSC inspection can be predicted through the generated posterior probabilities 
when observable evidence is provided. Bayes’ rule is applied to obtain the posterior 
probabilities in this study illustrated as follows: 
Imagine there are only two variables ‘vessel age’ and ‘vessel group’, and ‘vessel age’ is 
the parent node of ‘vessel group’. Set ‘vessel age’ as M, ‘vessel group’ as N, ‘𝑀 = 𝑀𝑖’ means 
the vessel is at its ith ‘vessel age’ state and the same goes to ‘𝑁 = 𝑁𝑗’. 
According to Bayes’ rule, the joint probability  
𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑀𝑖 , 𝑁 = 𝑁𝑗) =  𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑀𝑖) × 𝑃(𝑁 = 𝑁𝑗|𝑀 = 𝑀𝑖) 
Where: 𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑀𝑖, 𝑁 = 𝑁𝑗) represents the joint probability that events ‘𝑀 = 𝑀𝑖’ and 
‘𝑁 = 𝑁𝑗’ both occur, 𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑀𝑖) denotes the prior probability of the ith ‘vessel age’ state, 
𝑃(𝑁 = 𝑁𝑗|𝑀 = 𝑀𝑖) denotes the conditional probability of the occurrence of ith ‘vessel age’ 
state given that jth ‘vessel group’ state occurs. 
If the state of ‘vessel group’ is locked and the state of ‘vessel age’ is changed to different 
states, the sum of joint probabilities is known as the probability of ith ‘vessel group’ state 
described as follows: 
 𝑃(𝑁 = 𝑁𝑗) =∑𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑀𝑖) × 𝑃(𝑁 = 𝑁𝑗|𝑀 = 𝑀𝑖)
𝑖
 (3-4) 
Further, when the variable N has more than one parent node, the probability of ith ‘vessel 
group’ state can also be calculated through Equation (3-4) as it is a special case of binary 
variables. 
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Imagine 𝑀0, 𝑀1, 𝑀2, … ,𝑀𝑛 are parent nodes of N, and the ith state of kth parent nodes are 
represented as ‘𝑀𝑘 = 𝑀𝑖(𝑘)
𝑘 ′ . Through applying Equation (3-4), the probability of jth ‘vessel 
group’ state described as follows: 
𝑃(𝑁 = 𝑁𝑗) =∑𝑃(𝑀
1 = 𝑀𝑖(1)
1 ,𝑀2 = 𝑀𝑖(2)
2 , … ,𝑀𝑘 = 𝑀𝑖(𝑘)
𝑘 )
𝑖(𝑘)
× 𝑃(𝑁 = 𝑁𝑗|𝑀
1 = 𝑀𝑖(1)
1 ,𝑀2 = 𝑀𝑖(2)
2 , … ,𝑀𝑘 = 𝑀𝑖(𝑘)
𝑘 ) 
Where i (k), k= 1, 2… n, are independent numbers. 
 
3.2.6 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is known as a way to determine how the uncertainty in the output of a 
model can be influenced by the different sources of uncertainty in its input. In this particular 
study, a two-step sensitivity analysis has been developed to not only determine the influence 
degree of risk variables, but also validate the proposed model.   
3.2.6.1 Mutual information calculation 
Entropy is described as a value that, when increased, can be interpreted as increase in 
uncertainty of a dataset which would then require more information in order to describe that 
data. Consider a discrete random variable 𝜶 with possible values {𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼𝑖} and 
probability mass function 𝑃(𝜶), then the entropy can be explicitly written as: 
𝐻(𝜶) = −∑𝑃(𝛼𝑖)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑏𝑃(𝛼𝑖)
𝑖
 
Where b is the base of the logarithm used. Normally, the value of b is 2. 
Based on entropy theory, mutual information (entropy reduction) is introduced in this 
research to measure the mutual dependence of different variables, or in other words, it is the 
information that two variables share. It is the value used to calculate the strengths of the 
relationships between the target node (i.e. detention) and influencing nodes (i.e. vessel age, 
vessel flag). One of the advantages of mutual information is that it can be computed between 
variables at different layers. When a new observation of an influencing variable is obtained, 
the mutual information can help measure the uncertainty of the observation on target node.  
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Since our objective is to find the relationship between risk variables and ‘detention’, 
‘detention’ is chosen as a fixed variable in mutual information calculation. Therefore, the 
mutual information between ‘detention’ and other risk variables can be defined as: 
 𝐼(𝐷, 𝛽) = −∑𝑃(𝑑, 𝛽𝑖)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑏
𝑃(𝑑, 𝛽𝑖)
𝑃(𝑑)𝑃(𝛽𝑖)
𝑑,𝑖
 (3-5) 
Where D represents ‘detention’, 𝛽 represents risk variable, 𝛽𝑖 represents the ith state of 𝛽,   
𝐼(𝐷, 𝛽) represents the mutual information between ‘detention’ and risk variables. The value 
of 𝐼(𝐷, 𝛽) is only related to the two variables D and 𝛽, and it is independent to other mutual 
information in the model. The larger the value of mutual information, the stronger 
relationship which exists between variable ‘𝛽’ and ‘detention’.  
It is noteworthy that the amount of mutual information represents the degree of influence, 
not the exact influence of variables. The application of mutual information in this thesis is to 
clarify the strength of the relationships between influencing factors and ‘detention’. The 
factors having stronger relationships with ‘detention’ are viewed as significant variables and 
will be selected to test their influence through scenario simulation in section 3.2.6.2. 
 
3.2.6.2 Scenario simulation - the effects of different variables 
Once the variables are selected from mutual information calculation, scenario simulation, 
another form of sensitivity analysis, is needed to determine the influence of these variables. 
The classical way to set a scenario is to lock all the other nodes and change the target node 
gradually, for example, 10% as a step for up and down, and the changes rate can be used to 
analyse the effect of this variable. However, this approach has an obvious drawback that it is 
only suitable for variables having two states. For those who have more than two states, the 
classical way is not workable. Take the variable ‘vessel age’ in this study as an example, it 
has five states ‘0 to 5 years’, ‘5 to10 years’, ’10 to15 years’, ’15 to 20 years’ and ‘over 20 
years’ (the reason for the classification is in section 4). If we increase the state ‘over 20 years’ 
from 0% to 10%, the overall value of other states will decrease from 100% to 90% 
accordingly. Actually, the combinations in this case are innumerable, and it is impossible to 
decide which one should be applied. Therefore, the traditional scenario simulation (sensitivity 
analysis) is inappropriate to our study. 
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To overcome the difficulties, a new method (Alyami, et al., 2016) is applied in this study. 
The method has been applied to the container port risk analysis to test the impact of 
hazardous events on container port system. The results of empirical study and experiments 
carried out by Alyami proved the method to be reasonable and reliable. Hence, it is selected 
in this research project.  First, increase the probability of the state that can generate the 
highest detention rate to 100% to obtain the High Risk Inference (HRI). Secondly, increase 
the probability of the state that can generate the lowest detention rate to 100% to obtain the 
Low Risk Inference (LRI). Finally, the average value of HRI and LRI will show the True 
Risk Influence (TRI) of each risk variable in the entire PSC inspection system, and it is 
described as follows: 
 𝑇𝑅𝐼 =
HRI + LRI
2
   (3-6) 
 
The sensitivity analysis results, or in other words, the influence degree on ‘detention’ of 
different risk variables, can therefore be ranked according to the value of TRI.  
Through this approach, the downside of classical scenario simulation (sensitivity analysis) 
can be overcome.   
In general, the sensitivity analysis in this thesis is consist of two parts: the mutual 
information analysis to test the strength of relationships and select the significant variables, 
the scenario simulation part to present the exact influence of these variables. 
 
3.2.7 Model validation 
If the methodology and method in our study is reasonable and logical, then the sensitivity 
analysis must at least satisfy the following two axioms (Yang, et al., 2009; Jones, et al., 2010; 
Li, et al., 2014): 
Axiom 1. A slight increase/decrease in the prior probabilities of each parent node should 
certainly result in the effect of a relative increase/decrease of the posterior probabilities of the 
child node. 
Axiom 2. The total influence magnitudes of the combination of the probability variations 
from x attributes (evidence) on the values should be always greater than the one from the set 
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of x-y attributes (sub-evidence), where y is a subset of x, x-y refers to the attributes from x and 
not belong to y 
 
3.3 BN MODEL FOR PSC INSPECTION BEFORE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
NIR IN 2008 – ‘PRE-NIR BN MODEL’ 
3.3.1 Data  
A database containing 72,785 inspection records of different vessel types (e.g. bulk 
carrier, oil tanker, passenger vessel) before the implementation of NIR from 2005 to 2008 is 
established and named as ‘Pre-NIR’ database. To simplify the model, the model will focus on 
one specific vessel type.  
As one of the most used vessel types currently, bulk carriers make up 15% - 17% of the 
world's merchant fleets and range in size from single-hold mini-bulk carriers to mammoth ore 
ships able to carry 400,000 metric tons of deadweight (DWT). Such phenomena and trends 
can also be found in PSC inspection records. 11,366 inspections related to bulk carriers are 
recorded in the Paris MoU system, making up 15.62% of the total number of PSC 
inspections. Hence, as one of the important maritime carriers, the bulk carrier is selected as 
the research target in this study. 
 
3.3.2 Risk variables 
The risk variables identified from inspection records are explained with a particular 
reference to their state definitions as follows: 
(1) Vessel flag 
Each year a new White, Grey and Black list is published in the Paris MoU Annual Report 
(ParisMoU, 2005-2017). The “White, Grey and Black (WGB) list” presents the full spectrum, 
from quality flags to flags with a poor performance that are considered to have a high or very 
high risk. It is based on the total number of inspections and detentions over a 3-year rolling 
period for flags with at least 30 inspections.  
This variable has four states: ‘White’, ‘Grey’, ‘Black’ and ‘Black (high risk)’, where the 
performance of each state decreases successively.  
55 
 
(2) Recognized Organization (RO) 
The performance of recognized organizations is also summarized into a performance list 
by the Paris MoU. According to Recognised Organisation Performance table published by the 
Paris MoU every year, only those ROs that had 60 or more inspections in a 3-year period are 
taken into account. 
Meanwhile, the RO table provides an official performance level classification: ‘high’, 
‘medium’, ‘low’ and ‘very low’. 
(3) Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT) 
DWT is a measure of a vessel's weight carrying capacity, and does not include the weight 
of the ship itself. The ‘Review of maritime transport’ of United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) (UNCTAD, 2016) classified bulk carriers into five categories 
according to DWT: ‘Small’, ‘Handysize’, ‘Handymax’, ‘Panamax’ and ‘Capesize’. 
 
Figure 3.4 Bulk carrier categories 
(Source: UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport, 2016) 
(4) Vessel age 
Vessel age is another important factor influencing inspection results. Old vessels are more 
likely to suffer detention. In UNCTAD reports, vessel age is categorized in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5 Age distribution of bulk carriers 2016 
(Source: UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2016) 
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Refer to this table, vessel age has 5 states of ‘0 to 5 years’, ‘5 to10 years’, ’10 to15 
years’, ’15 to 20 years’ and ‘over 20 years’, where ‘0 to 5 years’ means 0 ≤  𝑥 < 5, and so as 
others. 
(5) Type of inspection 
A PSC officer visiting a ship will conduct a general inspection of several areas to verify 
that the overall condition of the ship complies with the requirements of PSC. 
If the ship is in full compliance, the PSC Officer will issue a ‘clean’ inspection report 
(Form A) to the master of the ship. In the case that any deficiency is identified, the inspection 
report will include a deficiency-found report (Form B) indicating any follow-up actions to be 
taken to rectify the deficiencies indicated. Furthermore, control on compliance with on-board 
operational requirements may be included in the control procedures, particularly if an officer 
has a reason to believe that the crew demonstrates insufficient proficiency in that area.  
This variable therefore has the three states of ‘Initial inspection’, ‘More detailed 
inspection’ and ‘Expanded inspection’. 
(6) Port of Inspection 
The Paris MoU consists of 27 participating maritime administrations and covers the waters 
of the European Coastal States and the North Atlantic basin from North America to Europe. 
Seven major countries investigated in the research are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain and UK, which occupy 6,913 cases in 11,000 inspection records.  
(7) Number of deficiencies (No. of deficiencies) 
During an inspection, a vessel may face detention if it is detected with deficiencies. There 
are different types of deficiencies, such as alarms, cargo operations, fire safety, navigation 
safety, ISPS. These deficiency types can be divided into two groups: major deficiencies and 
minor deficiencies. Major deficiencies can lead to direct detention regardless of its 
combination with other deficiencies.  
From the inspection records, the detention rate increases dramatically between the 
following states: ‘0’, ‘1 to 3’, ‘4 to 9’ and ‘more than 10’ (the number of inspected 
deficiencies are integer, e.g. ‘0’ means 0 deficiency in inspection, ‘1 to 3’ means the number 
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of deficiencies are 1, 2 or 3). Hence, these four states are applied to node ‘number of 
deficiencies’. 
(8) Detention 
In taking a decision concerning the rectification of a deficiency or detention of a ship, the 
PSC Officer (PSCO) will take into consideration the results of the more detailed or expanded 
inspection carried out in accordance with the Memorandum and the procedures mentioned in 
the Paris MoU committee instruction. The PSC officers will exercise professional judgment 
in determining whether to detain the ship until the deficiencies are rectified or to allow it to 
sail with certain deficiencies without unreasonable danger to the safety, health, or the 
environment, having regard to the particular circumstances of the intended voyage. As 
regards minimum manning standards and the provisions of the relevant ILO Conventions, 
special procedures will be observed. 
If the deficiencies on a ship are sufficiently serious to merit a PSC officer returning to the 
ship to be satisfied that they have been rectified before the ship sails, then the vessel will be 
detained. In other words, if the deficiencies of the vessel are found to be the grounds for the 
detention, for example, 1) failure of proper operation of propulsion and other essential 
machinery; 2) absence, insufficient capacity or serious deterioration of personal lifesaving 
appliances, survival craft and launching arrangements, the vessel is viewed as a high risk 
vessel and has large probability to be detained. 
The detention rates are expressed as a percentage of the number of inspections, rather than 
the number of individual ships inspected to take account of the fact that some ships are 
detained more than once a year.  
This variable has two states, i.e. ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. 
 
3.3.3 A new risk analysis BN model for PSC 
The model for analysing PSC inspections is developed by considering the risk variables at 
different levels and their relationships mentioned in section 3.2. According to the TAN 
learning mentioned in section 3.2.3.2, ‘detention’ is selected as the target node (or class label) 
and the parent node of other root variables. However, the conditional mutual information 
calculation between each pair of child nodes, the determination of maximum weighted 
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spanning tree, and the construction of directed network graph need to be achieved through 
other ways due to the complexity and impossibility to figure out these works manually. 
Therefore, a BN software called Netica is applied in this research to help complete these 
works. Netica is a powerful, easy-to-use, complete program for working with belief networks 
and influence diagrams. It can help us to draw the network, and the relationship between risk 
variables. Further, it has several advanced techniques based on the fastest and most modern 
algorithms, for example, find the appropriate values or probabilities for some unknown 
variables, make use of influence diagrams to obtain the optimal decisions maximizing the 
expected values of the users’ objectives, etc. Associated with this research, the function 
called ‘Learn TAN Structure’ can replace the manual calculation work of Equation (3-1) for 
BN structure construction. It provides a convenient way to avoid the heavy calculation work 
of learning TAN structure when the scale of structure is enormous. 
In fact, during the process of constructing the BN in this research, several improvements 
were made on the original network until the optimal BN for PSC was found.  
 
3.3.3.1 Original BN 
Based on the inspection dataset of bulk carrier derived from the Paris MoU online 
database in 2005-2008, Figure 3.6 presents the original BN structure via TAN learning 
through Netica. 
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Figure 3.6 Original BN 
(Source: Author) 
In this structure, links between child nodes and ‘detention’ are ‘leaving type’, which 
makes the structure a diverging network. It is quite strange and different from normal BN 
because that the links usually start from the influencing nodes to the target node. The reason 
for Netica choosing ‘diverging network’ is that it attempts to avoid too many links entering 
each node which may cause the CPT tables to be too large to have enough sampling 
information to calculate.  
There is no problem in having a great many links leaving a node, and since we will do 
Bayesian inference on the results, it is accepted for links to go in either direction. When 
classifying, predicting or diagnosing a particular variable with the best accuracy, it is required 
to have as many relationships with other variables as possible, resulting in many links leaving 
the variable. In other words, from a mathematical perspective, the diverging network is 
reasonable and it is a more appropriated structure type than ‘converging type’. 
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In the original BN presented in Figure 3.6, apart from the target node ‘detention’, ‘vessel 
flag’, ‘vessel age’, ‘DWT’, ‘Type of inspection’ are the second-level variables that are not 
only the child nodes of ‘detention’, but also the parent nodes of other nodes. The rest of the 
nodes, ‘RO’, ‘Port of inspection’ and ‘Number of deficiencies’, are the nodes at the third-
level that have no links pointing to other nodes. However, the relationships between risk 
factors revealed in this network still need to be verified and modified. 
Deficiencies 
1) Although the ‘diverging network’ is reasonable and proper from a mathematical 
perspective, it may be confusing for maritime practitioners that do not have the foundation of 
mathematics to see the links point from target factor to influencing factors. To make the 
model understandable and acceptable for all maritime practitioners, the network should 
conform to the basic logic that if factor A is influenced by factor B, then the link should point 
from B to A. By this logic, the links in the network should point from influencing factors (i.e. 
vessel age, inspection type) to the target factor ‘Detention’. Therefore, the network should be 
converted to ‘converging’ type, and the CPT calculation problems need to be solved under 
this situation.   
2) Some links in the network are meaningless or even incorrect. For example, in the 
network, the ‘vessel age’ has an influence on ‘DWT’; however, it is a common sense that the 
two factors have no connection. There are still other similar cases or links in the mode. 
Therefore, the BN needs to be manually modified once it is created by Netica, aiming to 
eliminate unnecessary and false links. 
 
3.3.3.2 Improved BN  
In order to improve the network and overcome the deficiencies mentioned above, several 
changes are made to the original BN. The biggest challenge lies in the size of CPT and the 
calculation work on conditional probabilities when the network of the TAN model is changed 
to converging type.  
The basic idea to handle this kind of problem is the principle of divorcing approach 
(Jensen, 2001). The essence of this approach is to split the parent nodes of target node into 
several sets. In this research, the set of parent nodes ‘vessel age’, ‘vessel flag’, ‘DWT’, ‘RO’ 
for ‘detention’ is divorced from the parent nodes ‘inspection type’, ‘port of inspection’, 
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‘number of deficiencies’ by introducing two mediating variables ‘vessel group’ and 
‘inspection group’, making ‘vessel group’ the child of vessel-related variables and ‘inspection 
group’ the child of inspection-related variables. Both of them are parent nodes of ‘detention’. 
 Vessel group 
The variable ‘vessel group’, which presents the overall risk level of a vessel, is added to 
the network having connections with ‘detention’ and inspection-related variables. It has four 
parent variables, ‘vessel flag’, ‘DWT’, ‘vessel age’ and ‘RO’. Meanwhile, it is the parent 
node of ‘inspection type’ because port authorities will choose inspection types according to 
the type (i.e. high or low risk) of the inspected vessel.  
Four parent nodes of ‘vessel group’ have a number of different combinations, and cases 
correlated with them can all be found in the PSC inspection database. If we select several 
cases with different combinations of vessel-related nodes and the same combination of 
inspection-related nodes, when inputting them into BN, the result reveals that most cases 
resulting in detention have a detention rate more than 10%, and other cases are lower than 
10%. 
(The selected combination of inspection-related nodes are under general conditions) 
Therefore, in this study, this variable has two states of ‘High detention risk vessel’ and 
‘Low detention risk vessel’.  
 Inspection group  
The ‘inspection group’ is set as the risk level of the inspection considering all inspection-
related risk factors. Similar to ‘vessel group’, it also connects the inspection-related variables 
with ‘detention’. It has three parent variables, ‘type of inspection’, ‘port of inspection’ and 
‘number of deficiencies’.  
This variable has two states of ‘High detention risk’ and ‘Low detention risk’, and the 
distinguish criteria is also 10% detention rate as ‘Vessel group’. 
Hence, the updated process of BN construction is illustrated as follows:  
a) Divide the risk variables into two groups, ‘vessel group’ and ‘inspection group’ 
      Vessel group 
      The first level variables are ‘vessel age’, ‘vessel flag’, ‘RO’, and ‘DWT’  
62 
 
      The mediating level variable is ‘vessel group’. 
      Inspection group 
      The first level variables are ‘port of inspection’, ‘type of inspection’, and ‘number of 
deficiencies’. 
      The mediating level variable is inspection group. 
b) The structure of each group is established via the TAN learning approach. ‘Vessel 
group’ and ‘Inspection group’ are set as the target node of each group respectively. Figure 
3.7 and Figure 3.8 are the resulting structures of each group, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.7 TAN structure of vessel group 
(Source: Author) 
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Figure 3.8 TAN structure of inspection group 
(Source: Author) 
 
c) Combine two group structures and ‘detention’ together to obtain the integrated BN 
structure, where ‘inspection group’ and ‘vessel group’ are parent nodes of ‘Detention’. 
The network is showed in Figure 3.9. 
 
Figure 3.9 Improved BN 
(Source: Author) 
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d) Amend the edges (or links) in the structure.  
 As defined above, ‘Vessel group’ represents the risk level of the vessel. Before 
executing the PSC inspection, the PSCO will determine the inspection type according to 
the historical inspection records of this vessel and its risk level. Therefore, a link from 
‘vessel group’ to ‘type of inspection’ is necessary. 
 Some links should be eliminated because they are illogical and meaningless, including 
‘vessel age-vessel flag’, ‘vessel age-dwt’, and ‘port of inspection-type of inspection’. 
These relationships do not conform to the real case. 
e) The final structure of BN model for analysing PSC inspections is developed and 
presented in Figure 3.10. 
 
Figure 3.10 Proposed BN for PSC inspection 
(Source: Author) 
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3.3.4 CPT and prior probabilities for each node 
Once the model is developed, the next step is to establish the CPT table of each node. 
When executing the BN model, the conditional probabilities of each node will be calculated 
based on Equation (3-2) and Equation (3-3) mentioned in the gradient descent section.  
Specifically, it is a three-step calculation process: 
(1) With regard to the root nodes, the proportion of each defined state is used as the prior 
probabilities.  
For instance, over the 6,913 inspection records, 926 vessels are 0-5 years old, 962 vessels 
are 5-10 years old, 1,050 vessels are 10-15 years old, 520 vessels are 15-20 years old, 3,455 
vessels are over 20 years old. Therefore, the calculation provides the prior probabilities of 
vessel age as 
0 - 5 years: 926/6913= 0.1340         5 - 10 years: 962/6913= 0.1392 
                 10 - 15 years: 1050/6913= 0.1519     15 - 20 years: 520/6913= 0.0752 
               Over 20 years: 3455/6913= 0.4998 
In a similar way, the prior probabilities of other root variables are presented in Table 3.1 
Table 3.1 The prior probability of each root node 
DWT 
Capesize Handymax Handysize Panamax Small   
0.0073 0.1284 0.5949 0.0094 0.2600   
Flag 
Black (High) Black Grey White    
0.0103 0.2218 0.0671 0.7008    
Vessel age 
0to5Years 5to10Years 10to15Years 15to20Years Over20Years   
0.1340 0.1392 0.1519 0.0752 0.4998   
Port of inspection 
Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain UK 
0.1297 0.1360 0.0866 0.1564 0.1243 0.2356 0.1315 
(Source: Author) 
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(2) Once prior probabilities of root variables are determined, they are served as the prior 
request for the subsequent gradient descent calculation for other first level and intermediate-
level risk variables.  
(3) Similar to step two, the conditional probabilities obtained in step 2 are set as the prior 
request for further calculation of third-level risk variable ‘detention’.   
Tables 3.2 – 3.7 list the CPTs of ‘RO’, ‘type of inspection’, ‘number of deficiencies’, 
‘detention’, and part of the ‘vessel group’ and ‘inspection group’. The full CPTs of ‘vessel 
group’ and ‘inspection group’ are too large to present here. Hence, they are placed in 
Appendix 1.  
Table 3.2 CPT of RO 
 RO 
Vessel flag 
High Low Medium Very Low 
Black (High) 0.5819 0.2467 0.0565 0.1149 
Black 0.9740 0.0044 0.0154 0.0063 
Grey 0.8113 0.0316 0.0604 0.0967 
White 0.9890 0.0036 0.0037 0.0036 
(Source: Author) 
Table 3.3 CPT of ‘type of inspection’ 
 Type of inspection 
 
Vessel group 
Expanded 
Inspection 
Initial 
Inspection 
More detailed 
Inspection 
Low Detention 
Risk 
0.2769 0.3305 0.3926 
High Detention 
Risk 
0.5701 0.1021 0.3278 
(Source: Author) 
 
Table 3.4 CPT of ‘number of deficiencies’ 
  No. of deficiencies 
Type of inspection 
4 to 10 More than 10 0 to 1 1 to 4 
Expanded Inspection 0.3136 0.2079 0.2273 0.2512 
Initial Inspection 0.1052 0.0093 0.6035 0.2820 
More detailed Inspection 0.2807 0.0973 0.3322 0.2898 
(Source: Author) 
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Table 3.5 CPT of ‘Vessel group’ 
Vessel age Flag RO DWT Low Detention Risk High Detention Risk 
Over20Years Black (High) High Capesize 0.5062 0.4938 
Over20Years Black (High) High Handymax 0.4364 0.5636 
Over20Years Black (High) High Handysize 0.0012 0.9988 
Over20Years Black (High) High Panamax 0.5109 0.4891 
Over20Years Black (High) High Small 0.0014 0.9986 
… … … … … … 
… … … … … … 
… … … … … … 
5to10years White Very Low Capesize 0.5508 0.4492 
5to10years White Very Low Handymax 0.4492 0.5508 
5to10years White Very Low Handysize 0.4691 0.5309 
5to10years White Very Low Panamax 0.4704 0.5296 
5to10years White Very Low Small 0.5111 0.4889 
(Source: Author) 
Table 3.6 CPT of ‘Inspection group’ 
 Inspection group 
Port of inspection Type of inspection No. of deficiencies Low High 
Belgium Expanded 4 to 10 0.9987 0.0013 
Belgium Expanded More than 10 0.0015 0.9985 
Belgium Expanded 0 to 1 0.9986 0.0014 
Belgium Expanded 1 to 4 0.9987 0.0013 
Belgium Initial 4 to 10 0.9989 0.0011 
… … … … … 
UK Initial 1 to 4 0.9987 0.0013 
UK More Detailed 4 to 10 0.9986 0.0014 
UK More Detailed More than 10 0.0013 0.9987 
UK More Detailed 0 to 1 0.9990 0.0010 
UK More Detailed 1 to 4 0.9985 0.0015 
(Source: Author) 
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Table 3.7 CPT of ‘Detention’ 
 Detention 
Vessel group Inspection group No Yes 
Low Detention Risk Low 0.9909 0.0091 
Low Detention Risk High 0.6471 0.3529 
High Detention Risk Low 0.9674 0.0326 
High Detention Risk High 0.5976 0.4024 
(Source: Author) 
 
3.3.5 Model result 
Based on the CPT of each node, the marginal probability of each child node can be 
obtained using Equation (3-4). Figure 3.11 shows the result of the BN model using Netica. It 
indicates that the detention rate of a bulk carrier under inspection is estimated to be 4.52% 
given the input data covering the period of 2005-2008. If we calculate the detention rate from 
the database directly, it is 4.57%, which shows a harmony with the result delivered by the 
model. The model is verified in terms of prediction of detention rate of bulk carriers.
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Figure 3.11 Results of BN model 
(Source: Author)
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3.3.6 Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis is conducted to analyse influencing degree of risk variables and 
validate the model to prove its capability of realizing dynamic risk prediction in dynamic 
environments. 
3.3.6.1 Mutual information calculation 
According to Equation (3-5) shown in section 3.2.6, mutual information between 
‘detention’ and other risk variables is obtained, which is shown in Table 3.8. The entropy of 
‘detention’ is 0.26555 and the percent column in the table represents the extent of shared 
information between the other nodes and ‘detention’. The values in this column are 
independent and unrelated to others. 
Table 3.8 Sensitivity of other nodes to ‘Detention’ 
Sensitivity analysis 
Node 
Mutual  
Info 
Percent Variance of Beliefs 
Inspection group 0.09654 36.4 0.0108729 
Number of deficiencies 0.09386 35.3 0.0105047 
Type of inspection 0.01464 5.51 0.0008056 
Vessel group 0.00140 0.527 0.0001046 
RO 0.00025 0.0933 0.0000171 
Vessel flag 0.00025 0.0929 0.0000161 
DWT 0.00009 0.0331 0.0000053 
Vessel age 0.00003 0.0131 0.0000021 
Port of inspection 0 0.0007 0.0000001 
(Source: Author) 
From Table 3.8, it is concluded that:  
Firstly, inspection-related risk factors have a stronger relationship with ‘detention’ than 
vessel-related variables in general, except ‘port of inspection’. Port of inspection has almost 
no influence on final inspection results.    
Secondly, the most significant node is therefore the variable ‘Inspection group’. The main 
reason for this impact is that the parent nodes of ‘Inspection group’, ‘Number of deficiencies’ 
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and ‘Type of inspection’, can change the detention probability more significantly than other 
first level nodes. 
Meanwhile, from Table 4.8, ‘Inspection group’, ‘Number of deficiencies’, ‘Type of 
inspection’, ‘Vessel group’, ‘RO’ and ‘Vessel flag’ are selected to do further analysis. 
 
3.3.6.2 Scenario simulation - the effects of different variables 
Table 3.9 shows the HRI, LRI and TRI value of selected nodes under different scenarios 
through Equation (3-6). 
Take ‘Number of deficiencies’ as an example to illustrate the calculation process. 
1) Set the state ‘0’ to 100%, hence, other states are all at state ‘0’, the detention rate under 
this scene is obtained through the proposed BN model, which is 1.05 %.  
2) Repeat the first step and adjust other states to 100% in turn. The detention rates under 
each situation are 1.07% (100% ‘1-3’), 1.10% (100% ‘4 to 9’), and 35% (100% ‘more than 
10’). 
3) Select the lowest detention rate among these situations to calculate LRI. In this case, the 
scene that state ‘0’ is 100% has the lowest value 1.05%. Therefore, LRI is calculated as 
follows: 
LRI = 4.52% - 1.05% = 3.47% 
4) Similarly, HRI is represented as the maximum increment among these scenarios, which 
is presented as follows: 
HRI = 35% - 4.52% = 30.48% 
5) Finally, TRI is the average value of LRI and HRI. 
TRI = (3.47% + 30.48%) / 2 = 16.98% 
As a result, the TRI of ‘Number of deficiencies’ is 16.98%. The same calculation process 
goes to other nodes. 
In Table 3.9, the first row of each variable represents the normal scenario, and the 
following rows represent the different scenarios when each state of the variable reaches 100% 
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occurrence probability respectively. The comparison between TRI of different variables 
indicates the results of sensitivity analysis – the influence degree of different risk variables. 
Table 3.9 TRI of risk variables 
Inspection group 
High Low Detention rate HRI LRI TRI 
- - 4.52%  
31.18% 
 
3.49% 
 
17.34% 100% 0 35.7% 
0 100% 1.03% 
Number of deficiencies 
0 1 to 3 4 to 9 More than 
10 
Detention rate HRI LRI TRI 
- - - - 4.52%  
 
30.48% 
 
 
3.47% 
 
 
16.98% 
100% 0 0 0 1.05% 
0 100% 0 0 1.07% 
0 0 100% 0 1.10% 
0 0 0 100% 35% 
Type of inspection 
Initial Expande
d 
More detailed Detention rate HRI LRI TRI 
- - - 4.52%  
3.86% 
 
3.41% 
 
7.27% 100% 0 0 1.11% 
0 100% 0 8.38% 
0 0 100% 4.41% 
Vessel group 
High Low Detention rate HRI LRI TRI 
- - 4.52%  
4.35% 
 
0.24% 
 
4.59% 100% 0 8.87% 
0 100% 4.28% 
RO 
High Medium Low Very low Detention rate HRI LRI TRI 
- - - - 4.52%  
 
2.79% 
 
 
0.07% 
 
 
2.86% 
100% 0 0 0 4.45% 
0 100% 0 0 5.95% 
0 0 100% 0 7.11% 
0 0 0 100% 7.31% 
Vessel age 
0 to 5 5 to 10 10to15 15to20 Over20 Detention rate HRI LRI TRI 
- - - - - 4.52%  
 
0.14% 
 
 
0.16% 
 
 
0.3% 
100% 0 0 0 0 4.36% 
0 100% 0 0 0 4.37% 
0 0 100% 0 0 4.36% 
0 0 0 100% 0 4.43% 
0 0 0 0 100% 4.66% 
(Source: Author) 
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Accordingly, based on the results obtained in Table 3.9, the most important variables can 
be listed as follows: 
Inspection group > Number of deficiencies > Type of inspection > Vessel group > RO > 
Vessel age 
As ‘inspection group’ and ‘vessel group’ are class variables which do not exist in PSC 
inspection records, ‘Number of deficiencies’ is in fact the most important risk factor, 
followed by ‘type of inspection’, ‘RO’ and ‘Vessel age’. This result indicates sub-standard 
performance of inspection-related items (Number of deficiencies, type of inspection, etc.) is 
more likely to lead to detention than unqualified intrinsic attributes of vessels (vessel age, 
dwt, RO, etc.).  
Meanwhile, the BN model in this study can be used to calculate detention rate of bulk 
carriers under different situations, serving as a dynamic prediction tool. Such a tool not only 
helps port authorities to test their policies, but also urges ship owners to improve their vessels 
accordingly.  
In addition, the floating range of different variables on detention rate can also be obtained 
from this table.  
 
3.3.7 Model validation 
To validate the model, another sensitivity analysis is carried out by investigating the 
detention rate of the minor change given different risk variables. By selecting ‘Inspection 
group’ as the first node, the state generating the highest detention rate is increased by 10%, 
while the state generating lowest detention rate is decreased by 10%. This change is denoted 
as ‘~10%’ in this study. Once the updated detention rate is obtained, the same change is 
applied to next node and the combined detention rate is calculated. The sensitivity analysis 
continues in the same manner until all nodes are included. The following Table 3.10 presents 
the results of this sensitivity analysis.  
 
 
 
74 
 
Table 3.10 Detention rate of minor change in variables 
Inspection 
group 
Number of 
deficiencies 
Type of 
inspection 
Vessel 
group 
RO Vessel age 
Detention 
rate 
- - - - - - 4.52% 
~10% - - - - - 7.98% 
~10% ~10% - - - - 7.99% 
~10% ~10% ~10% - - - 8.55% 
~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% - - 9.14% 
~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% - 9.59% 
~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% 9.71% 
 (Source: Author) 
The first row shows the original detention rate and the rest of the table presents the 
updated detention rates by changing risk variables continuously. Through comparing the 
updated results with the initial detention rates, it is claimed that the model is proved to be in 
line with Axiom 1. 
As to Axiom 2, it can be examined by comparing the initial detention rate with reassigned 
detention rates, which can be regarded as the evidence and sub-evidence. From Table 3.9, the 
detention rate is gradually increasing along with the continuous variation of risk variables, 
which proves the model is sound in line with Axiom 2.   
In general, the model developed is proved reasonable and reliable. It can be used to predict 
the detention rate of PSC inspection of the Paris MoU when any new evidence is entered. 
Meanwhile, the results of the model, as well as the variation law of detention rate, can be 
used by port authorities to improve their policies and ship owners to increase their passing 
rate.  
Although based on the inspection records before the implementation of NIR, it still has 
great referential significance. Additionally, it is also important to illustrate the model to help 
us better understand the significance and influence of NIR. 
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3.4 BN MODEL FOR PSC INSPECTION AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
NIR – ‘POST-NIR BN MODEL’ 
After the implementation of NIR, the PSC inspection system experienced huge 
transformation. SRP, Company performance calculator, ‘fair share’ scheme and the new 
THETIS data system are some of the great efforts made to ensure the efficient operation of 
the PSC inspection system. Reflecting the risk assessment model, the BN of this period is 
different from the former one. 
3.4.1 Data acquisition 
Collected from the Paris MoU online inspection database, this time 49, 328 inspection 
records from 2015-2017 are extracted to form the foundation of the research. To maintain 
consistency, bulk carriers are still selected as the research target, which is helpful for the 
comparative analysis conducted in Chapter 4. 
According to the statistics, 7,252 inspection records are related to bulk carriers, occupying 
14.7% of the total amounts. Compared to 15.62% occupancy in the former model, the status 
of bulk carriers in PSC inspections largely remains the same. 
 
3.4.2 Variable identification 
The variables in ‘Post-NIR’ BN are also identified from the Paris MoU online inspection 
database. However, the identified risk factors are slightly different from the ones in ‘Pre-
NIR’ BN, including vessel flag, vessel age, company performance, type of inspection, port of 
inspection, date of inspection, number of deficiencies, and detention. Among these variables, 
‘Company performance’ and ‘Inspection date’ are two new-added risk factors. In addition, 
‘Company performance’ is the factor that can best represent the specialty of the NIR, which 
also highlights the novelty of the ‘Post-NIR’ BN model.  
Here is an explanation of them with a particular reference to their state definitions. 
(1) Company performance 
Since the implementation of NIR, most ISM companies have raised their adoption policies 
to maintain their reputation in spite of facing possible toll losses. As a result, company 
performance, one of the parameters to determine the SRP, is currently one of the most 
relevant indexes reflecting vessel safety conditions and inspection results. 
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Company performance takes account of the detention and deficiency history of all ships in 
a company’s fleet while that company was the ISM Company for the ship. Companies are 
ranked as having a very low, low, medium or high performance. The calculation is made 
daily based on a running 36-month period. There is no lower limit for the number of 
inspections needed to qualify except a company with no inspections in the last 36 months will 
be given a “medium performance”. 
Table 3.11 presents the standard of classification of company performance from the Paris 
MoU official website. 
Table 3.11 Company performance classification standard 
Detention Index Deficiency Index Company Performance 
Above Average Above Average Very Low 
Above Average Average 
Low 
Above Average Below Average 
Average Above Average 
Below Average Above Average 
Average Average 
Medium Average Below Average 
Below Average Average 
Below Average Below Average High 
(Source: Paris MoU) 
In a word, this variable has four states: ‘High’, ‘Medium’, ‘Low’ and ‘Very low’.  
Because the inspection records online only have the number of the ISM company of each 
vessel, hence we calculate the company performance of each inspection manually through the 
‘company performance calculator’ online.  
(2) Inspection date 
This variable is set up in order to test the influence of time. Due to the different situations 
and environments port authorities may face each year, the policy and regulations of PSC will 
change accordingly, affecting the passing rates of vessels being inspected at ports. 
It has three states apparently, ‘2015’, ‘2016’ and ‘2017’. 
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In addition, two vessel-related variables, RO and DWT, are not taken into account this 
time. This is because the new Paris MoU online inspection database after NIR does not 
display the two variables on the ‘search’ page any more. Hence, the web crawler software we 
used is unable to acquire their information and thus they are excluded from the BN model.  
Other variables remain the same with the ‘Pre-NIR’ BN model and the state definitions of 
these variables also do not change. Table 3.12 shows the state classification of each variable 
in ‘Post-NIR’ model. 
Table 3.12 Identified variables in PSC inspections from 2015-2017 
VARIABLE STATE 
Vessel flag White, Grey, Black, Black (high risk) 
Vessel age 
0 to 5 years, 5 to10 years, 10 to15 years, 15 to 20 years, over 20 
years 
Company performance High, Medium, Low, Very low 
Type of inspection Initial inspection, More detailed inspection, Expanded inspection 
Port of inspection 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, UK 
Date of inspection 2015, 2016, 2017 
Number of deficiencies 0, 1 to 3, 4 to 9, more than 10 
Inspection group High detention Risk, Low detention Risk 
Vessel group High detention Risk, Low detention Risk 
Detention Yes, No 
(Source: Author) 
* The justification of the selection of the variables and their grades refers to the former section.  
Similarly, two mediating level risk variables, ‘vessel group’ and ‘inspection group’, are 
introduced based on the principle of divorcing approach (Jensen, 2001; Yang, et al., 2018) to 
avoid that the size of CPTs are too large to effectively control. The classification criterion of 
the two nodes remains the same with ‘Pre-NIR’ BN. 
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3.4.3 BN construction 
Through the Netica software, the resulting BN structure from TAN learning is presented in 
Figure 3.12. The optimizing process of network construction is omitted here, because it is 
identical to the process illustrated in section 3.3.3.
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Figure 3.12 The structure of BN 
(Source: Author)
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Compared to the ‘Pre-NIR’ BN model, the biggest difference between the two models lies 
in the removal of the links pointed from ‘vessel group’ to ‘Inspection type’, which is the 
connection between vessel-related variables and inspection-related variables. Instead, a link 
from ‘vessel group’ to ‘number of deficiencies’ now acts as the bond connecting the two 
parts. The reason for this change is that the inspection type of a particular vessel under NIR is 
currently influenced by the last PSC inspection results this vessel experienced. Hence, the 
‘vessel group’ node, which represents the vessel status of this time, is no longer the parent 
node of ‘inspection type’ in our model. In order to maintain the connection between vessel-
related variables and inspection-related variables, the link between ‘vessel group’ and 
‘number of deficiencies’ is set as the new bond, because the overall condition of the vessel 
has crucial influence on the number of deficiencies detected during a PSC inspection.   
 
3.4.4 CPT distribution and risk prediction 
After confirming the structure of the BN, the conditional probabilities of the nodes are 
required to model the uncertainties of risk variables. Through gradient descent approach 
mentioned above, the CPTs can be obtained and shown in Appendix 2.  
 
3.4.5 Model result 
Figure 3.13 shows the result of detention analysis based on the BN model. It indicates that 
the detention rate of a bulk carrier is estimated to be 3.25% given the input data covering the 
period of 2015-2017. If we calculate the detention rate from the database directly, it is 3.23%, 
which shows a harmony with the result delivered by the model. The model is verified in 
terms of prediction of detention rate of bulk carriers.
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Figure 3.13 ‘Post-NIR’ BN 
(Source: Author)
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3.4.6 Sensitivity analysis and model validation 
The sensitivity analysis of ‘Post-NIR’ BN also consists of two parts, analysis on mutual 
information and scenario simulation.  
3.4.6.1 Analysis of Mutual information 
Table 3.13 presents the value of mutual information between different nodes and target 
node ‘detention’. Due to the variation of network structure, the results of sensitivity analysis 
on ‘Post-NIR’ BN through the comparison of mutual information change accordingly are 
different from those in ‘Pre-NIR’ model, which are displayed in section 4.3.6 
Table 3.13 Mutual information between other nodes and ‘Detention’ 
Sensitivity analysis 
Node Mutual  Info Percent Variance of Beliefs 
Detention 0.20672 100 0.0314319 
Inspection group 0.06135 29.7 0.0061904 
Number of deficiencies 0.04891 23.7 0.0050644 
Vessel group 0.03622 17.5 0.0024699 
Company Performance 0.02659 12.9 0.0016154 
Vessel age 0.00638 3.09 0.0003219 
Type of inspection 0.00579 2.8 0.0002493 
Port of inspection 0.00110 0.531 0.0000505 
Vessel flag 0.00036 0.174 0.0000208 
Inspection date 0.00008 0.0369 0.0000033 
(Source: Author) 
Compared to Table 3.8, the mutual information related to ‘inspection group’, ‘number of 
deficiencies’, ‘type of inspection’ decrease, indicating the relationships between these 
variables and ‘detention’ become weaker, while the mutual information related to ‘vessel 
group’, ‘vessel age’, ‘port of inspection’ increase, representing stronger relationships of these 
variables with ‘detention’. In general, more risk factors are closely connected with ‘detention’ 
than ever.   
At the same time, the conclusions acquired from Table 3.8 are also reasonable for Table 
3.13.  
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1) Inspection-related risk factors still overwhelm vessel-related factors in terms of 
relationship with ‘detention’.  
2) ‘Inspection group’ continues to be the most significant variable, followed by ‘Number 
of deficiencies’. 
3) ‘Port of inspection’, along with ‘vessel flag’ and new added factor ‘inspection date’, 
become the lowest priority parts. Although compared to the ‘Pre-NIR’ period, ‘port of 
inspection’ and ‘vessel flag’ increased dramatically, for example, ‘port of inspection’ has 
risen from 0.0007% to 0.531% (more than 700 times increase), the relationships between 
them and ‘detention’ are still too weak when comparing with other nodes. Therefore, they are 
not selected to do further analysis. In a word, the selection of nodes is a result of both 
horizontally and vertically comparison.   
The detailed information of the comparison between the results of sensitivity analysis of 
two models is presented in Chapter 4, which is used to demonstrate the change and 
significance brought about by the implementation of NIR. 
 
3.4.6.2 Scenario simulation - the effects of different variables 
Table 3.14 shows the TRI value of selected nodes under different scenarios. Because of 
little influence on the ‘detention’ compared to other nodes, ‘Port of inspection’, ‘Vessel flag’ 
and ‘Inspection date’ are therefore not taken into our consideration.  
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Table 3.14 TRI of risk variables 
Inspection group 
High Low Detention rate HRI LRI TRI 
- - 3.25%  
29.65% 
 
2.09% 
 
15.87% 100% 0 32.9% 
0 100% 1.16% 
Number of deficiencies 
None 1 to 3 4 to 9 More than 
10 
Detention rate HRI LRI TRI 
- - - - 3.25%  
 
32.75% 
 
 
2.21% 
 
 
17.48% 
100% 0 0 0 1.04% 
0 100% 0 0 1.41% 
0 0 100% 0 4.52% 
0 0 0 100% 36% 
Vessel group 
High Low Detention rate HRI LRI TRI 
- - 3.25%  
12.35% 
 
1.99% 
 
7.17% 100% 0 15.6% 
0 100% 1.26% 
Company Performance 
High Medium Low Very low Detention rate HRI LRI TRI 
- - - - 3.25%  
 
11.65% 
 
 
1.93% 
 
 
6% 
100% 0 0 0 1.49% 
0 100% 0 0 1.32% 
0 0 100% 0 9.17% 
0 0 0 100% 14.9% 
Vessel age 
0to5Y 5to10Y 10to15Y 15to20Y over20Y Detention rate HRI LRI TRI 
- - - - - 3.25%  
 
4.74% 
 
 
1.65% 
 
 
3.20% 
100% 0 0 0 0 1.60% 
0 100% 0 0 0 3.15% 
0 0 100% 0 0 2.50% 
0 0 0 100% 0 6.56% 
0 0 0 0 100% 7.99% 
Type of inspection 
Initial Expanded More detailed Detention rate HRI LRI TRI 
- - - 3.25%  
2.49% 
 
1.79% 
 
2.24% 100% 0 0 1.46% 
0 100% 0 5.74% 
0 0 100% 3.40% 
(Source: Author) 
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Through comparing TRI values, the variables are listed in the sequence of the degree of 
the influence on ‘detention’, which is shown as follows: 
Number of deficiencies > Inspection group > Vessel group > Company performance > 
Vessel age > Type of inspection 
The conclusions obtained from scenario simulation of the ‘Pre-NIR’ model still take 
effect, for example, inspection-related risk factors should be paid more attention than vessel-
related factors because the influence value of the former group is much greater than the latter 
one; ‘Number of deficiencies’ remains its dominating position in this list. 
However, at the same time, it is obvious to find that the sequence is different from the 
previous one, i.e. Number of deficiencies is the most influencing variable under NIR; the 
influence of ‘Company performance’ is only less than ‘Number of deficiencies’ among the 
whole risk factors group (except two dummy variables). All these changes indicate that the 
implementation of NIR has indeed affected the PSC inspection system. 
Chapter 4 will present a comparative analysis between Table 4.8 and Table 4.12 from 
different angles to illustrate the influence of the new inspection regime.  
 
3.4.7 Model validation 
The principle of conducting model validation is the same as Section 3.3.7. By selecting 
‘Number of deficiencies’ as the first node, the state generating highest detention rate is 
increased by 10%, while the state generating lowest detention rate is decreased by 10%. This 
change is denoted as ‘~10%’ in this study. Once the updated detention rate is obtained, the 
same change is applied to the next node and the combined detention rate is calculated. In this 
model, the sequence is ‘Number of deficiencies – Inspection group – Vessel group – 
Company performance – Vessel age – Type of inspection’.  
Table 3.15 presents the results of the minor changes given different variables.  
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Table 3.15 Detention rate of minor change in variables 
Number of 
deficiencies 
Inspection 
group 
Vessel 
group 
Company 
performance 
Vessel 
age 
Type of 
inspection 
Detention 
rate 
- - - - - - 3.25% 
~10% - - - - - 6.74% 
~10% ~10% - - - - 10.20% 
~10% ~10% ~10% - - - 13.40% 
~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% - - 16.5% 
~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% - 18.7% 
~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% 21% 
 (Source: Author) 
The first row shows the original detention rate and the rest of the table presents the 
updated detention rates by changing risk variables continuously. Through comparing the 
updated results with the initial detention rates, it is claimed that the model is proved to be in 
line with Axiom 1. 
As to Axiom 2, it can be examined by comparing the initial detention rate with reassigned 
detention rates, which can be regarded as the evidence and sub-evidence. From Table 3.14, 
the detention rate is gradually increasing along with the continuous variation of risk variables, 
which proves the model is sound in line with Axiom 2. 
In general, the ‘Post-NIR’ BN model is reasonable and reliable. Since the implementation 
of NIR, this is the first time that a risk assessment model is developed to help analyse the new 
inspection system and the change brought by the new regime. Additionally, it can also serve 
as a dynamic prediction tool for port authorities and ship owners to estimate the detention 
rate of PSC inspection of the Paris MoU when any new evidence is entered. It can work as a 
screening tool for port authorities to check whether the inspected vessel is legal or not. Those 
having higher estimated detention rates should be inspected in detail to determine the exact 
detention time, and other vessels can be paid less attention and less resource. For ship 
owners, they can estimate the inspection rate of their vessels according to the vessel status 
and the expected inspection details to see whether their vessels need to be maintained and 
improved in advanced. 
Section 3.5 will illustrate how the proposed model works in real life to help different 
stakeholders in PSC inspections. 
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3.5 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS – ANALYSIS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF 
ISM COMPANIES  
As the newly added risk variables, the performance of ISM companies presents its great 
influence on inspection results based on the above analysis, demonstrating the important role 
of ISM companies in the current PSC practice. 
For ISM companies, when deciding whether to adopt a vessel, they need to do many 
preparation works on this vessel. A sub-standard vessel may reduce its performance level 
recorded at Paris MoU, and then further influence its reputation in this area and do harm to its 
potential revenue. Hence, ISM companies should pay attention to those variables that are 
closely related to their performance level indicator at Paris MoU. 
In this section, a brief analysis is conducted to tell ISM companies which variables they 
should focus on when selecting vessels based on the proposed BN model. 
Table 3.16 presents the mutual information between ‘Company performance’ and other 
variables in ‘Post-NIR’ BN model. Because mutual information describes the strength of 
relationship between variables, which can be seen as the degree of impact, it is helpful to 
provide suggestions for ISM companies. Additionally, the relationships here are undirected, 
which means company performance is not always the affected variable. 
Table 3.16 Mutual information between ‘Company performance’ and other variables 
Node Mutual information 
Company performance 1.25605 (Entropy) 
Vessel group 0.38650 
Vessel age 0.06074 
Detention 0.02659 
Number of deficiencies 0.02417 
Inspection group 0.01282 
Vessel flag 0.01048 
Inspection date 0.00000 
Port of inspection 0.00000 
Inspection type 0.00000 
(Source: Author) 
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According to Table 3.16, several suggestions can be made to ISM companies. 
1) ‘Vessel group’ has the strongest relationship with company performance. The influence 
brought by ‘Vessel group’ is much larger than other risk variables. ISM companies should 
give the highest priority to the risk level of vessels when making adoption decisions. A low 
risk vessel basically means the company performance indicator at PSC inspection is high or 
medium, as indicated in Figure 3.14. On the contrary, a high-risk vessel largely leads to a 
low/very low performance level record in the PSC inspection database, as shown in Figure 
3.15. 
 
 
Figure 3.14 Low vessel-related risk level vessels 
(Source: Author) 
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Figure 3.15 High vessel-related risk level of vessels 
(Source: Author) 
In practice, the risk level of vessels is reflected by the inspection records, or the SRP 
indicator, which should be taken into consideration by ISM companies. 
2) For ISM companies, vessel-related variables, i.e. vessel age, vessel flag, and other 
variables not listed in BN, have closer relationship with ‘company performance’ than 
inspection-related variables. These variables represents every aspect of the risk level of 
vessels. 
3) Among the vessel-related variables, vessel age is the most influential variables. Figure 
3.16 and 3.17 illustrate the company performance level when the vessel age is at ‘0-5’ and 
‘more than 20’ states, and it is not surprising to find older vessels will reduce the company 
performance indicator largely, thus need to be treated seriously. 
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Figure 3.16 Vessels at 0-5 years 
(Source: Author) 
 
 
Figure 3.17 Vessels over 20 years 
(Source: Author) 
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4) Inspection-related variables have almost no influence on the company performance. 
This phenomenon is reasonable because the selection of ISM companies happens before the 
occurrence of PSC inspections, hence the ISM companies are unable to evaluate its 
performance level based on these factors.  
One interesting thing is that ‘Inspection group’ has weak relationship with company 
performance, this can be viewed as the influence brought by company performance on the 
risk level of inspection. Although the influence is weak, it still proves that the performance 
level of ISM companies can affect the inspection risk of vessels. 
5) The mutual information calculation in Table 3.16 once again demonstrate the influence 
brought by company performance on detention, urging ISM companies to improve their 
adoption criteria and select more high-quality vessels. The detailed information of this 
influence can be found in Section 4.3.2. 
 
3.6 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS - MODEL APPLICATIONS IN REAL CASES 
In this section, some real cases are simulated to illustrate how the proposed model can 
help both port authorities and ship owners in PSC inspections. The information in the cases is 
set based on the real inspection records in the Paris MoU online database.  
In order to demonstrate the practical significance of the model, as well as make the 
illustration more convincing, the ‘Post-NIR’ model is selected to do the case studies. The 
reason is that the ‘Pre-NIR’ model is constructed based on the past inspection records, thus is 
no longer suitable in today’s environment.  
 
3.6.1 Case I 
A bulk carrier was inspected at the Port of Liverpool on 01/12/2017, and the information 
of this inspection is shown as follows: 
1) Vessel age: 3 years 
2) Vessel flag: Marshall Islands (White list) 
3) Company performance: Medium (Atlantska Plovidba dd, IMO number 0096086) 
4) Inspection date: 2017 
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5) Inspection: initial inspection 
6) Port: Liverpool (UK) 
7) Number of deficiencies identified: 1  
To determine whether this vessel meets the requirement of PSC regulations, the port 
authority of Liverpool should input the information of this inspection into the proposed ‘Post-
NIR’ BN model, which is shown in Figure 3.14. The result indicated the detention rate was 
0.54%, demonstrating this vessel was standard and should not be detained.  
 
  
Figure 3.18 Inspection result prediction of Case I 
(Source: Author) 
In fact, the inspection record of case I in the Paris MoU online database showed this vessel 
passed the inspection, which coincides with the model result, illustrating the effectiveness of 
the model in PSC inspections.  
 
3.6.2 Case II  
The relevant information gathered from a bulk carrier that was to be inspected at the Port 
of Gibraltar on 06/10/2017 was: 
1) Vessel age: 12 years 
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2) Vessel flag: Panama (White list) 
3) Company performance: Very low (Irika Shipping SA, IMO number 5022255) 
4) Inspection date: 2017 
5) Inspection: Expanded inspection 
6) Port: Gibraltar 
7) Number of deficiencies identified: 16  
 
3.6.2.1 Perspective from the port authority of Gibraltar 
Port authorities aim to regulate the behaviour of ship owners to avoid potential accidents 
and ensure ship safety through their PSC inspections. The vessels at high risk need to be 
identified and detained. In this case, the port authority of Gibraltar could input the relevant 
information related to this inspection into the proposed BN model, the result indicated the 
detention rate was 58.5% under this condition in Figure 3.15. Compared to the normal 
detention rate 3.52%, the detention rate of this vessel was almost 17 times higher. 
Meanwhile, it was 108 times higher than the detention rate of the standard vessel in Case I 
(0.54%). Therefore, this vessel was sub-standard and port authority of Gibraltar needed to 
detain this vessel to avoid potential accidents at sea.  
In fact, if we check the result of this inspection from the Paris MoU database, this vessel is 
indeed detained, proving the effectiveness and accuracy of the model when making decisions 
for port authorities.   
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Figure 3.19 Perspective of Gibraltar Port authority  
(Source: Author) 
 
3.6.2.2 Perspective of the ship owner 
Once this ship owner was informed that their vessel was detained, they needed to address 
all the identified deficiencies. If the vessel were detained twice in succession, it would have a 
very high probability to be banned by the Paris MoU. Different from port authorities, ship 
owners care more for profits and thus evaluate whether the investment on repair/maintenance 
could help them avoid detention next time. In this regard, the BN model is helpful to 
rationalize their decisions. 
When the ship owner fixed the deficiencies according to the detention report and retains 
the vessel at a high quality status by reducing the number of deficiencies at a low level, e.g. 
‘1 to 3’, it can be accepted and managed by an ISM company that performs much better. 
When it was inspected in the Port of Gibraltar in this case, even under the worst situation 
with the combination of low company performance and expanded inspection type, the 
likelihood for its detention was only 0.54% shown in Figure 3.16. Therefore, it would 
strongly motivate the owner to rectify the deficiencies given it was proved to be beneficial.  
 
95 
 
 
Figure 3.20 Perspective of the ship owner 
(Source: Author) 
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CHAPTER 4 THE IMPACT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
NIR ON PSC INSPECTION SYSTEM 
Since being introduced in 2011, the Paris MoU continuously amended the related regulations 
and policies to improve the efficiency of the NIR. In this chapter, a comprehensive analysis is 
conducted to test the influence of the implementation of NIR on the PSC inspection results. 
From several different perspectives, a comparative analysis between the ‘Pre-NIR’ period and 
‘Post-NIR’ period is conducted, and the significance of the NIR is revealed to demonstrate its 
ability to transform and modernise the PSC inspection system in the Europe region.  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
PSC programs, which render port authorities the ability to inspect the foreign vessels in 
their own ports, have turned to port inspections to prevent shipping accidents and other risks 
from occurring in their legal waters. In recent years, it is regarded as the last line of defence 
in dealing with substandard vessels.  
In 2011, the much-anticipated NIR was finally launched on January 1st after many years 
of preparation. It was viewed as the most significant change that transforms and modernises 
the PSC system in recent years. Compared to the old system that was based on the agreement 
from 30 years ago, NIR introduced a radical change. The change was necessary to bring the 
Paris MoU in line again with global maritime developments, introduction of new IMO 
instruments and a better-balanced method of targeting and inspection of ships. The main 
objective during the development has been to reward quality shipping and to intensify control 
and sanctions on ships with poor performance. 
The new regime introduces a major departure from the “25% inspection commitment” and 
6-month inspection intervals, which overburdened the shipping industry and PSC authorities 
with inspections. When the criteria are met, quality ships will be rewarded with a “low risk 
ship” status and the inspection interval may be up to 36 months. Even “standard risk ships” 
benefit from the new system extending inspection intervals to up to 12 months. New to the 
system is that companies are now also monitored for performance, based on the inspection 
history of their ships. 
To balance the system, more resources will be directed to those ships with poor safety 
records, the “high risk ships”. These ships are subject to mandatory expanded inspections 
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every 6 months when they call at a Paris MoU port. A complex system of risk calculations, 
targeting and recording of inspections is supported by the new database “THETIS”, hosted 
and managed by EMSA in Lisbon. Results of inspections, currently detained ships and 
banned ships are now displayed directly from THETIS on the Paris MoU web site. 
It should be understood that substandard ships would no longer be tolerated in the region 
and with the new refusal of access measures in place, repeated offenders will be “banned” 
from our ports. This has happened to a substantial number of vessels already, some of which 
have been recycled in the meantime. Others choose to find new areas to operate, endangering 
the lives of the seafarers on board and constituting a risk for the environment. 
As a risk-based targeting mechanism, NIR rewards quality shipping with a reduced 
inspection burden and concentrates efforts on high-risk vessels. Making use of not only the 
performance of the flag state and the RO, but also the performance of the ISM Company for 
calculating the ship risk profile, it is expected to be a comprehensive regime ensuring the 
maritime safety and preventing illegal actions of ship owners.  
In order to figure out whether the implementation of NIR truly transforms the PSC system 
and brings significant influence on the inspection results, a comparative analysis between the 
‘Pre-NIR’ period and ‘Post-NIR’ period is conducted in this chapter. The key performance 
indicators (KPI) provided by the annual reports of the Paris MoU from 2005 to 2016 are 
utilized to analyse the influence of NIR from a macro-level perspective. In addition, with the 
help of two BN models, the micro-level changes that NIR brings to the PSC inspection 
system are revealed from different angles, e.g. influence of company performance, the 
sensitivity to detention, and the priority change of risk factors (vessel-related or inspection-
related).  
 
4.2 MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS - THE INFLUENCE OF NIR ON PSC 
INSPECTION 
In this section, a macro-level analysis is conducted to describe the impact of the 
implementation of NIR. The Paris MoU displays the detailed information and KPIs related to 
PSC inspection results on its website, which provides the data source for the analysis. 
Through the data collection process, the facts & figures of PSC inspections in 2005-2016 are 
summarized and listed from annual reports of the Paris MoU, including number of 
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inspections, number of inspected vessels, number of deficiencies, number of detainable 
deficiencies, number of detentions, and refusal access of vessels. The statistics are specific to 
different vessel types. Each category corresponds to an important aspect to judge the 
efficiency of the NIR and represents a criterion to estimate the overall quality and safe 
condition of inspected vessels. Understanding the changes of PSC inspections in these 
aspects is essential for us to clarify the macro-level influence brought by NIR on the PSC 
inspection system. Unlike the BN models developed in Chapter 3, the statistics collected 
from the Paris MoU focus on all vessel types, not the bulk carriers only. 
 
4.2.1 General analysis 
4.2.1.1 Facts & Figures 
To start our research, the facts and statistics about PSC inspections are collected in 
chronological order from 2005 to 2016, containing various aspects of the previous and 
current conditions of the PSC inspections in recent decades. The number of inspections, the 
individual vessels inspected, the number of deficiencies, the detainable deficiencies, the 
number of detentions, and the number of access refusals each year are all recorded in the 
database and considered in this study. The changes in these aspects are important signals 
representing the influence brought by NIR, because these are all important KPIs in the PSC 
inspection system, as stated in Paris MoU official statements. Table 4.1 lists these KPIs value 
derived from Paris MoU annual reports in 2005-2016. Because of the lack of statistics, the 
detainable deficiencies in 2005 and 2006 are vacant. 
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Table 4.1 The facts of PSC inspection from 2015 to 2016 
Year Inspections 
Individual 
vessels 
Deficiencies 
Detainable 
deficiencies 
Detentions 
Refusal of 
access to ships 
2016 17840 15234 41857 3769 683 20 
2015 17877 15225 41777 3513 610 11 
2014 18477 15386 46224 3155 623 21 
2013 17687 14108 49074 3231 668 29 
2012 18308 14646 49261 2882 669 14 
2011 19058 15268 50738 3080 688 20 
2010 24058 14762 64698 3866 790 6 
2009 24186 14753 71911 5451 1059 13 
2008 24647 15237 83751 6280 1220 19 
2007 22877 14182 74713 6434 1250 14 
2006 21566 13417 66142 - 1174 14 
2005 21302 13024 62434 - 994 28 
(Source: Paris MoU) 
It is worth noting that some of the statistics in Table 4.1 may not suitable to use for 
analysis directly. For example, the number of deficiencies per year experienced a huge 
decline (e.g. 64698 in 2010 and 50738 in 2011) when NIR was implemented in 2011, 
however, at the same time, the inspections per year also reduced largely from 24058 to 
19058. If simply drawing the conclusion that the PSC inspection system improved a lot 
because of the decline in the number of deficiencies, the analysis would be one-sided as the 
decline in the number of inspections is a signal of a negative effect on the PSC inspection 
system. The mutual contradiction of the facts hinders our analysis. Hence, in order to make 
the conclusions reasonable, some KPIs in Table 4.1 need to be adjusted to help the research.  
To support the analysis, deficiency rate, average inspected time per vessel, detainable 
deficiency rate, detention rate and refusal rate are calculated to replace some KPIs in table 
4.1, like the number of deficiencies, the number of detainable deficiencies, the number of 
detentions, and the number of access refusals. Table 4.2 presents the calculated results. 
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Table 4.2 The results of inspection-related rates in 2005-2016 
Year 
Deficiency 
rate 
Average inspected 
time per vessel 
Detainable 
deficiency rate 
Detention 
rate 
Refusal rate 
2016 2.346 1.171 0.211 3.83% 0.11% 
2015 2.337 1.174 0.197 3.41% 0.06% 
2014 2.502 1.201 0.171 3.37% 0.11% 
2013 2.775 1.254 0.183 3.78% 0.16% 
2012 2.691 1.250 0.157 3.65% 0.08% 
2011 2.662 1.248 0.162 3.61% 0.10% 
2010 2.689 1.630 0.161 3.28% 0.02% 
2009 2.973 1.639 0.225 4.38% 0.05% 
2008 3.398 1.618 0.255 4.95% 0.08% 
2007 3.266 1.613 0.281 5.46% 0.06% 
2006 3.067 1.607 / 5.44% 0.06% 
2005 2.931 1.636 / 4.67% 0.13% 
(Source: Author) 
Based on the statistics in Table 4.1 and 4.2, the macro-level analysis is carried out 
focusing on these aspects, which is presented in the following sections.  
 
4.2.1.2 Change in the number of inspections & individual vessels 
According to the Table 4.1, the number of inspections & inspected vessels per year are 
picked up and used to form the column chart showed in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1 Number of inspections and individual vessels in 2005-2016 
(Source: Author) 
From Figure 4.1, several changes related to the two KPIs because of the implementation of 
NIR are revealed. 
1) It is obvious to find that there was a decrease in the number of inspections, but an 
increase in the number of individual inspected vessels in 2011 when NIR was implemented.  
The phenomenon is one of the influences that NIR brings to us. In the previous inspection 
system, each member state of the Paris MoU would inspect 25% of the individual vessels 
calling at their ports, which is called national commitment. However, under new regime, each 
member only inspects the vessels visiting the ports and anchorages in the Paris MoU region. 
The transformation from national commitment to regional commitment results in the change 
of targeting of inspected vessels. Since 2011, the annual inspection target for each member 
state is based on ship movement data rather than individual ship calls and dedicated quality 
shipping is rewarded with longer inspection intervals. Consequently, the number of 
inspections executed per year dropped.  
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2) From 2011, the number of inspections and individual inspected vessels continued to 
drop, except 2014, when both indicators increased slightly. 
Under the new inspection system, the recorded ships will be categorized into three risk 
types: low risk ship, standard risk ship, and high-risk ship. For different types of vessels, the 
inspection intervals are different. HRS has a 5 to 6 months interval, SRS has a 10 to 12 
months interval, while LRS has a 24 to 36 month interval. In other words, the inspection on 
HRS is semi-annual, while it is annually for SRS and 2-3 years for LRS. Hence, when it 
comes to 2014, the third year since the NIR was implemented, a large number of LRS needed 
to be inspected, indicating an increase in both the number of inspections and individual 
inspected vessels.  
Meanwhile, because SRP is re-calculated on a daily basis, when an SRS or HRS is 
inspected next time, it may be upgraded to a safer level, thus leading to a decreasing trend in 
both indicators.  
3) Since NIR was implemented, both the number of inspections and the inspected vessels 
per year remain stable compared to the former inspection system.  
After the implementation of NIR, the number of inspections per year was around 18,000, 
except the first year of implementation that had about 19,000. Meanwhile, the number of 
inspected vessels per year has bounced around in a tight range near 15,000. All these signs 
indicated that the implementation of NIR made the PSC inspection system more stable than 
ever. Additionally, the fewer inspections carried out per year reduced the workload and the 
consumed resources of port authorities 
 
4.2.1.3 Change in deficiency rate and detainable deficiency rate 
Figure 4.2 presents a column chart for the change of deficiency rate and detainable 
deficiency rate from 2005 to 2016. Here deficiency rate refers to the average number of 
deficiencies per inspection; detainable deficiency rate goes the same. The trend in the figure 
reveals several changes that NIR brings to the inspection system. 
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Figure 4.2 Deficiency rate and detainable deficiency rate in 2005-2016 
(Source: Author) 
1) The introduction of NIR significantly reduced the deficiency rate and detainable 
deficiency rate of vessels inspected under the Paris MoU inspection system. (Year 2010 is a 
special case that will not be considered)  
Although the number of inspections and deficiencies decreased simultaneously since the 
NIR was implemented, the descending trends of deficiency rate and detainable deficiency 
rate in Figure 4.2 reveals the decline in the number of deficiencies and detainable deficiencies 
(positive effect of NIR) was greater than the number of inspections (negative effect), which 
demonstrate the effectiveness and applicability of the NIR.  
For the year 2010, the Paris MoU conducted a Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) 
on tanker damage stability that came into effect from 1st September to 30th November. This 
activity prompted every tanker (e.g. oil, gas, chemical) operator to improve their vessels’ 
quality and the relevant documentation to comply with applicable regulations. Hence, 2010 
was a special year that had the lowest deficiency rate before 2011, in spite of the NIR has not 
been implemented.  
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2) Since NIR was implemented, the deficiency rate maintained a downward trend, from 
2.662 in 2011 to 2.346 in 2016, especially in 2014, where there was a huge decline. On the 
contrary, the detainable deficiency rate experienced a slightly increase.  
The contradictory trends of deficiency rate and detainable deficiency rate form an 
interesting situation. On the one hand, the continuous improvements of NIR urged the ship 
owners to pay more attention to the quality of their vessels, thus resulting in a descending 
trend of deficiency rate. For example, in 2014, 55% of the performed inspections had one or 
more deficiencies, and in 2013, this figure was 58%. The decline of deficiency rate reflected 
the improvement of the vessel quality. 
However, on the other hand, the passion and motivation of ship owners weakened after the 
‘honeymoon’ of the NIR. It will cost them a lot to maintain and repair the vessels, especially 
in those places that may cause detainable deficiencies. Hence, the pathology of gambling 
makes them unwilling to maintain the quality of vessels and hope to pass the inspection by 
luck. The changes in psychology may be an important reason for the increase in the 
detainable deficiency rate, and such mentality will be explained in detail in the next chapter.  
 
4.2.1.4 Change on detention rate  
As the most intuitive KPI, detention rate reflects the overall inspection situation over a 
period. Figure 4.3 illustrates the variation of the detention rate in the last decade, from 2005 
to 2016.  
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Figure 4.3 Trend of detention rate in 2005-2016 
(Source: Author) 
1) Overall, the detention rate after 2011 is lower and more stable compared to the period 
before NIR.  
Although in 2010, the detention rate declined sharply and reached the lowest point in the 
past decade, the overall detention rate before and after the implementation NIR is widely 
different, which is demonstrated as follows: 
Detention rate from 2011-2016: 6487/138636=4.68% 
Detention rate from 2011-2016: 3941/109247=3.61% 
The improvement on detention rate: (4.68%-3.61%)/4.68%= 22.86% 
The calculation above shows that the detention rate dropped 22.86% since NIR was 
implemented. It is obvious that the introduction of NIR indeed improved the operation of the 
PSC inspection system and stimulated the ship owners to spend more on the maintenance of 
the quality of their vessels.  
Meanwhile, the range of fluctuation of detention rate after 2011 is less than 0.5%, far 
lower than the 2.18% range in 2005-2010, demonstrating the PSC inspection system is 
currently running healthily and stable.   
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2) Before the implementation of NIR, the detention rate dropped to 3.28%, the lowest point 
until now.  
This interesting phenomenon can be explained by the following reasons. 
First, as mentioned before, the Paris MoU conducted a Concentrated Inspection Campaign 
(CIC) on tanker damage stability that came into effect from 1st September to 30th November 
in 2010. This activity prompted every tanker (e.g. oil, gas, chemical) operator to improve 
their vessels’ quality and the relevant documentation to comply with applicable regulations. 
Hence, the overall quality of vessel types was much better. 
Second, although NIR was implemented in 2011, it was announced by the Paris MoU in 
2009 that a new and more rigid inspection regime would come into force in 2011. In order to 
better adapt to the new system when it came out, most ship owners chose to improve the 
quality of their vessels as much as possible to avoid severe punishment if NIR was 
implemented later. Hence, the overall quality of the vessels in maritime transportation 
improved, resulting in a lower detention rate reflected by the PSC inspection system. 
3) Year 2014 witnessed a relatively huge decrease in the detention rate. However, the 
detention rate increased a lot in 2016, for the first time since 2013. 
There are two interesting points after the implementation of NIR. One is 2014, when there 
was an increase in the number of inspections. The majority of the growing segment was LRS, 
leading to a decreasing tendency of detention rate.  
The other is 2016, when the detention rate reached the peak value since the introduction of 
the NIR in 2011, along with the highest value of detainable deficiency rate. Under the rising 
economic pressures, some ship owners decided to choose to cut corners in areas where it is 
possible to reduce the operating costs of their vessels. Cooperating with some shipping 
companies, they made the deliberate choices to operate sub-standard vessels, mainly because 
the costs of running a ‘bona fide operation’ outweigh the risk of being detained and rectifying 
deficiencies. As the ship operators are getting more and more familiar with the NIR, it is 
predictable that the detention rate may remain at a relatively high level compared with the 
first two or three years. It is noteworthy that the Paris MoU increases the penalties to ensure 
the sub-standard shipping will not flourish, for example, the number of banned vessels in 
recent years.  
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4.2.1.5 Other KPIs 
Besides the KPIs mentioned above, the average number of inspections per ship and the 
refusal rate per ship are also indicators may reflecting the influence of NIR.  
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 use the line charts to describe the trend of average number of 
inspections per ship and the refusal rate. Through the investigation on the charts, the 
influence of NIR on these two aspects is revealed below: 
 
 
Figure 4.4 The trends of average number of inspections/vessel 
(Source: Author) 
108 
 
 
Figure 4.5 The trends of refusal rate of vessel access 
(Source: Author) 
1) The implementation of NIR significantly reduced the burden on the ship owners (from 
1.6 inspections/year to 1.2 inspections/year). 
The number of inspections per vessel per year can represent the inspection burden on the 
ship owners. A higher value of this indicator means that the vessel needs to be subjected to 
more inspections per year, increasing the burden on its ship owner.  
Since NIR was implemented, this indicator dropped from 1.6 to approximate 1.2. The 
huge decrease on this indicator is a signal that the cost to ship owners of preparing for PSC 
inspections reduced a lot, representing a positive effect brought by NIR to ship owners. 
2) NIR has no influence on the refusal rate of vessel access.  
According to the statistics, the access refusal rate of vessels was the only indicator that 
NIR had no influence on in the past decade. One possible reason for this is that the refusal of 
a vessel is a rare event in PSC inspections that may only occur 10 to 20 times per year. This 
kind of rare event is hard to control for port authorities, because the sampling size is too 
small.  
 
109 
 
4.2.2 Influence of NIR on different vessel types 
In section 4.2.1, the statistics reveals that every year over 10,000 individual vessels are 
inspected at the ports within the region of the Paris MoU, including bulk carrier, chemical 
tanker, combination carrier, etc. Different vessel types have different inspection performance, 
reflecting the overall quality of the vessels. Since the implementation of NIR, different vessel 
types adopted different measures to cope with the new inspection system and regulations, 
resulting in different changes in the performance during the inspections. In this section, to 
figure out the influence of NIR on vessel types, an analysis on the variation of some 
important KPIs is carried out. The results revealed clarify the impact degree of different 
vessel types. 
Due to the fact that more than 20 types of vessels are inspected at ports, it is difficult and 
impossible to analyse all of them. Hence, only the types having more than 1,000 inspections 
every year are selected, including the following five vessel types: general cargo vessel, 
container, bulk carrier, chemical tanker and oil tanker. 
 
4.2.2.1 Number of inspections 
As the most direct indicator, the changes in the number of inspections brings the most 
remarkable perception on the influence of NIR. Figure 4.6 illustrates the trend of number of 
inspections of different vessel types from 2005-2016.  
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Figure 4.6 Number of inspections of different vessel types in 2005-2016 
(Source: Author) 
1) The inspections on general cargo vessels were far more than other vessel types, 
however, the gap narrowed since the implementation of NIR. In addition, the gap has become 
smaller and smaller over the last decade. (e.g. in 2008, the inspections on general cargo 
vessels were 9,851, the second was bulk carrier with 3,684; in 2016, the inspections on 
general cargo vessels and bulk carriers were 5,048 and 3,619, respectively.) 
2) When NIR was implemented in 2011, most of the vessel types experienced a huge drop 
in the number of inspections, except bulk carriers, which remained at almost the same 
number of inspections. 
3) After 2011, the inspections on general cargo vessels maintain a momentum of decline, 
while other vessel types (bulk carrier, container, chemical tanker and oil tanker) remained 
stable until 2016.  
Overall, the implementation of NIR reduced the number of inspections of most vessel 
types, and kept this number at a steady level.  
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4.2.2.2 The percentage of inspections with deficiencies 
Among the inspections performed, some inspections recorded one or more deficiencies, 
others refer to the vessels without faults. Although having deficiencies does not mean the 
inspected vessels are sub-standard, the percentage of inspections with deficiencies is still an 
important indicator to measure the overall quality of the inspected vessels. Figure 4.7 
presents this KPI of different vessel types. To simplify the work, this KPI is referred as 
‘PID’. 
  
Figure 4.7 Percentage of inspections with deficiencies of different vessel types in 2005-2016 
(Source: Author) 
1) When NIR was implemented in 2011, the PID of most vessel types experienced a more 
or less growing tendency, except bulk carrier, indicating bulk carrier owners adapted to the 
new regulations better.  
2) In 2013, the PID of all vessel types reached the peak value at the same time. 
Subsequently, the values began to drop, revealing more efforts are made by the ship owners 
to maintain the vessel quality from 2014.  
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3) In 2016, the PID of the general cargo vessels and the chemical tankers increased, 
especially the general cargo vessel, mainly because the ship owners of these vessels took 
risks to pass the inspection at the lowest cost due to the economic pressures. (The detailed 
explanation can be found in 5.3.1.4) 
Figure 5.7 tells us that the deficiency rate of most vessel types did not change much, 
except bulk carriers, which had a lower deficiency rate compared to the ‘Pre-NIR’ period.   
 
4.2.2.3 The detention rate 
The trends of detention rates of different vessel types, as well as the average detention 
rate, are depicted in the Figure 4.8. Through the comparison between the different curves in 
the following figure, several conclusions can be made (the average detention rate is referred 
as ‘ADR’, presented in a black line). 
 
Figure 4.8 Detention rate of different vessel types in 2005-2016 
(Source: Author) 
1) In general, the detention rate of these vessel types all dropped, indicating the positive 
influence on detention rate of NIR suited for the major vessel types in the PSC inspection 
system.  
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2) The detention rate of bulk carrier is mostly the same with the ADR, indicating the bulk 
carrier can be used to represent the inspection system. (This is part of the reason that bulk 
carriers are selected as the target vessel type.) 
3) The detention rate of general cargo vessel is much higher than ADR, revealing general 
cargo vessels as the most dangerous and risky vessel type under NIR.  
4) Container vessels, chemical tankers and oil tankers have better performance and lower 
detention rates.  
5) After 2011, the detention rates of different vessel types remained stable in general, 
except 2016, when the situation became worse and the detention rates increased.  
 
4.2.3 Summary 
In this part, the influence brought by NIR is clarified from the perspective of macro-level 
analysis. As a summary, the influence is classified into three types: positive influence, 
negative influence, and no influence. Only the influence related to trends is considered, 
meaning those special cases in a particular year are not taken into account in this part. 
Positive influence 
1) From 2011, the number of inspections and individual inspected vessels continued to 
drop, except 2014, when both indicators increased slightly. 
2) Since NIR was implemented, both the number of inspections and the inspected vessels 
per year remained stable compared to the former inspection system.  
3) The introduction of NIR significantly reduced the deficiency rate and detainable 
deficiency rate in the Paris MoU inspection system.  
4) Since NIR was implemented, the deficiency rate maintained a downward trend, from 
2.662 in 2011 to 2.346 in 2016, especially in 2014, when there was a huge decline.  
5) The detention rate after 2011 was lower and more stable compared to the period before 
NIR.  
 6) The implementation of NIR significantly reduced the burden on the ship owners (from 
1.6 inspections/year to 1.2 inspections/year). 
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7) The implementation of NIR reduced the number of inspections of most vessel types, 
and kept this number at a steady level.  
8) The detention rate of all vessel types dropped, indicating the positive influence on 
detention rate of NIR suited for the major vessel types in the PSC inspection system.  
Negative influence 
1) The detainable deficiency rate experienced a slightly increased trend after the 
implementation of NIR. 
No influence 
1) NIR has no influence on the access refusal rate of vessels.  
2) The deficiency rate of major vessel types did not change much, except bulk carriers, 
which had a lower deficiency rate compared to the ‘Pre-NIR’ period.   
In summary, the implementation of NIR is a positive action from the macro-level 
perspective. Most of the influence brought by NIR is beneficial for the management of port 
authorities and maritime safety. 
 
4.3 MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS - THE INFLUENCE OF NIR ON PSC 
INSPECTION 
To fulfil the study, a micro-level analysis of the NIR influence on PSC inspection is 
reviewed in this section. The two proposed BN models, ‘Pre-NIR’ and ‘Post-NIR’, provide 
the opportunity for us to carry out this part of research. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the PSC 
BN model can estimate the detention rate, reveal the inner relationships between different 
risk factors, and identify the degree of importance of individual variables. Due to the different 
periods that two BNs focus on, the results obtained from two BNs are different, reflecting the 
micro-level changes brought about by the implementation of NIR. 
 The analysis is conducted from the following perspectives, including 1) the comparison of 
influence degree of risk factors; 2) Company performance impact; 3) Prior probability 
change; 4) the role of different factor groups. Each aspect is one of the results and 
implications that can be obtained from BN, and represents the possible changes brought by 
the implementation of NIR. Through the comparison of the information of these aspects in 
two BNs, the micro-level influence of NIR on the PSC inspection system will be clear. 
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Figuring out the evolution of NIR in micro-level aspects is essential to understand the essence 
of NIR, as well as its intrinsic effects.  
 
4.3.1 Sensitivity to detention -The influence degree of risk factors under different periods 
According to previous analysis on mutual information, only the nodes having strong 
relationships with ‘detention’ are selected to conduct the scenario simulations and TRI 
calculation. In section 3.3.6 and section 3.4.6, the selected nodes of two models are 
presented. Each model picks six nodes to do the comparison. 
Pre-NIR: Inspection group, Vessel group, Number of inspections, Type of inspections, 
Vessel flag, RO 
Post-NIR: Inspection group, Vessel group, Number of inspections, Type of inspection, 
Vessel age, Company performance 
For different periods, the selected nodes and the results of sensitivity analysis (TRI) are 
different, revealing the influence degree of risk factors on inspection results changes over 
time. Due to the fact that the value of TRI represents the degree of importance of the nodes, it 
is necessary to compare the results of two BNs to clarify the changes caused by NIR in this 
aspect.   
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 presents the results of sensitivity analysis from both ‘Pre-NIR’ 
BN and ‘Post-NIR’ BN as proposed in Chapter 3.  
Table 4.3 Results of sensitivity analysis (Pre-NIR) 
Sensitivity to ‘detention’ （Pre-NIR） 
Node Mutual  Info Percent (%) TRI (%) 
Inspection group 0.09654 36.4 17.34 
Number of deficiencies 0.09386 35.3 16.98 
Type of inspection 0.01464 5.51 7.27 
Vessel group 0.00140 0.527 4.59 
RO 0.00025 0.0933 2.86 
Vessel flag 0.00025 0.0929 0.3 
(Source: Author) 
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Table 4.4 Results of sensitivity analysis (Post-NIR) 
Sensitivity to ‘detention’ (Post-NIR) 
Node Mutual  Info Percent (%) TRI (%) 
Inspection group 0.06135 29.7 15.87 
Number of deficiencies 0.04891 23.7 17.48 
Vessel group 0.03622 17.5 7.17 
Company Performance 0.02659 12.9 6 
Vessel age 0.00638 3.09 3.2 
Type of inspection 0.00579 2.8 2.24 
(Source: Author) 
Through the comparison between the results of two periods, several findings are 
concluded with respect to the influence of NIR.  
1) In general, the stronger relationship with ‘detention’, the greater influence on the 
inspection results it will be.  
2) Since NIR was implemented, the relationships between risk factors and ‘detention’ have 
become closer and stronger. This change is reflected in the percentage of mutual information 
(PMI). In ‘Pre-NIR’ model, the gap of the PMI value between the first two factors and other 
factors is huge (35.3% for ‘number of deficiencies’, 5.51% for ‘type of inspection’, and other 
factors lower than 1%), which is abnormal for the inspection system. As a comparison, the 
gap between different risk factors is narrowed since the implementation of NIR (29.7%, 
23.7%, 17.5%, 12.9% respectively), indicating the influence of different risk factors on 
inspection results are becoming closer under the new situations.  
In a word, the implementation of NIR provides a healthier and more reasonable inspection 
system for port authorities. Within the system, every risk factor is endowed with scientific 
influence on the inspection results.  
3) After the implementation of NIR, the number of deficiencies becomes the most 
influential factor in PSC inspection. 
4) Vessel group, as well as the vessel age, are paid more attention since the 
implementation of NIR.  
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5) The newly added factor, company performance, indeed influences the inspection results 
to some extent. Although not as influential as ‘number of deficiencies’, it is still one of the 
factors that should be of concern to port authorities.  
6) Before the implementation of NIR, inspection type was one of the most influential 
factors. However, after 2011, the TRI value of inspection type drops from 7.27% to 2.24%, 
indicating it is no longer as important as it used be.  
7) Compared to other factors, the relationships with ‘detention’ of RO and vessel flag are 
relatively weak, hence not listed in the table after the implementation of NIR.  
 
4.3.2 Company performance impact 
As a newly added factor in the PSC inspection system, company performance plays an 
important role when calculating the SRP of the vessels. It is viewed as one of the significant 
improvements and changes on the inspection system stated by many PSCOs and members of 
the Paris MoU. The analysis of degree of importance above has already proved that company 
performance indeed has an important effect on the occurrence probability of detention, and 
even within the range of the most influential factors.   
In this section, the effect of company performance is further clarified. The sensitivity 
analysis with respect to the given states of company performance is shown is Table 4.5, 
including the detention rates and changes rate to the normal condition.  
Table 4.5 Effect of company performance 
High Medium Low Very low Detention rate Changes rate 
- - - - 3.25%  
100% 0 0 0 1.49% -54.15% 
0 100% 0 0 1.32% -59.38% 
0 0 100% 0 9.17% +182.15% 
0 0 0 100% 14.9% +358.46% 
(Source: Author) 
In this table, ‘-‘means the reduction of detention rate, ‘+’ means the increment of detention 
rate. 
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 1) If the performance of the management company is poor, the changes in the detention 
rate will be huge, up to 182.15% (low), and even 358.46% (very low).   
2) On the contrary, a high or medium performance ISM company will reduce the detention 
rate to some extent, and there is no big difference between high company performance and 
medium company performance.  
3) The attitudes of port authorities towards vessels under the management of low and very 
low shipping companies are rigorous, much more than the benefits gained from selecting a 
high/medium management company.    
4) The huge change in the inspection results of different performance levels reflects 
company performance is viewed as a high risk factor from the perspective of port authorities, 
demonstrating the fact that an ISM company is no longer beyond the control of the PSC 
inspection system. 
 
4.3.3 Prior probability change 
Another change lies in the prior probabilities of risk factors before and after the 
implementation of NIR. The investigation on this aspect can help reveal the change on 
actions taken by port authorities and ship owners under NIR, respectively. The involved 
factors are vessel age, vessel flag, inspection type, and port of inspection. Table 4.6 lists the 
related information. Canada and Greece in the Post-NIR model are not considered, because 
they are not within the range of the states of ‘port of inspection’ in the Pre-NIR model. 
Hence, a normalization on the other seven countries after the implementation of NIR is 
conducted and presented in the table. 
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Table 4.6 Comparison of prior probability before and after NIR 
Vessel flag 
 Black (High) Black Grey White    
Pre-NIR 0.0103 0.2218 0.0671 0.7008    
Post-NIR 0.0077 0.0109 0.0150 0.9664    
Vessel age 
 0to5Years 5to10Years 10to15Years 15to20Years Over20Years   
Pre-NIR 0.1340 0.1392 0.1519 0.0752 0.4998   
Post-NIR 0.2633 0.3884 0.1876 0.1051 0.0556   
Port of inspection 
 Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain UK 
Pre-NIR 0.1297 0.1360 0.0866 0.1564 0.1243 0.2356 0.1315 
Post-NIR 0.0806 0.1057 0.1027 0.1593 0.1975 0.2072 0.1470 
Inspection type 
 Initial More detailed Expanded     
Pre-NIR 0.2814 0.3668 0.3518     
Post-NIR 0.3447 0.4319 0.2234     
(Source: Author) 
It is obvious to find there are huge changes on the prior probabilities of these aspects, 
indicating various trends on the inspections. 
1) The flag performance of inspected vessels improves a lot and almost all the inspected 
vessels have a white list flag.  
After 2011, more and more ship owners select flag states that are listed on the white list of 
the Paris MoU (from 0.7008 to 0.9664). On the contrary, the percentage of selecting black list 
flag states declined sharply from 0.2218 to 0.0109, and the other two states of ‘vessel flag’ 
experience a slightly drop as well. 
2) Young vessels replace the position of old vessels and become the majority part of 
inspected vessels.  
Currently, the majority of inspected vessels are young vessels under 10 years old, 
occupying over 60% of the total number. This figure was only around 27% before the 
120 
 
implementation of NIR. Meanwhile, the percentage of vessels over 20 years old drops 
significantly from 49.98% to 5.56%. 
3) There is not much change in the port of inspection before and after the introduction of 
NIR. 
As an unimportant risk factor, the places of inspections seem not to have been influenced 
by the implementation of NIR. The percentage of inspections taking place in seven major 
costal countries in Europe remains almost the same, except Netherlands, which had a small 
increase (from 12.43% to 19.75%) in this area.  
4) More-detailed inspections is the preferred inspection type of port authorities.  
Before NIR was implemented, port authorities executed almost the same number of more 
detailed inspections and expanded inspections. However, since the overall quality of vessels 
has improved nowadays, more and more initial and more-detailed inspections are carried out, 
and the percentage of expanded inspections has decreased from 35.18% to 22.34%.  
 
4.3.4 The role of ‘vessel group’ and ‘inspection group’ 
Although ‘vessel group’ and ‘inspection group’ are two dummy variables introduced to 
reduce the calculation work of CPTs, they actually represent the overall level of vessel-
related risks and inspection-related risks. Understanding the changes of the impact degree of 
two factors is essential to figure out which part is more risky and which part is paid more 
attention compared to the former inspection system.  
Table 4.7 illustrates the changes rate of two variables under different scenarios. ‘-‘means 
the reduction of detention rate, ‘+’ means the increment of detention rate. 
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Table 4.7 The change on ‘vessel group’ and ‘inspection group’ 
Inspection Pre-NIR Post-NIR Vessel Pre-NIR Post-NIR 
Prior 
probability 
4.52% 3.25% 
Prior 
probability 
4.52% 3.25% 
Posterior 
probability 
(High) 
35.70% 32.90% 
Posterior 
probability 
(High) 
8.87% 15.60% 
Changes rate +689.80% +912.30% Changes rate +96.20% +380% 
Posterior 
probability 
(Low) 
1.03% 1.16% 
Posterior 
probability 
(Low) 
4.28% 1.26% 
Changes rate -77.20% -64.30% Changes rate -5.30% -61.20% 
 (Source: Author) 
The changes on this aspect are obvious, which is presented as follows. 
1) Compared to the previous system, both the high inspection risk and high vessel risk 
vessels will have much higher chances to be detained by port authorities under the new 
inspection system.  
2) Nowadays, vessels having low vessel-related risks will have a huge reduction in the 
detention rate when accepting inspections, stimulating the ship owners to be more concerned 
about the vessel quality.  
3) No matter whether it was before or after the implementation of NIR, inspection-related 
risks are always the top priority of port authorities. However, vessel-related risks are no 
longer an indifferent part compared to inspection-related risks and have gradually become 
crucial to the inspection results. 
4) The changes on the inspection and vessel risks demonstrate that port authorities are 
vigilant to all potential risks and will no longer tolerate any types of risk.  
 
4.3.5 Summary 
Based on the proposed BNs in Chapter 3, the influence of NIR from the micro-level angle 
is clearly understood. Similar to the findings in the macro-level analysis, some changes are 
positive, while other changes may not act as expected. As a summary, the intrinsic changes 
and influence on the PSC inspection system are categorized into three types: positive 
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changes, negative changes, and neutral changes (Those changes do not affect the system). 
The summary can tell us whether the implementation of NIR is beneficial for port authorities 
and ship owners, even for the maritime transportation system.  
Positive changes 
1) Since NIR was implemented, the relationships between risk factors and the inspection 
results have become closer and stronger. 
2) Vessel-related risk factors are paid more attention since the implementation of NIR.  
3) The newly added factor, company performance, is viewed as an important risk factor 
that greatly affects the final inspection results. The vessels under high and medium company 
management are highly unlikely to be detained; on the other hand, low and very low ISM 
companies are on the ‘black list’ of all ports within the range of the Paris MoU and have 
greatly increased chances of detention. 
4) The attitudes of port authorities towards vessels under the management of low and very 
low shipping companies are rigorous, much more than the benefits gained from selecting a 
high/medium management company for inspection. 
5) The flag performance of inspected vessels improves a lot and almost all the inspected 
vessels have a white list flag.  
6) The age of inspected vessels from 2011 is becoming younger, indicating the 
implementation of NIR eliminated those low quality old vessels.  
7) Compared to the previous system, both the high inspection risk and high vessel risk 
vessels will have much higher chances to be detained by port authorities under the new 
inspection system.  
8) Vessels having low vessel-related risks will have a huge reduction in the detention rate 
when accepting inspections, stimulating the ship owners to be more concerned about the 
vessel quality.  
9) Vessel-related risks are no longer an indifferent part compared to inspection-related 
risks and have gradually become crucial to the inspection results. 
10) Port authorities are vigilant to all potential risks and will no longer tolerate any types 
of risk 
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Neutral changes 
1) After the implementation of NIR, the number of deficiencies becomes the most 
influential factor in PSC inspections. 
2) There is not much change in the port of inspection before and after the introduction of 
NIR. 
3) More-detailed inspections is the preferred inspection type for port authorities.  
Negative changes 
1) Inspection type was no longer as important as it used be.  
2) The influence of RO and vessel flag greatly reduced compared to the former system. 
In a word, the implementation of NIR provides a healthier and more reasonable inspection 
system for port authorities. Under the operation of the new regime, the vessel quality is 
guaranteed and the maritime safety is ensured. 
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CHAPTER 5 A RISK-BASED GAME MODEL FOR RATIONAL 
INSPECTIONS IN PORT STATE CONTROL 
This chapter develops a risk-based game model via payoff matrix based on Bayesian network 
(BN) for guiding the ship owner and the port authority to make optimal decision strategies in 
PSC inspections. The results obtained from the BN model are used to help determine the 
crucial factors influencing the ship owner and port authority’s decision on PSC inspections 
and their values in the game model. During this process, the risk-based PSC decision model 
through the innovative incorporation of game theory and BN, for the first time, takes into 
account the new role of International Shipping Management (ISM) (i.e. the third party) 
companies introduced by NIR in the game decision and exploits a rational and feasible way 
to analyse PSC inspection practice since NIR was implemented. 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
During an inspection, PSC officers will select high-risk vessels for inspection according to 
the risk estimation mechanism suggested by the regional PSC organizations (Xu, et al., 
2007). Since established in 1982, PSC is gradually viewed as the last safety line of defence 
against sub-standard vessels because it effectively restricted the appearance of the vessels not 
fully following the relevant safety regulations. Nevertheless, it is not perfect, leaving the 
holes to be addressed and new solutions to be explored. According to the PSC inspection 
records, every year a large number of vessels do not comply with the regulations reckoned by 
port authorities and fail to pass the inspections.  
Generally, the ship owners need to prepare many works to make their vessels meet the 
requirements of PSC inspections, for example, selecting a high performance ISM company, 
investing capital to improve quality of vessels, and employing some experienced staff. 
However, because of the large amount of funds invested, especially the high maintenance 
cost, some ship owners do not tackle the safety loopholes of their vessels in time, leading to 
high risks of the vessels being detained.  
Although facing huge punishment when the vessel is detained, the ship owners still 
gamble on the inspection, as they understand the PSC regulations well, and that it is 
impossible for port authorities to inspect all the vessels arriving at the port due to limited 
resources. Hence, on this matter, different ship owners make different decisions according to 
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the characteristics, the circumstances, the resources owned, and the judgments on the 
regulations of destination ports.  
From the perspective of the port authority, it costs them a lot to inspect a vessel. The 
limited resources, which include both the funding and the human resources (the PSC 
officers), restrict the amount of inspection that can be carried out. In general, the funds for the 
MoU are provided by each member, and the inspection costs are thus borne by them. The 
ports have the right to decide the resources they put into each inspection, and MoU cannot 
and could not charge any of them. Although having the convenience, port authorities still 
need to spend a lot on inspections to ensure the quality and effectiveness of them. Every day, 
many vessels will visit the port, and the costs are increased with higher inspection rates. Port 
authorities need to get further funds from some other finance channels, as well as recruit and 
train more related personnel to take charge of on-board inspections.  
On the other hand, excessive PSC inspections may harm the competitiveness of the port 
and increase the burden on ship owners, leading some ship owners to turn to other 
destinations that may have a more relaxed inspection policy (Li, et al., 2015). Further, 
excessive controls, increasing delays, tied up capacities, inventory costs etc., may also be 
translated into costs ultimately paid by the customers (Goss, 1989). 
Therefore, striking a PSC inspection balance between port authorities and ship owners 
requires a scientific decision for rational policymaking. While the port authorities aim at 
motivating ship owners to maintain their vessels at a high safety level to mitigate maritime 
accidents, ship owners care more about minimization of the associated costs. Such conflicts 
of interest therefore forms an antagonistic relationship between the two stakeholders, which 
is called the inspection game.  
An inspection game is a mathematical model of a non-cooperative situation where an 
inspector verifies that another party, called inspectee, adheres to legal rules. The inspector 
wishes to deter illegal activity on the part of the inspectee and, should illegal activity 
nevertheless take place, detect it with the highest possible probability and as soon as possible. 
The inspectee may have some incentive to violate his commitments and violation, if 
observed, will incur punishment. Therefore, if he chooses illegal behaviour, the inspectee will 
wish to avoid detection with the highest possible probability. In PSC inspection, port 
authorities are inspectors and ship owners are inspectees.  
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To improve the PSC inspection system, the much-anticipated New Inspection Regime 
(NIR) was launched in 2011. According to Paris MoU Annual Report (2011), it is viewed as 
the most significant change that transforms and modernizes the PSC system in recent years. 
Under the new inspection system, the vessel visiting a port will be attributed a ship risk 
profile through an associated information system, which determines the priority of ship 
inspections, the intervals between the inspections of a ship and the scope of the inspections. 
Based on the feedback, the port authority will decide the details of the inspections, 
(inspection types, detention results, and detention periods). The Paris MoU hoped that the 
implementation of NIR could efficiently improve the performance of PSC inspection system. 
It is noteworthy that an important element that helps to categorize the ship risk profiles in 
NIR is the performance of International Shipping Management (ISM) companies. Before the 
implementation of NIR, ISM companies are just third-party managers who, for a negotiated 
fee and with no shareholding ties with their clients, undertake the responsibility of managing 
vessels in which they have no financial stake (Mitroussi, 2003). They accepted ships from 
and managed them on behalf of ship owners without much concern on their technical 
soundness given that they had no responsibility on vessels’ failures of passing PSC 
inspections. However, this practice has been changed since the NIR was introduced in 2009 
and implemented in 2011 on the Paris MoU. The Paris MoU establishes a shipping company 
(including ISM) performance formula that takes into account detention and deficiency 
records of the vessels under the company’s management over a period of 36 months. Based 
on the deficiency and detention rates, the performance of ISM companies is classified into 
groups of four grades: high, medium, low and very low. A list of ‘ISM managers’ of poor 
performance has been developed, consisting of the ISM companies who have shown an 
unwillingness or inability to comply with the international conventions on maritime safety 
and/or on the protection of marine environment. Once a vessel is detained, the reputation of 
its associated ISM will be affected, leading to an increase frequency of inspections in future.  
To ensure their profits and maintain their reputation, ISM companies are putting much 
effort to make them adaptive to the NIR and improving their management level. Considering 
the vessel quality, ISM companies raise their vessel acceptance criteria to ensure the 
successful inspection results that the ships under their management can receive. The 
involvement of ISM companies obviously influences the game between port authorities and 
ship owners in today’s PSC practice.   
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For port authorities, when regulating their policies under NIR, it is of vital importance to 
take the company performance indicator into account. However, in this research, as we only 
focus on the period in which the vessel is already at the port, ISM companies are considered 
as a factor influencing the decision-making of port authorities, because the selection and 
determination of ISM companies happen before the occurrence of the inspections. Therefore, 
quantifying the influence of company performance on inspection results becomes the major 
issue when analysing the PSC inspection game under NIR in this research. Further research 
may consider ISM companies as a player in the inspection game if the time range of the game 
is widened.   
This chapter aims at developing a risk-based game model based on Bayesian network 
(BN) to determine the optimal inspection strategy of a port authority under different 
circumstances after the implementation of NIR. Based on 49,328 primary historical 
inspection reports obtained from the Paris MoU database in 2015-2017, those related to bulk 
carriers (i.e. 10000 records) are selected to build a BN risk model. The BN risk model 
provides a novel way to obtain the detention rates relating to different company performance 
levels and vessel quality. They can be used as important input in the subsequent game model 
construction. Through calculating every payoff during an inspection, a payoff matrix is 
utilized to present the new BN risk-based PSC game model. 
The Nash equilibrium of the newly proposed game model will eventually reveal the 
optimal inspection policy for port authorities and motivate ship owners to improve their 
vessel quality and safety performance to mitigate maritime accidents. Supported by the 
empirical case study in Chapter 6, the managerial insights about the optimal inspection policy 
and the decision-making framework for port authorities can be obtained. 
 
5.2 BASIC CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY 
5.2.1 Strategic games 
A strategic game is a model of interactive decision-making in which each decision-maker 
chooses his plan of action once and for all, and these choices are made simultaneously. The 
model consists of a finite set of players, set of actions for each player, and a preference 
relation on the set of action profiles. Different from decision problem, which is the study of 
how to maximize expected utility in situations where there are no other participants making 
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choices, strategic game is more complicated and practical. In a strategic game, each player 
may care not only about his own action but also about the actions taken by the other players, 
a feature that distinguishes the strategic games from decision problems. If the set of actions of 
every player is finite, then the game is finite.  
The high level of abstraction of this game model allows it to be applied to a wide range of 
situations. A player may be an individual human being or any other decision-making entity 
like a government, a board of directors, an administration authority, and the leadership of a 
revolutionary movement, or even a flower or an animal. The model places no restrictions on 
the set of actions available to a player, which may, for example, contain just a few elements 
or be a huge set containing a complicated plan that covers a variety of contingencies. 
However, the range of application of the model is limited by the requirement that each player 
is associated with a preference relation. A player’s preference relation may simply reflect the 
player’s feelings about the possible outcomes or, in the case of an organism that does not act 
consciously, the chances of its reproductive success.  
The fact that the model is so abstract is a merit to the extent that it allows applications in a 
wide range of situations, but is a drawback to the extent that the implications of the model 
cannot depend on any specific features of a situation. Indeed, very few conclusions can be 
reached about the outcome of a game at this level of abstraction; one needs to be much more 
specific to derive interesting results.  
In some situations, the players’ preferences are most naturally defined not over action 
profiles but over their consequences. When modelling the PSC inspection in this study, for 
example, port authorities and ship owners may set as the players, and the set of actions of 
each player are the choices like inspection or maintenance. Actually, it is the profit that 
matters, not the choices that generates the profit. To do so, a set of consequence (profit) is 
introduced, and a function from actions to consequence is generated. Hence, this kind of 
strategic game reflects a situation that the preference relation of each player is set over 
consequence.  
Interpretation of the model 
Normally, there are two kinds of interpretations. 
One common interpretation is that strategic game is a model of an event that occurs only 
once. Each player knows the details of the game and the fact that all the players are rational, 
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and the players choose their actions simultaneously and independently under this 
interpretation. Each player is unaware, when choosing his action, of the choices being made 
by the other players; there is no information (except the primitives of the model) on which a 
player can base his expectation of the other players’ behaviour.  
Another interpretation is that a player can form his expectation of the other players’ 
behaviour based on information about the way that the game or a similar game was played in 
the past. Under this situation, an individual who plays the game many times must be 
concerned only with his instantaneous payoff and ignore the effects of his current action on 
the other players’ future behaviour, which is slightly different from the former interpretation. 
One thing to note that is for a situation to be modelled as a strategic game, it is important 
only that the players make decisions independently, no player being informed of the choice of 
any other player prior to making his own decision. 
 
5.2.2 Payoff matrix 
Under a wide range of circumstances, the preference relation of player in a strategic game 
can be represented by a payoff function (also called a utility function). The value of such a 
function is called payoff. If the payoff of one action A is higher than another action B, then 
action A has a higher priority and probability to be chosen as the strategy of this player.  
In reality, payoffs are numbers that represent the motivations of the players. Depending on 
different games, payoffs may represent profit, quantity, continuous measures (cardinal 
payoffs), and/or the rank of desirable outcomes (ordinal payoffs). 
In order to determine the optimal strategy for each player, a payoff matrix is usually 
applied to address the problem. It is an m×n matrix that gives the possible payoff of a two-
person game when player 1 has m strategies and player 2 has n strategies. This visual 
representation approach can describe the payoff of each player under different strategy 
profiles in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1 An example of a payoff matrix 
                           C D 
A w1, w2 y1, y2 
B x1, x2 z1, z2 
(Source: Author) 
Player 1’s strategies are identified with the rows and player 2’s with the columns. The two 
numbers in each cell are the players’ payoffs when player 1 chooses the row strategy and player 
2 chooses the column strategy. For example, the two numbers w1 and w2 in first cell means 
when player 1 chooses strategy A and player 2 chooses strategy C, the payoff of player 1 is w1 
and the payoff of player 2 is w2. 
Payoff matrix presents a visualized way to analyse the strategic game, and it is currently a 
widely used approach to figure out the optimal strategies of participating players. 
 
5.2.3 Nash equilibrium 
Nash equilibrium is the most commonly used solution concept in the game theory. It 
captures a steady state of the play of a strategic game in which each player holds the correct 
expectation about the other players’ behaviour and acts rationally (Nash, 1950). Meanwhile, 
it does not attempt to examine the process by which a steady state is reached. 
When it comes to a Nash equilibrium, no player has another action yielding an outcome 
that he prefers to that generated when he chooses a corresponding action, given that every 
other player chooses his or her Nash equilibrium action. Briefly, no player can profitably 
deviate, given the actions of the other players. 
The following case named and interpreted by Tucker presents a simple example of Nash 
equilibrium (Tucker, 1983). Two criminals are caught in a crime and put into separate cells. 
The police will interrogate both of them, respectively. If they both confess, each will be 
sentenced to three years in jail. If only one of them confesses, he will be freed and used as a 
witness against the other, who will receive a sentence of four years. If neither confesses, they 
will both be convicted of a minor offence and spend one year in prison. The payoff matrix of 
this game is shown in Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2 An example of obtaining Nash equilibrium 
                           Confess Not confess 
Confess 3, 3 0, 4 
Not confess 4, 0 1, 1 
(Source: Tucker, 1983) 
If the two criminals decide to cooperate, the best strategy for them is that neither confesses 
and both of them only have to be sentenced to jail one year. However, in a strategic game, 
each player is rational and has an incentive to be a self-centred person, which means the 
players care more about their own benefits and therefore will not choose cooperation. In this 
case, no matter what one criminal choose, the other prefers ‘confess’ to ‘not confess’ as the 
former choice always generates a higher payoff than the latter one for every person. Hence, 
the Nash equilibrium of this example is ‘Confess, Confess’. This problem is called ‘Prisoner’s 
dilemma’, which is one of the famous cases in game theory.  
 
5.2.4 Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is designed to model a steady state of a game in which 
the participants’ choices are not deterministic but are regulated by probabilistic rules. For a 
strategic game, a member of action set of players is called a pure strategy. On the contrary, a 
member of the set of probability distribution of action set of players is called a mixed 
strategy. Based on this conception, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is a 
Nash equilibrium of its mixed extension.  
There are a number of interpretations of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, and some of 
them are shown as follows: 
1) Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium entails a deliberate decision by a player to introduce 
randomness into his behaviour, representing the objectives of his choice.  
2) Similar to Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is explained as a 
stochastic steady state of an environment in which players act repeatedly and ignore any 
strategic link that may exist between plays.  
3) A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is a description of a steady state of the system that 
reflects elements missing from the original description of the game. 
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4) A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of belief, each element in the 
equilibrium is a common belief of all the other players about this player’s actions. Under this 
interpretation, each player chooses a single action rather than a mixed strategy. An 
equilibrium is a steady state of the players’ beliefs, not their actions. 
These interpretations explain the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium from many different 
aspects. Each of them has its limitation, leading to several criticisms of it. However, the 
discussions on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium indicate its popularity and importance in 
the field of game theory.  
 
5.3 THEORETICAL GAME MODEL BETWEEN PORT AUTHORITIES AND 
SHIP OWNERS 
A game between a port authority and a ship owner is more like a ‘supervise-being 
supervised’ activity. In this game, the main object of the port authority is to optimize the 
social welfare (Florens & Foucher, 1999). Therefore, it takes measures to ensure maritime 
safety, such as the policies on maritime safety, the conventions on maritime security and the 
punishment of the illegal ship owners. Although these measures cannot completely eradicate 
potential maritime safety hazards, they can certainly stimulate ship owners to improve the 
quality of their vessels. Simultaneously, the ship owner aims at maximizing their benefits, 
resulting in the search for a balance between the cost and detention. The conflict of objectives 
forms the game relationship between the port authority and the ship owner. 
The process of developing a game model consists of three essential steps: 1) confirming 
the participated players, 2) figuring out the strategy of each player, and 3) determining the 
payoff of each strategy. When making decisions, both port authorities and ship owners will 
make their choices based on the payoffs of the strategies under different situations. As one of 
the important factors in game model, the inspection risk plays a key role in determining the 
payoffs. Hence, in order to quantify the inspection risk, BN is combined with the game model 
for the first time to reflect the actual conditions in PSC after the implementation of NIR 
precisely. Meanwhile, the BN model proposed in this thesis takes into account company 
performance as an important risk factor influencing the inspection results, and the final model 
is able to reveal the detention rates under various conditions involving different company 
performance levels. In the subsequent game model construction, the detention rate can be 
used as an indicator of the company performance, presenting a game model between port 
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authorities and ship owners considering the effect of company performance for the first time 
since PSC inspection regime changed.  
As the objective of this section is to analyse the optimal inspection policy of port 
authorities after the implementation of NIR, ‘Post-NIR’ BN model is selected to help the 
work of game model construction. The process of building the game model is illustrated as 
follows.  
 
5.3.1 Assumptions 
Before constructing the game model, several assumptions are proposed to conform to the 
definition of the strategic game. Based on the definition and interpretations from Osborne & 
Rubinstein (1994), the following assumptions are made in this study: 
1) The vessel type selected for constructing the game model is bulk carrier for two 
reasons: one is bulk carrier accounts for 20% of inspection records; second is the detention 
rate of bulk carrier is mostly the same as the average detention rate (for all vessel types), 
indicating that the bulk carrier can be used to represent the inspection system. (Explained in 
Chapter 4 in detail).  
2) The two stakeholders in the PSC inspection game, the port authorities and the ship 
owners, are rational players. The purposes of the two stakeholders are presented as follows:  
Ship owners: for maximizing personal interest 
Port authorities: for minimizing social welfare losses 
The conflicts between the objectives of two major stakeholders in the inspection game 
manifest that the PSC inspection game is a non-cooperative game2. 
3) The game is a strategic game, and each player holds the correct expectation about the 
other player’s behaviour and acts rationally based on the information about the way that the 
game was played in the past.  
                                                          
2 A non-cooperative game is a game with competition between individual players and in which only self-
enforcing (e.g. through credible threats) alliances (or competition between groups of players, called "coalitions") 
are possible due to the absence of external means to enforce cooperative behaviour (Osborn & Rubinstein, 1994; 
Friedman, 1991). 
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4) The players make decisions independently and simultaneously, and each player is 
unaware of the choices being made by the other players. 
5)  ‘Bulk carriers’ is classified into two types according to the maintenance effort of ship 
owners: standard vessels with effort M and sub-standard vessels with effort m. The reason for 
the classification is to conform to the PSC inspection system that marks the vessel passing the 
inspection as ‘standard vessel’ and the vessel failing to pass the inspection as ‘sub-standard’ 
vessel. 
6) To simplify the calculation work, the accident losses caused by standard or sub-
standard vessels are the same in this research3.  
 
5.3.2 Parameter identification 
From the definition of the strategic game, it consists of three elements: 1) a finite set of 
players, 2) a nonempty set of strategies for each player and 3) a preference relation on the set 
of strategies, which can be represented by payoff.  
Therefore, when building the inspection game in this study, the parameters need to be 
identified from these three aspects.  
5.3.2.1 Players 
It is obvious that the inspection game involves two players: port authorities and ship 
owners. 
 
5.3.2.2 Strategies 
Strategy of the port authorities 
There are two strategies for the port authorities to treat the vessels arriving at their ports  
 Inspect the vessel (with probability X) 
 Not inspect the vessel (with the probability 1 – X) 
                                                          
3 In fact, the accident losses of the two vessel types would be slightly different, because standard vessels may 
have more precautionary measures to deal with the maritime accidents than sub-standard vessels, thus leading to 
less loss when encountering unexpected cases. 
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Strategy of the ship owners 
When confronted with the inspections, the ship owners can make either a high intensity 
effort to ensure the vessel standard or a low effort to leave the vessel sub-standard. The 
strategies are expressed as follow. 
 High intensity effort: Standard vessels (with probability Y) 
 Low effort: Sub-standard vessels (with probability 1-Y) 
 
5.3.2.3 Payoffs 
In section 5.2.2, ‘payoffs’ is defined as the numbers that represent the motivations of the 
players. It has a wide variety of forms, e.g. profit, rank, or quantity. According to the 
objectives of the players in PSC inspections, the ‘payoffs’ in the inspection games is defined 
as profit.  
Based on the literature (Li, et al., 2015) and the inspection record reports, the payoff of the 
ship owner consists of the following components: expected detention cost, expected accident 
loss, inspection cost, maintenance cost and the port charges. Accordingly, the payoff of the 
port authority includes social welfare increase due to detention, the social welfare loss due to 
accidents, inspection cost, and the port charges.  
These parameters influencing payoffs are explained with a particular reference to their 
state definitions as follows: 
1) Expected detention cost 
Related to the choice of the port authority, the expected detention cost is the risk that the 
ship owner faces when accepting inspections. Only when the port authority decides to inspect 
the vessel, is it incurred. Meanwhile, because the inspection results can be subject to errors, 
there exists detention rate (likelihood) for both standard vessels and sub-standard vessels. 
Hence, the expected detention cost is the product of detention rate and detention-related cost. 
(i.e. expected detention cost = detention rate (D) * detention related cost (CD1)) 
Detention rate: D 
Detention rate is the probability that a vessel fails to pass the inspection. Meanwhile, it acts 
like a bond linking the ship owner, port authority and ISM Company. Its value can be obtained 
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through the BN model in Chapter 3.  
Detention-related cost of the ship owner: CD1 
In general, a ship is not released from detention before all necessary repairs are made, and 
it even needs to sail to another shipyard for repair if it is not possible to repair these deficiencies 
at the place of inspection. Such detention-related cost during the detention period is 
summarized as the consequence of detention.  
According to the definition of risk (i.e. Risk = Likelihood * Consequence), the expected 
detention cost is the product of detention rate and detention-related cost.  
Expected detention cost = detention rate (D) * detention related cost (CD1) 
2) Expected social welfare increase due to detention 
Other than the expected detention cost to the ship owner, detention also brings social welfare 
increase to the port authority. The punishment to ship owners makes the vessel safer and better, 
as well as generating additional earnings for the port. This part is set as CD2. 
However, the detention-related cost to the ship owner does not equal to the increase in social 
welfare because some cost types of the former are not included in the latter, e.g. operating cost, 
fuel cost (if a ship needs to sail to another place for repair).  
Similar to expected detention cost, the expected social welfare increase is the product of 
detention rate and the punishment.  
Expected social welfare increase = detention rate (D) * punishment (CD2) 
3) Expected accident loss 
Expected accident loss is the risk of the vessel being caught in maritime accidents. It is 
composed of accident rate and accident loss.  
Accident rate: P 
Maritime transportation is risky and hazardous. When sailing at sea, every vessel will face 
the dangers of maritime accidents. On this occasion, ship owners’ effort really matters. A 
standard and compliant vessel is less likely than a sub-standard one to be caught in an accident.  
 PM: accident probability of standard vessel 
 Pm: accident probability of sub-standard vessel  
Accident loss: CA 
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Accident loss is the consequential cost related to the ship owner when an accident happens, 
e.g. vessel value, cargo value, casualties. Different effort of the ship owner can influence the 
severity of loss, and standard vessel is more likely to better deal with emergencies and cause 
less loss. Because of limited data availability, only the value of the vessel is chosen to represent 
the accident loss in this thesis.  
 CA1: accident loss of standard vessel 
 CA2: accident loss of sub-standard vessel 
As a result, the expected accident loss is calculated via the following equation, 
Expected Accident loss = accident rate (P) * accident loss (CA) 
4) Social welfare loss of accidents: CSW 
When an accident happens, it will lead to the loss of social welfare. This type of loss includes 
environmental pollution damage, salvage cost, recovery cost and so on. Port authorities should 
consider these losses when calculating social welfare loss. Similar to accident loss to the ship 
owner, different vessel safety levels will cost differently.  
 CSW1: social welfare loss of standard vessel  
 CSW2: social welfare loss of sub-standard vessel 
5) Inspection cost CI 
When making the decision to inspect a vessel, the port authority needs to spend money and 
human resources on it. At the same time, it will incur a cost to the ship owner as well.  
 CI1: inspection cost of port authority 
 CI2: inspection cost of ship owner 
6) Maintenance cost of the ship owner: C (Pi, i) 
In order to pass the inspection and avoid maritime accidents, the ship owner will spend a 
certain amount of money and resources, including technological, operational and preventive 
costs. The more they invest the higher probability to pass the inspection and avoid the 
occurrence of accidents. This type of cost is presented as C (Pi, i), i = m, or M 
 C (PM, M): cost to maintain a standard vessel 
 C (Pm, m): cost to maintain a sub-standard vessel 
 7) Port charges: CPC 
When the vessel arrives at the port, it will face some different types of charges from the port, 
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e.g. tonnage dues, harbour dues, pilotage dues, berth hire charges and anchorage fee. Unlike 
detention cost and inspection cost, costs in this aspect are unavoidable for all vessels, no matter 
whether the vessel is standard or sub-standard, detained or not detained.  
 
5.3.3 The payoff matrix 
When formulating the payoff matrix, the primary work is to figure out the payoffs under 
different strategy combinations. Based on the identified parameters and the information 
provided above, the payoff functions of port authorities and ship owners under different 
situations are provided in Equation (5-1) and Equation (5-2).  For port authorities, their payoffs 
are associated with social welfare increment of vessel detention, social welfare loss of maritime 
accidents, costs paid for PSC inspections and port charges from arriving vessels; for ship 
owners, the possible detention cost, the possible maritime accident loss, the inspection costs, 
and the charges at port are the units constituting the payoffs. For the different pairs of strategy 
combinations, the payoff of each stakeholder can be obtained via inserting the values of 
parameters reflecting the investigated situation into corresponding functions. 
The equation to calculate the payoffs of the port authority and the ship owner under different 
situations are presented in Equation (5-1) and Equation (5-2) as follows: 
Payoff of the port authority = (Expected social welfare increase due to detention – Expected 
social welfare loss of accident - inspection cost + port charges)                                          (5-1) 
Payoff of the ship owner = - (expected detention cost + expected accident loss + inspection 
cost + maintenance cost + port charges)                                                                               (5-2) 
 
5.3.3.1 Scenario 1: Inspection (port authority) and standard vessel (ship owner)  
1) Payoff of the port authority 
There are two possible results: detention or no detention. From Equation (5-1), there are 
four components to form the payoff.  
Expected social welfare increase exists only when detention occurs, hence it is CD2 when 
the vessel is detained, and otherwise it is 0. 
Expected social welfare loss of an accident always exists whatever the inspection result is. 
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In this scenario, the accident rate is PM; and the social welfare loss when an accident happens 
is CSW1. Therefore, the expected social welfare loss is PM × CSW1. Other components, the 
inspection cost and port charges, can be easily obtained as CI1 and CPC, respectively.  
In summary, the payoff of the port authority is: 
 If the vessel is detained (DM) 
𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶  
 If the vessel is not detained (1- DM) 
0 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
Overall payoff: 
𝐷𝑀 × (𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) + (1 − 𝐷𝑀) × (0 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
= 𝐷𝑀 × 𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
 
2) Payoff of the ship owner 
According to Equation (5-2), the payoff of the ship owner consists of five parts. 
Similar to expected social welfare increase, the expected detention cost is also influenced 
by the inspection results. If the vessel is detained, the detention-related cost is CD1. If not, the 
ship owner does not need to pay anything.  
Since the vessel is at standard safety level, the probability it encounters an accident is PM, 
while the consequence of the maritime accident for the ship owner is CA1. Hence, the expected 
accident loss is PM ×CA1. 
In addition, to ensure the vessel’s compliance with regulation standards, it will cost the ship 
owner C (PM, M) to maintain the vessel. Furthermore, the inspection cost CI1 and the port 
charges CPC are important expenditure for the ship owner. In summary, the payoff of the ship 
owner is: 
 If the vessel is detained (DM) 
−(𝐶𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀, 𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶)  
 If the vessel is not detained (1- DM) 
−(0 + 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀, 𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶)  
Overall payoff: 
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𝐷𝑀 × [−(𝐶𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀, 𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶)] + (1 − 𝐷𝑀) × [−(0 + 𝑃𝑀 ×
𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀, 𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶)]  
= −(𝐷𝑀 × 𝐶𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀, 𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
 
5.3.3.2 Scenario 2: Inspection (port authority) and sub-standard vessel (ship owner) 
In this scenario, the way to calculate the payoffs for each player is similar to scenario 1. The 
components of payoff need to change to the corresponding values of sub-standard vessels based 
on the information provided in parameter identification section, e.g. DM to Dm, PM to Pm, C (PM, 
M) to C (Pm, m), CA1 to CA2 and CSW1 to CSW2. 
However, when a sub-standard vessel is detained, it is asked to repair these deficiencies until 
the vessel complies with the regulations of the port. This process will improve the safety level 
of the vessel and reduce the accident probability. In this study, in order to simplify the model, 
the accident rate is set as PM for the sub-standard vessel after its detention. At the same time, 
the expected accident loss and expected social welfare loss also change as follows. 
Expected accident loss = {
𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1, detention
𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2, no detention
 
Expected social welfare loss = {
𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1, detention
𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2, no detention
 
1) Payoff of the port authority 
 If the vessel is detained (Dm) 
𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
 If the vessel is not detained (1- Dm) 
0 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶  
Overall payoff: 
𝐷𝑚 × (𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) + (1 − 𝐷𝑚) × (0 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
= 𝐷𝑚 × 𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 − 𝐷𝑚 × (𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2) 
 
2) Payoff of ship owner 
 If the vessel is detained (Dm) 
−(𝐶𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑚, 𝑚) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶)  
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 If the vessel is not detained (1- Dm) 
−(0 + 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑚, 𝑚) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶)  
Overall payoff: 
𝐷𝑚 × [−(𝐶𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑚, 𝑚) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶)] + (1 − 𝐷𝑚) × [−(0 + 𝑃𝑚 ×
𝐶𝐴2 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑚, 𝑚) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶)]  
= −(𝐷𝑚 × 𝐶𝐷1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑚, 𝑚) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 + 𝐷𝑚 × (𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2)) 
 
If the port authority does not inspect the vessel, the detention will not occur and the values 
of the inspection-related parameters will be 0, including the expected detention cost, the 
expected social welfare loss and the inspection cost.  Meanwhile, the risk of being detained is 
free. As a result, the payoff equation is simplified as: 
Payoff of the port authority = (– Expected social welfare loss of accident + port charges) 
(5-3) 
Payoff of the ship owner = - (Expected accident loss + maintenance cost + port charges) 
(5-4)  
5.3.3.3 Scenario 3: No inspection (port authority) and standard vessel (ship owner)  
In this scenario, the payoffs of the port authority and ship owners are obtained according to 
the Equation (5-3) and Equation (5-4), respectively. Because the port authorities choose not to 
inspect the vessel, the calculation of payoff does not need to be divided into two parts. The 
following expressions present the payoffs of each stakeholder. 
1) Payoff of port authority 
−𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶  
2) Payoff of ship owner 
−(𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀, 𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
 
5.3.3.4 Scenario 4: No inspection (port authority) and sub-standard vessel (ship owner) 
Similar to scenario 3, the payoffs of the port authority and ship owners are obtained 
according to the Equation (5-3) and Equation (5-4), respectively. The following expressions 
142 
 
present the payoffs of each stakeholder under this case. 
1) Payoff of port authority 
−𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
2) Payoff of ship owner 
−(𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑚, 𝑚) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
 
5.3.3.5 The payoff matrix of PSC inspection game under NIR  
In the above scenario simulation, each scenario represents a strategy profile in the PSC 
inspection game. The final payoff matrix of the PSC inspection game under NIR can be 
obtained through summarizing the payoffs in every situation.  
Table 5.3 depicts the payoff matrix. The actions identified with rows are the strategies of 
port authorities, while the actions in column are the ship owners’ choices. The two expressions 
in the boxes represent the payoff of stakeholders when port authorities choose row action and 
ship owners choose column action. The above expressions in the boxes are the payoffs of port 
authorities under this scenario, while the nether expressions describe the payoffs of ship owners 
correspondingly.  
Table 5.3 Payoff matrix of PSC inspection game 
 Standard vessel Sub-standard vessel 
Inspection 
𝐷𝑀 × 𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
 
−(𝐷𝑀 × 𝐶𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶𝐼2 +
𝐶(𝑃𝑀 ,𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶)  
𝐷𝑀 × 𝐶𝐷2 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2 − 𝐶𝐼1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 −
 𝐷𝑚 × (𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2)  
 
−(𝐷𝑚 × 𝐶𝐷1 + 𝐶𝐼2 + 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 +
𝐶(𝑃𝑚,𝑚) + 𝐷𝑚 × (𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 − 𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2))  
No 
inspection 
−𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊1 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
−(𝑃𝑀 × 𝐶𝐴1 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑀 , 𝑀) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
−𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝑆𝑊2 + 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
−(𝑃𝑚 × 𝐶𝐴2 + 𝐶(𝑃𝑚,𝑚) + 𝐶𝑃𝐶) 
(Source: Author) 
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5.3.4 Nash equilibrium solution 
For the inspection game in this study, the choices of players are not deterministic but are 
regulated by probabilistic rules. The Nash equilibrium under this condition is called mix 
strategy Nash equilibrium, and the aim of this section is to find out the mix strategy Nash 
equilibrium for the PSC inspection game.  
 
5.3.4.1 The existence of Nash equilibrium 
To find out the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the proposed game model, the first thing 
is to ensure that there exists an equilibrium point forming the steady state of the game model. 
If the interests of port authorities and ship owners were diametrically opposed, then the 
inspection game would have no Nash equilibrium point.   
According to a theorem presented by Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) in their book named 
‘A course in Game theory’,  
Theorem 1: Every finite strategic game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. 
(The proof for the theorem is not illustrated here, as it requires complicated mathematical 
knowledge.) 
In the PSC inspection game, there are two players (the port authority and the ship owner), 
and each player has two actions and their preference. The settings of our game conform to the 
definition of finite strategic game. Hence, according to theorem 1, the PSC inspection game 
proposed in this research has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.  
 
5.3.4.2 Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium - Osborne & Rubinstein approach 
There are various ways to obtain the Nash equilibrium solutions to the game models. In this 
research, an approach proposed by Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) is applied, which is a proper 
and convenient way to deal with the cases like PSC inspection game. 
According to Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), there is an important property of mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium that is useful when calculating the equilibria. 
Theorem 2: For a finite strategic game G, 𝛂∗ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G 
if and only if for every player i in the game, every pure strategy in the support of 𝛂𝒊
∗ is the 
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best response to 𝛂−𝒊
∗
. 
(αi means the mixed strategy of player i in the mixed Nash equilibrium, while α-i means the 
mixed strategies of players without player i.) 
Proof: (Proof by contradiction) 
First, let us suppose that there exists an action of player i called ai in the support of the mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium α∗ that is not a best response to α−𝑖
∗ . Then player i can increase his 
payoff by replacing this action to another action that is a best response to α−𝑖
∗ . Hence, this new 
mixed strategy combination is superior to α∗, making α∗ not the equilibria of the game model, 
which is contradictory to the settings.  
Second, suppose that there exists another mixed strategy α𝑖
′ that gives player i a higher 
payoff than  α𝑖
∗ in response to α−𝑖
∗ . Hence, there must be at least one action in the support of α𝑖
′ 
output a higher payoff than some actions in the support of α𝑖
∗. Under this occasion, not all the 
actions in the support of αi
∗ are the best response to α−i
∗
 , which is also contradictory to the 
settings in the theorem.  
Q.E.D. 
To simplify the description of Theorem 2 and transform it into words that are easy to 
understand, the following simplified theorem is presented. 
Theorem 3: Every action in the support of any player’s equilibrium mixed strategy yields 
that player the same payoff.  
One thing worth noting is that the requirement that the players’ preferences can be 
represented by expected payoff functions plays a key role in these characterizations of mixed 
strategy equilibrium, which is also suitable and feasible for the PSC inspection game. Hence, 
this approach is suitable and preferable for the Nash equilibrium calculation in our research. 
However, the results do not necessarily hold for other theories of decision-making under 
uncertainty.  
The following example further clarifies this approach and illustrates how the mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium can be found according to Theorem 3.  
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Table 5.4 An example of how to calculate Nash equilibrium 
 Bach – a2(B) Stravinsky – a2(S) 
Bach – a1(B) 2, 1 0, 0 
Stravinsky – a1(S) 0, 0 1, 2 
(Source: A course in Game theory, 1994) 
Consider two people are planning to go to a concert, they have two choices: Bach or 
Stravinsky. The payoffs of each player are presented in Table 5.4, where these values represent 
their preferences. A large number means the player prefers it much. Now we show how to 
calculate the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this example based on Theorem 3.  
Suppose (a1, a2) is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for this example, where a1 is the 
choice of player 1, a2 represents player 2’ action. According to Theorem 3, given a2, player 1’s 
action Bach and Stravinsky yield much the same payoff for him, so that we have  
{
2 𝑎2(𝐵) + 0 𝑎2(𝑆)  =  0 𝑎2(𝐵)  +  1 𝑎2(𝑆)
𝑎2(𝐵) + 𝑎2(𝑆) = 1
 
Thus, we have 𝑎2(𝐵) =
1
3
, 𝑎2(𝑆) =
2
3
 
Similarly, given a1, player 2’s two actions yield much the same payoff for his too, the result 
shows  𝑎1(𝐵) =
2
3
, 𝑎1(𝑆) =
1
3
 . Therefore, the only non-degenerate mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium of the game is ((
2
3
,
1
3
) , (
1
3
,
2
3
)).  
Based on Theorem 3 and the provided example, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
solution for PSC inspection game can be obtained. 
Table 5.5 The simplified payoff matrix 
 Standard vessel(Y) 
Sub-standard 
vessel(1-Y) 
Inspection(X) PA11, SO11 PA12, SO12 
No inspection(1-X) PA21, SO21 PA22, SO22 
(Source: Author) 
Table 5.5 presents the simplified payoff matrix for the convenience of calculation. The first 
number in each cell represents the payoff of the port authority, while the second represents that 
of the ship owner.  
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In terms of the payoffs in this table, the equation set according to Theorem 3 is shown as 
follows 
{
𝑌 × 𝑃𝐴11 + (1 − 𝑌) × 𝑃𝐴12 = 𝑌 × 𝑃𝐴21 + (1 − 𝑌) × 𝑃𝐴22
𝑋 × 𝑆𝑂11 + (1 − 𝑋) × 𝑆𝑂21 = 𝑋 × 𝑆𝑂12 + (1 − 𝑋) × 𝑆𝑂22
 
 
Where PA means the port authority, SO means the ship owner. The first equation means 
‘Inspection’ and ‘No inspection’ of the port authority generate the same payoff for PA given 
the ship owner’s optimal choice, while the second equation indicates the ‘Standard 
maintenance effort’ and ‘Sub-standard maintenance effort’ yield the same payoff for SO given 
the PA’s optimal choice.  
The solution to this equation set presents the probability of each action in support of mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium.  
 
{
 
 𝑋 =
𝑆𝑂22 − 𝑆𝑂21
𝑆𝑂11 + 𝑆𝑂22 − 𝑆𝑂12 − 𝑆𝑂21
𝑌 =
𝑃𝐴22 − 𝑃𝐴12
𝑃𝐴11 + 𝑃𝐴22 − 𝑃𝐴12 − 𝑃𝐴21
 
 
(5-5) 
 
In addition, the final mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is ((X, 1-X), (Y, 1-Y)). 
After plugging the payoffs into the corresponding places in Equation (5-5), the mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium of the strategic game between the port authority and the ship owner 
is presented. Additionally, considering the fact that the players in the game may not always act 
as the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium tells them, the final Nash solution to the PSC inspection 
game is presented in Equation (5-6) and Equation (5-7), respectively: 
 
 𝑋
∗ = {
0, 𝑌∗ > 𝑌0
𝑋0, 𝑌
∗ = 𝑌0
1, 𝑌∗ < 𝑌0
 
 
(5-6) 
 
 
 
𝑌∗ = {
1, 𝑋∗ > 𝑋0
𝑌0, 𝑋
∗ = 𝑋0
0, 𝑋∗ < 𝑋0
 
 
(5-7) 
where𝑋0 =
𝑃𝑀×𝐶𝐴1−𝑃𝑚×𝐶𝐴2+𝐶(𝑃𝑀,𝑀)−𝐶(𝑃𝑚,𝑚)
𝐶𝐷1×(𝐷𝑀−𝐷𝑚)+𝐷𝑚×(𝑃𝑀×𝐶𝐴1−𝑃𝑚×𝐶𝐴2)
, 𝑌0 =
𝐷𝑚×(𝑃𝑀×𝐶𝑆𝑊1−𝑃𝑚×𝐶𝑆𝑊2)−𝐷𝑚×𝐶𝐷2+𝐶𝐼1
𝐶𝐷2×(𝐷𝑀−𝐷𝑚)+𝐷𝑚×(𝑃𝑀×𝐶𝑆𝑊1−𝑃𝑚×𝐶𝑆𝑊2)
 
This means that if 𝑌∗ > 𝑌0, the port authority will not inspect the vessel; if 𝑌
∗ < 𝑌0, the port 
authority will inspect the vessel. Only when 𝑌∗ = 𝑌0 will the port authority choose the mixed 
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strategy 𝑋∗ = 𝑋0. The same goes to the ship owner.  
According to assumption (6) in Section 5.3.1, the accident loss under standard and sub-
standard conditions are set the same (CA1= CA2 = CA0, where CA0 is a constant no matter whether 
the vessel is standard or not). Therefore, the final solution is defined as follows. 
 
 𝑋
∗ = {
0, 𝑌∗ > 𝑌0
𝑋0, 𝑌
∗ = 𝑌0
1, 𝑌∗ < 𝑌0
 
 
(5-8) 
 
 
 
𝑌∗ = {
1, 𝑋∗ > 𝑋0
𝑌0, 𝑋
∗ = 𝑋0
0, 𝑋∗ < 𝑋0
 
 
(5-9) 
where𝑋0 =
(𝑃𝑀−𝑃𝑚)×𝐶𝐴
0+𝐶(𝑃𝑀,𝑀)−𝐶(𝑃𝑚,𝑚)
𝐶𝐷1×(𝐷𝑀−𝐷𝑚)+𝐷𝑚×𝐶𝐴
0×(𝑃𝑀−𝑃𝑚)
, 𝑌0 =
𝐷𝑚×(𝑃𝑀×𝐶𝑆𝑊1−𝑃𝑚×𝐶𝑆𝑊2)−𝐷𝑚×𝐶𝐷2+𝐶𝐼1
𝐶𝐷2×(𝐷𝑀−𝐷𝑚)+𝐷𝑚×(𝑃𝑀×𝐶𝑆𝑊1−𝑃𝑚×𝐶𝑆𝑊2)
 
 
5.3.5 Further improvement of the game model 
The theoretical game model between the PA and SO in PSC inspection is presented. 
However, it is not perfect. Some settings of the game model are simplified and idealized 
because of the scarcity of related information and research. In this part, the further 
improvements to the game model are presented, guiding the direction of future research on this 
topic. 
1) As stated in the assumption part, the players make decisions independently and 
simultaneously, and each player is unaware of the choices being made by the other players. 
However, in real cases, the port authorities have advantages over ship owners in PSC 
inspections, i.e. they formulate the PSC inspection policies, and they have the right to punish 
the ship owners for illegal actions. The advantages port authorities have against ship owners 
may enable them to make decisions first, in spite of the truth that the ship owners will observe 
their actions. On this occasion, the Nash solution is not suitable for the stakeholders in the game 
anymore. Instead, the Stackelberg equilibrium solution is preferred to tackle the scenarios like 
that.  
Further research should consider this case to improve the game model, making it a more 
realistic mathematical model. 
2) When a sub-standard vessel is detained, it is asked to repair these deficiencies until the 
vessel complies with the regulations of the port. This process will improve the safety level of 
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the vessel and reduce the accident probability. In this study, the accident rate of the sub-
standard vessel after the repair is set as the same as the standard vessel in order to simplify the 
model.  
In fact, the relationship between the vessel quality and the accident probability might be 
expressed by a particular function. If only classifying the accident probability into two types 
(standard and sub-standard), the setting would be too general to affect the final solutions to the 
model. Future work should pay more attention to the investigation into the relationship between 
the two aspects. 
3) The accident loss under standard and sub-standard conditions are set the same when 
constructing the game model. The assumption is mainly for the later empirical case study part. 
The mixed strategy Nash solution is complicated and consists of many parts, if the accident 
loss was classified into several conditions, the calculation work would be enormous and could 
hardly be done manually. Nevertheless, the accuracy of the game model is influenced because 
of the assumption. 
As many maritime consultancies have conducted related research and published the reports 
containing the information of the relationship between vessel quality and accident loss, for 
example, the Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd, the game model would be improved a lot if 
the related statistics were collected and considered in the game model. 
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CHAPTER 6 AN EMPIRICAL STUDY TO DEMONSTRATE 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEORETICAL GAME MODEL 
In this chapter, a case study based on the inspection records from 2015-2017 is applied to 
facilitate the theoretical optimal inspection rate obtained from the game model in Chapter 5. 
The results reveal several trends of the optimal inspection rates, which enable port authorities 
to rationalize their inspection policies and ship owners to improve their vessel performance, 
and consequently maritime safety as a whole. Meanwhile, several suggestions are proposed to 
help port authorities manage the PSC inspection process more effectively. 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
To characterize the optimal inspection policy for bulk carriers with respect to the Paris MoU, 
Nash equilibrium solutions need to be analysed through a numerical case. Through 
transforming the symbols in the theoretical Nash solutions into real values, the optimal 
inspection rates under real cases or situations are obtained. The analysis on the resulting values 
will provide important insights for port authorities when making inspection regulations.  
Because the theoretical optimal inspection rates are obtained via the game model 
constructed after the implementation of NIR, the empirical study conducted in this chapter is 
based on the inspection records from 2015-2017.  
However, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to acquire the data information of all 
parameters. Previous scholars chose to simulate the parameter values or discuss them by 
empirical data (Florens & Foucher, 1999). Nevertheless, there exists too much noisy vessel 
data, which requires a screening process before using them in the thesis.  
In this chapter, data comes from three different databases, as shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Database and sources 
Database Sources 
Basic vessel information database World Shipping Encyclopedia 
Casualty database IMO, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 
PSC inspection database Paris MoU online inspection database 
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The objective focuses on finding out the optimal inspection policy for the port authority 
based on the proposed Nash solutions in Chapter 5. 
The basic vessel information database is mainly compiled from the World Shipping 
Encyclopedia (WSE). It describes each vessel, with over 200 variables such as identity (IMO) 
number, nationality, date of building, tonnage, etc. However, most of the variables are not 
related to the research and not useful for the empirical study. In fact, only several major 
variables representing the important aspects of the vessels are selected to help us conduct the 
case study. The approximate capacity of the database is 130,000 vessels, and 7% of them is 
lost vessels. 
The casualty dataset contains over 10,000 maritime accident records derived from IMO 
database and Lloyd’s Register from 1979 until now. The casualty dataset includes accident 
records of collisions, contacts, fires and explosions, foundering, hull/machinery damage, and 
miscellaneous wrecks/stranding/groundings. However, in this research, accident types are not 
within our consideration. The casualty dataset is constructed and applied to figure out where 
the accident happened. The combination of casualty dataset and basic information dataset plays 
an important role in calculating the important parameters in the game model. 
The PSC inspection dataset is the same as applied to construct the BN models of PSC 
inspection in Chapter 3. It consists of two parts: one is the inspection records from 2005 to 
2008; the other is the inspection records from 2015 to 2017. All the inspection records collected 
are the inspections of bulk carriers that happened within the operation of the Paris MoU. It is 
used to calculate the detention rate of different vessel types when substituting into the proposed 
BNs. 
Additionally, the BN model utilized to conduct the empirical study is the ‘Post-NIR’ model, 
because the game model developed in Chapter 5 focuses on the game relationship between the 
port authority and the ship owner after the implementation of NIR. Therefore, the ‘Post-NIR’ 
BN is the correct and proper model for the empirical study aiming at demonstrating the 
significance of the theoretical game model. 
 
6.2 DETERMINATION OF THE PARAMETER VALUES 
6.2.1 Detention rate through BN 
In Chapter 3, the ‘Post-NIR’ BN model is proved reliable and able to predict the detention 
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rate of PSC inspection when any new evidence is observed and collected. Hence, based on the 
function, the detention rates of different safety levels of any investigated vessel can be obtained.  
 
6.2.1.1 Standard vessels 
If the ship owner makes a high intensity effort in maintaining the vessel, the vessel will be 
maintained at a standard safety level and reach the criteria of inspection regulations. During an 
inspection, the detention risk of the vessel is relatively low, which means the two 
comprehensive factors ‘inspection group’ and ‘vessel group’ that represents two aspects of 
detention risk are both at the low level.  
Hence, the scenario in which both ‘vessel group’ and ‘inspection group’ are at ‘low 
detention risk’ state in BN represents the standard bulk carriers, From the BN reasoning, the 
detention rate is calculated as 0.46% (decrease from the average 3.25%). 
 
Figure 6.1 The detention rate of standard vessels 
(Source: Author) 
 
6.2.1.2 Sub-standard vessels 
Accordingly, a sub-standard vessel is more likely to be caught in detention, indicating the 
two major risk factors that reflect the detention risk, ‘vessel group’ and ‘inspection group’, are 
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at the ‘high detention risk’ state. The result of the BN reasoning reveals that the detention rate 
of a sub-standard vessel is 58.8% (increased from the average 3.25%). 
 
Figure 6.2 Detention rate of sub-standard vessels 
(Source: Author) 
 
6.2.2 Maintenance cost and accident loss 
The maintenance cost is crucial to the ship owner and it is affected by a large number of 
factors, e.g. vessel age, material price, regional differences and damage degree. In addition, the 
effort of the ship owner also needs to be considered as an important factor.  
Table 6.2 shows the maintenance cost under different conditions. It contains the 
maintenance cost of bulk carriers with different sizes and ages in a certain period. For example, 
the repair and maintenances cost for a young bulk ship with standard effort is US $200,175, 
while it is only US $120,105 with sub-standard effort (Drewy Shipping Concultants, 2012).  
According to UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2016, there are five types of bulk 
carriers: small, handysize, handymax, panamax and capesize. The size of the five types of 
vessels is incremental. Based on this, vessel size in this thesis is separated into two states: small, 
handysize and handymax bulk carriers as ‘Small’; panama and capesize bulk carriers as ‘Large’.  
Vessel age is classified into three groups ‘Young 0-5 years’, ‘Medium 6-10 years’ and ‘Old 
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over 10 years’.  
Table 6.2 Estimated approximate repair and maintenances under different conditions (US$) 
Vessel size Small 
Vessel age Young Medium Old 
SO’s effort Stan Sub Stan Sub Stan Sub 
Bulk carrier 200175 120105 440385 190166 447057 266900 
Vessel size Large 
Vessel age Young Medium Old 
SO’s effort Stan Sub Stan Sub Stan Sub 
Bulk carrier 319650 191790 703230 303667 713885 426200 
Source: Drewy Shipping Consultants Ltd. 
Meanwhile, as mentioned in parameter identification, the value of vessels is viewed as the 
accident loss to ship owners due to the data acquisition issue. Therefore, the price of second-
hand vessels is used as the accident loss in this project, as it is a good indicator of the market 
value of the vessels. 
Table 6.3 Estimated accident loss under different conditions (US$M) 
Vessel size Small Large 
Vessel age Young Medium Old Young Medium Old 
Bulk carrier -31 -28 -11 -67 -53 -20 
Source: Drewy Shipping Consultants Ltd 
 
6.2.3 Accident rate 
The accident rate is calculated by using a logistic regression approach (Wang, et al., 2017), 
which is an exponential function of various influencing factors. Normally, there are two types 
of logistic regression: binary logistic regression and multinomial regression. 
In a multinomial regression, the dependent variable y is multinomial, and is modelled with 
different range of values for different status. Usually, the discrete-dependent variable is 
specified in the form of unobserved but continuous variable 𝑦∗, where 𝑦∗ ∈ (−∞,+∞). 
Consider an independent variable set 𝑿 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑛) leading to the dependent variable 
y, where each independent variable has several status (j). Defining the unobserved variable 𝑦∗ 
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as a function of 𝑿, 
                              



n
i
m
j ijij
xy
1
1
1
                                                (6-1) 
Where 𝛽𝑖𝑗  represents the contribution of ix  in status j , 𝜀  is an unobserved stochastic 
component, and the value of ijx  is defined as 1ijx  when status j of ix occurs, otherwise
0ijx . 
Therefore, we can get the conditional probability of y under a configuration of independent 
variable set 𝑿𝟎 through multinomial regression: 
                                  𝑃(y = 𝑦𝑖) =
𝑒𝜷𝒊𝑿
𝟎+𝜀
1+∑ 𝑒𝜷𝒊𝑿
𝟎+𝜀𝑚−1
𝑖=1
                                                        (6-1) 
Where iy represents the j -th status of y , and m the number of status of y. 
Specific to the maritime accidents, Equation (6-1) can be transformed into the following 
Equation (6-3) 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐴 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑆 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖+2𝑉𝑇𝑖
5
𝑖=1 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑆 + +𝛽9𝐹𝑆 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗+9
30
𝑗=1 𝑍𝑗 + 𝜀                (6-3) 
where: 
y: The probability of the maritime accidents, y=1 if the accident happens, y=0 if the accident 
not happens. 
VA: vessel age.  
VS: vessel size.   
VT: vessel type. VTi=1 if it is a dry cargo ship, otherwise VTi=0, i = 1, 2, …, 4 indicating 
the five different vessel types, namely dry cargo, bulk carrier, tanker and container. 
CS: classification society. If the vessel is a member of International Association of 
Classification Societies (IACS), CS=1; otherwise CS=0 
FS: flag state. If the vessel’s flag is a close registry, FS=1; otherwise FS=0 
Zj: dummy variables representing different geographical zones. In this thesis, we divide the 
world into 31 zones according to the World Casualty Statistics. Each zone has its own effect 
on the accident probability. 
155 
 
𝜀: Stochastic component that follows the logistic distribution, including objective causes 
(e.g. safety equipment, vessel structure) and subjective causes (e.g. ship owners’ effort, crew 
ability and experience). In this study, it is used to refer to the maintenance quality of the vessel 
(e.g. substandard or standard). If the value is positive, the vessel is a substandard vessel; if the 
value if negative, the vessel is viewed as a standard vessel (Li, et al., 2014). 
Among these variables, VA and VS are continuous variables, and need to be transformed 
into discrete variables. The classification has been clarified in section 7.2.2. VT, CS, FS, and 
Zi are all dummy and discrete variables. 
Although the maritime accident case is a binary logistic regression (there are only two states 
for dependent variable y), the results obtained from multinomial regression can also fit this case 
because binary logistic regression is a special case of multinomial regression. 
Through applying the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) method, the estimation of βi 
is achieved through SPSS software, which is shown in Table 6.4.  
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Table 6.4 Coefficients of the model 
Variable Variable label Coefficient p-value 
𝛽0 Constant -2.42 0.000 
VA Vessel age -0.03 0.000 
VS Vessel size 0.09 0.000 
VT1 Dry cargo 1.25 0.000 
VT2 Bulker 0.50 0.000 
VT3 Container 0.21 0.000 
VT4 Tanker 0.00 0.000 
VT5 Passenger 0.29 0.000 
CS Classification societies -0.95 0.000 
FS Flag state 0.18 0.000 
Z1 Zone1 0.49 0.000 
Z2 Zone2 -0.21 0.003 
Z3 Zone3 16.39 0.885 
Z4 Zone4 -0.48 0.000 
Z5 Zone5 -0.71 0.000 
Z6 Zone6 2.61 0.000 
Z7 Zone7 -0.71 0.000 
Z8 Zone8 0.97 0.000 
Z9 Zone9 0.78 0.000 
Z10 Zone10 1.49 0.000 
Z11 Zone11 -0.51 0.000 
Z12 Zone12 -1.11 0.000 
Z13 Zone13 -0.43 0.000 
Z14 Zone14 16.75 0.912 
Z15 Zone15 -0.17 0.185 
Z16 Zone16 0.87 0.000 
Z17 Zone17 16.49 0.950 
Z18 Zone18 0.92 0.000 
Z19 Zone19 0.46 0.000 
Z20 Zone20 -0.60 0.000 
Z21 Zone21 -1.62 0.000 
Z22 Zone22 -1.71 0.000 
Z23 Zone23 0.13 0.094 
Z24 Zone24 1.37 0.000 
Z25 Zone25 1.19 0.000 
Z26 Zone26 16.93 0.893 
Z27 Zone27 0.68 0.000 
Z28 Zone28 2.71 0.000 
Z29 Zone29 -0.75 0.000 
Z30 Zone30 -1.89 0.000 
(Source: Author) 
Table 6.4 presents the information related to the estimation of the probability of the vessel 
being involved in a maritime accident, including the coefficient value and the partial effects of 
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the coefficients. The results indicate that the model fits the data well. Almost all the variables 
are highly significant with the occurrence of maritime accidents, because the p-values are less 
than 0.01 (except several zones).  
Eventually, by inserting the values of these coefficients into Equation (6-2), the accident 
rates of bulk carriers under different situations is obtained and presented in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5 The accident rate of bulk carriers under different situations 
Ship safety condition Standard 
VS Smaller 
VA Young Average Old 
FS Closed Open Closed Open Closed Open 
CS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS 
Accident 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.1 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.04 
Non-Accident 0.88 0.93 0.87 0.91 0.9 0.95 0.86 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.91 0.96 
Ship safety condition Standard 
VS Larger 
VA Young Average Old 
FS Closed Open Closed Open Closed Open 
CS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS 
Accident 0.19 0.08 0.24 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.1 0.01 0.12 0.02 
Non-Accident 0.81 0.92 0.76 0.89 0.88 0.94 0.84 0.92 0.9 0.99 0.88 0.98 
Ship safety condition Sub-Standard 
VS Smaller 
VA Young Average Old 
FS Closed Open Closed Open Closed Open 
CS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS 
Accident 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.3 0.24 0.39 0.21 0.15 
Non-Accident 0.74 0.72 0.68 0.76 0.81 0.78 0.72 0.7 0.76 0.61 0.79 0.85 
Ship safety condition Sub-Standard 
VS Larger 
VA Young Average Old 
FS Closed Open Closed Open Closed Open 
CS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS Non-IACS IACS 
Accident 0.35 0.2 0.41 0.2 0.29 0.16 0.28 0.19 0.2 0.39 0.27 0.18 
Non-Accident 0.65 0.8 0.59 0.8 0.71 0.84 0.72 0.81 0.8 0.61 0.73 0.72 
(Source: Author)
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However, the classification of the situations in Table 6.5 is too detailed to put into the Nash 
solution to the game model, the accident rates in Table 6.5 need normalization4. Table 6.6 
presents the result of normalization, which is useful for later calculation.  
Table 6.6 Accident rates of bulk carriers 
Vessel size Small 
Vessel age Young Medium Old 
SO’s effort Stan Sub Stan Sub Stan Sub 
Accident rate 0.106 0.278 0.0959 0.26 0.0643 0.227 
Vessel size Large 
Vessel age Young Medium Old 
SO’s effort Stan Sub Stan Sub Stan Sub 
Accident rate 0.164 0.299 0.111 0.234 0.0669 0.249 
(Source: Author) 
 
6.2.4 Detention cost  
Because of the detention punishment from the port authority, avoiding detention with 
minimum effort is the primary goal of the ship owner. At the same time, detention punishment 
also plays an important role in regularizing the behaviours of the ship owner from the port 
authority perspective. Hence, the detention cost (or the detention punishment) CD is a focus for 
both sides. 
If CD is not large enough, the ship owner may maintain their vessels at a sub-standard safety 
level. In order to reduce the social welfare loss, the port authority have to increase the 
inspection rate or extend the detention time; if CD is large enough, the ship owner will turn to 
improve the quality of vessels, resulting in lower inspection costs and a lower accident rate. 
However, the data of detention cost is unavailable because it is an abstract parameter 
changing with different situations (i.e. different ports, different vessel type, and different 
regional policy) and there is no source providing related data. In order to illustrate how the 
model works, an assumption is made according to related academic research. Specifically, CD 
is assumed in a linear relationship with the expected accident loss of sub-standard vessels, as 
                                                          
4 Normalization means adjusting values measured on different scales to a notionally common scale, often prior 
to averaging. 
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the punishment policy aims at dealing with illegal actions and sub-standard safety levels of the 
inspected vessels  (Li, et al., 2015).   
𝐶𝐷 = 𝜔𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑚 
Where 𝜔 represents the punishment intensity. It is a product of multiple influencing factors, 
especially detention time. A longer detention time means a severe punishment intensity to the 
vessel.  
The setting of detention cost in this thesis is just for the calculation and analysis of Nash 
equilibrium solution, as well as illustrate how the proposed game model works. In practice, 
port authorities can set this parameter as a function of detention time according to historical 
statistics. 
 
6.3 OPTIMAL INSPECTION RATE   
As discussed in sections 6.1 and 6.2, all the parameters in Equation (5-8) are constant values, 
except the detention cost. The detention cost is a dynamic parameter that varies with the 
punishment intensity ω. That is to say, the optimal inspection rate is actually a function of the 
punishment severity ω, denoted as X (ω). 
Because ω is a positive variable related to the port inspection regulations, it is impractical 
to fix it at a certain value to satisfy all the cases. Hence, in this study, the punishment severity 
is changed to see the optimal inspection rates in various circumstances.  
The following Table 6.7 shows the optimal inspection rates when 𝜔 changes from 0 to 20 
(𝜔 is integer). The purpose is to see the variation of optimal inspection rate with different 
punishment intensity and analyse its trends. 
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Table 6.7 Optimal inspection rate with different punishment severity levels 
 Small Large 
 Young Medium Old Young Medium Old 
ω=1 65.025% 63.184% 64.793% 53.061% 55.913% 67.126% 
ω=2 40.343% 39.316% 41.103% 31.518% 33.892% 42.716% 
ω=3 29.243% 28.536% 30.098% 22.417% 24.315% 31.325% 
ω=4 22.933% 22.396% 23.741% 17.394% 18.958% 24.730% 
ω=5 18.863% 18.430% 19.602% 14.210% 15.536% 20.429% 
ω=6 16.020% 15.657% 16.691% 12.011% 13.160% 17.403% 
ω=7 13.921% 13.610% 14.533% 10.402% 11.414% 15.157% 
ω=8 12.309% 12.036% 12.870% 9.173% 10.078% 13.425% 
ω=9 11.031% 10.788% 11.548% 8.203% 9.021% 12.048% 
ω=10 9.994% 9.775% 10.472% 7.419% 8.165% 10.927% 
ω=11 9.135% 8.936% 9.580% 6.772% 7.457% 9.997% 
ω=12 8.412% 8.229% 8.827% 6.229% 6.863% 9.213% 
ω=13 7.795% 7.626% 8.185% 5.766% 6.356% 8.543% 
ω=14 7.262% 7.106% 7.629% 5.367% 5.919% 7.964% 
ω=15 6.798% 6.652% 7.144% 5.020% 5.538% 7.458% 
ω=16 6.389% 6.252% 6.717% 4.715% 5.203% 7.013% 
ω=17 6.027% 5.898% 6.339% 4.445% 4.906% 6.618% 
ω=18 5.703% 5.581% 6.000% 4.205% 4.642% 6.265% 
ω=19 5.413% 5.297% 5.696% 3.989% 4.404% 5.948% 
ω=20 5.151% 5.041% 5.422% 3.794% 4.190% 5.661% 
(Source: Author) 
Based on the information in Table 6.7, Figure 6.3 provides a visualized diagram to describe 
the trend of optimal inspection rates when the punishment severity changes.  
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Figure 6.3 Trend of optimal inspection rate 
(Source: Author) 
From Table 6.7 and Figure 6.3, several conclusions are made and research implications are 
derived. 
(1) With the increase of punishment severity, the optimal inspection rates see a decreasing 
trend regardless of the vessel conditions.  
For example, the optimal inspection rate of small and young bulk carriers at ω=1 is 65.025% 
and falls to 18.863% when ω increases to 5.  
Actually, when calculating an optimal inspection rate, the only variable in Equation (5-8) 
is the severity degree ω. Other parameters, like the accident rate, accident loss, they are all 
constant. Hence, the function of optimal inspection rate can be written as  
𝑋(𝜔) =
𝑎3
𝑎1𝜔 + 𝑎2
  
Where a1, a2, a3 are positive constant.  
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Because of the positive value of ω, therefore, the first derivative test of the optimal 
inspection rate is 
𝑋′(𝜔) = −
𝑎1𝑎3
(𝑎1𝜔 + 𝑎2)2
 
 
𝑋′(𝜔) < 0 means the optimal inspection rate is a decreasing function and does not have an 
extremum. The limiting case lies that when ω is infinitely great, the optimal inspection rate of 
bulk carriers is infinitely close to zero regardless of the safety condition and characteristics of 
the vessel.  
(2) The declining speed of the optimal inspection rates slows down with the increase of the 
punishment severity.  
It can be explained from a mathematical perspective. 
The second derivative test of the optimal inspection rate is: 
𝑋′′(𝜔) =
2𝑎1
2𝑎3
(𝑎1𝜔 + 𝑎2)3
 
Because ω is a positive variable, 
𝑋′′(𝜔) > 0 
If the second derivative test of a function is always positive no matter how the variable 
changes, the first derivative test is an increasing function. When combining it with the result 
that 𝑋′(𝜔) < 0, we disclose that 𝑋′(𝜔) is a negative increasing function, and |𝑋′(𝜔)| is a 
positive decreasing function.  
When represented in the graph, 𝑋′(𝜔) reflects the slope of the line 𝑋 (𝜔), and |𝑋′(𝜔)| 
measures the steepness or grade of the line.  
Therefore, a positive decreasing nature of |𝑋′(𝜔)| indicates the line of optimal inspection 
rate is steeper at first and tends to be smooth with the increase of the punishment severity.  
In fact, the variation trend reveals that with the increase of the punishment intensity, the 
standard ship owners’ motivation  of implementing better safety maintenance policy among 
the sub-standard ship owners becomes lower and lower.  
(3) Vessel age has little influence on the optimal inspection rates of small bulk carriers. 
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Table 6.8 illustrates the standard deviation of small bulk carriers. The standard deviation 
here represents the variation of the optimal inspection rates of small bulk carriers. It is obvious 
to find that the standard deviation of small bulk carriers is always low no matter how the 
punishment intensity changes. It means that the dispersion of the data is kept at a low level 
under all circumstances. In addition, the value of standard deviation is always below 1%, and 
keeps dropping when the punishment intensity increases. Hence, for small bulk carriers, vessel 
age has no influence on the optimal inspection rates. 
Table 6.8 The standard deviation of small bulk carriers 
Small 
 Young Medium Old Standard deviation 
ω=1 65.03% 63.18% 64.79% 0.82% 
ω=2 40.34% 39.32% 41.10% 0.73% 
ω=3 29.24% 28.54% 30.10% 0.64% 
ω=4 22.93% 22.40% 23.74% 0.55% 
ω=5 18.86% 18.43% 19.60% 0.48% 
ω=6 16.02% 15.66% 16.69% 0.43% 
ω=7 13.92% 13.61% 14.53% 0.38% 
ω=8 12.31% 12.04% 12.87% 0.35% 
ω=9 11.03% 10.79% 11.55% 0.32% 
ω=10 9.99% 9.78% 10.47% 0.29% 
ω=11 9.14% 8.94% 9.58% 0.27% 
ω=12 8.41% 8.23% 8.83% 0.25% 
ω=13 7.80% 7.63% 8.19% 0.23% 
ω=14 7.26% 7.11% 7.63% 0.22% 
ω=15 6.80% 6.65% 7.14% 0.21% 
ω=16 6.39% 6.25% 6.72% 0.20% 
ω=17 6.03% 5.90% 6.34% 0.19% 
ω=18 5.70% 5.58% 6.00% 0.18% 
ω=19 5.41% 5.30% 5.70% 0.17% 
ω=20 5.15% 5.04% 5.42% 0.16% 
(Source: Author) 
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(4) Large and old bulk carriers have the highest optimal inspection rates. In addition, old 
vessels are always the most risky vessels. 
In Figure 6.3, the curve representing the optimal inspection rate of ‘Large-old bulk carriers’ 
is always on top of other vessel types no matter how the punishment intensity changes, 
followed closely by the curve ‘Small-Old bulk carriers’. As a summary, old vessels have higher 
optimal inspection rates than young and average vessels when other variables remain identical. 
The finding derived from the empirical study conforms to the common sense that old vessels 
are more risky. The components of most old vessels are more fragile and may not able to tackle 
emergencies and accidents when sailing. Meanwhile, the maintenance cost spent on old vessels 
is a huge number compared to other vessels as indicated in Table 6.2, restraining the motivation 
of many ship owners.  
Hence, a higher optimal inspection rate for old bulk carriers reflects the hazards and risks 
that old vessels possess, prompting the port authority to pay more attention to them and prevent 
illegal actions from ship owners. 
(5) For young and medium bulk carriers, vessel size is a factor of more influential power 
than vessel age in PSC.  
To compare the effect of vessel size and vessel age on the optimal inspection rate, sensitivity 
analysis is conducted. When locking one factor and changing the states of another factor (target 
factor), the change of optimal inspection rate is measured as the effect of the target factor under 
this scenario.  
For example, when ω=1, if the vessel is a small vessel, it can be observed that the optimal 
rate of a young small vessel is 65.03%. On the other hand, the medium small vessel is 63.184%. 
Therefore, the different value 1.84% is the effect of vessel age on the optimal inspection rate 
when locking vessel size at ‘small’ and ω=1. Table 6.9 shows the individual effect of vessel 
size and vessel age under different scenarios.  
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Table 6.9 Effect of vessel age and vessel size 
Target factor Vessel age Vessel size 
Locked state Small Large Young Old 
ω=1 1.84% 2.85% 11.96% 7.27% 
ω=2 1.03% 2.37% 8.83% 5.42% 
ω=3 0.71% 1.90% 6.83% 4.22% 
ω=4 0.54% 1.56% 5.54% 3.44% 
ω=5 0.43% 1.33% 4.65% 2.89% 
ω=6 0.36% 1.15% 4.01% 2.50% 
ω=7 0.31% 1.01% 3.52% 2.20% 
ω=8 0.27% 0.90% 3.14% 1.96% 
ω=9 0.24% 0.82% 2.83% 1.77% 
ω=10 0.22% 0.75% 2.58% 1.61% 
ω=11 0.20% 0.68% 2.36% 1.48% 
ω=12 0.18% 0.63% 2.18% 1.37% 
ω=13 0.17% 0.59% 2.03% 1.27% 
ω=14 0.16% 0.55% 1.90% 1.19% 
ω=15 0.15% 0.52% 1.78% 1.11% 
ω=16 0.14% 0.49% 1.67% 1.05% 
ω=17 0.13% 0.46% 1.58% 0.99% 
ω=18 0.12% 0.44% 1.50% 0.94% 
ω=19 0.12% 0.42% 1.42% 0.89% 
ω=20 0.11% 0.40% 1.36% 0.85% 
(Source: Author) 
It is obvious that vessel size has more influence on the inspection rate than vessel age under 
various situations. However, the tendency of the impact magnitude gradually decreases when 
the punishment intensity of the port authority is higher and higher.  
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6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PORT AUTHORITIES   
6.4.1 Suggestions when formulating inspection policy 
This section illustrates how the proposed model and theoretical optimal inspection rates can 
help port authorities to make their optimal decisions in PSC inspections. It is noteworthy that 
the prerequisite of the suggestion is that port authorities and ship owners make their decisions 
independently, and both of them are not aware of the choice of the other.  
When applying the optimal inspection policy in practice, the social welfare increase 
(detention cost) assumption in the game model should be improved first. Based on the historical 
inspection data of the port, the social welfare loss (detention cost) can be set as a function of 
detention time, which is denoted as: 
 𝐶𝐷 = 𝐷𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑖
0 
(6-4) 
Where DTi is detention time (day) and represents the punishment intensity, while 𝐶𝑖
0 is the 
detention cost of vessel type i per day. Here vessel types are classified according to the 
inspection performance, and the vessels of same type will have the same detention time.  
Next, the port authority should figure out the average detention time of different vessel types 
under different scenarios, and then calculate the possible social welfare increase (detention cost) 
per inspection based on Equation (6-4)  
Based on the proposed optimal inspection rate equation, the optimal inspection rates of 
vessels under different conditions can be obtained when inserting corresponding values, 
denoted as Xi (i represents vessel types). Meanwhile, the historical data can tell the numbers of 
bulk carriers arriving at port per day, denoted as Ni. Therefore, the optimal number of PSC 
inspections at the port per vessel type per day is Xi Ni, which is useful for the port authority 
when formulating its inspection regulations.  
However, sometimes the resources that the port authority has in reality do not support them 
to do the exactly number of inspections that the Nash solution suggests. On this occasion, the 
port authority has two strategies: 
1) Increase the resources for PSC inspection, e.g. PSC inspectors (human resources), 
funding and operational expenditure. 
2) If it is not possible to increase the resources, the port authority can use the Equation (5-
8) and (6-4) to improve its inspection policy.  
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 Based on the limited resources the port authority has for different vessel types, the 
maximum number of inspections on different vessel types per day is obtained. Hence, 
the required optimal inspection rates are calculated, which is denoted as Xi
’ 
 Input Xi’ into optimal inspection rate Equation (5-8) and use the backward calculation 
to get the detention cost CDi
’ for different vessel types. 
 Once the required detention cost CDi’ is obtained, the punishment intensity and the 
detention time of different vessel types DT’i can be calculated through Equation (6-4).  
Because Xi
’ < Xi, then CDi’ > CDi, DT’i > DTi. The port authority can prolong the 
detention time and increase the punishment intensity to the corresponding level based 
on the optimal inspection equation to ensure the operation of PSC inspection system.  
In general, when a port authority has sufficient resources, it should choose the optimal 
inspection rate; otherwise it can increase the punishment intensity level to tackle the sub-
standard effort and illegal actions of the ship owner.  
 
6.4.2 The decision-making framework for the port authority 
Since NIR was implemented, the Paris MoU continued with its work of improving the 
performance of the PSC inspection system and inspecting vessels in accordance with the 
relevant instruments of the Memorandum. Over the years within the Paris MoU, the 
developments and works carried out by the authority were apparent, for example, the 
Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC), the updated ‘white, grey, black’ list every year, the 
development of the Technical Evaluation Group, the training and development of PSCOs, the 
detention review panel, and vessel quality management. These actions enable port authorities 
to execute high quality and detailed PSC inspections, and improve the efficiency and accuracy 
of the inspection results. 
In this regard, this section aims to propose a decision-making framework for port authorities 
when formulating the inspection policy and examining the inspected vessels to fit the 
increasingly perfect inspection system. Due to the money, human resources, and other types of 
cost that are consumed, it is of vital importance to provide an optimal decision-making 
framework for port authorities when inspecting vessels. It can be achieved by incorporating the 
BN model of Post-NIR PSC inspection system and the non-cooperative strategic game 
proposed in this research. The results yielded by the framework present a novel way to select 
the best actions under different situations, which enables decision makers to find optimal 
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solutions to improve performance of the PSC inspection system. 
The following Figure 6.4 describes the process of the proposed decision-making framework 
by this thesis. The improvements to the current practice have been highlighted in the figure and 
the detailed information is highlighted in the description of the framework as well. 
 
Figure 6.4 Decision-making framework for the port authority 
(Source: Author) 
 1) Preparatory work 
The first step is preparatory work. The port authority should collect and summarize the 
related information and statistics required for the modelling, for example, the average 
detention time of detained bulk carriers under different scenarios, the possible social welfare 
increase (detention loss to the ship owner) per inspection, the numbers of bulk carriers arriving 
at port per day, the human resources (mainly PSCOs) it has, the limit of expenditure per day, 
etc. The statistic derived from historical records corresponds to the important elements in risk 
assessment BN model and strategic game model. Clarifying the statistics in these aspects is 
essential for the later optimal inspection policy selection and decision-making process. 
2) Strategy determination 
Based on the proposed optimal inspection rate derived from the game model, the port 
authority can choose the proper inspection strategy (the total number of inspections for 
different types of vessels) according to the resources it has. As discussed in section 7.4.1, if the 
port authority has enough resources, it should set the number of inspections per day according 
to the optimal inspection rate; if the port authority does not have enough resources, it should 
Step 1: Preparatory work 
Step 2: Strategy determination 
Step 4: Risk estimation 
Step 3: PSC Inspection Execution 
Step 5: The decision of inspection results 
Step 6: Result delivery 
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either acquire more resources to satisfy the optimal inspection rate or increase the punishment 
intensity to the corresponding level based on the existing resources. The strategy choice relies 
on the environment around the port and the overall situation of the PSC inspection system at 
this port. Once the strategy of number of inspections is determined, the port authority can pick 
the vessels based on the result of the last inspection, SRP of the vessel, selection regime of the 
port, and other factors. 
3) PSC inspection execution 
The next step is to carry out inspections on selected vessels. The ship owner has to report 
24 hours before his/her vessel arrives at the port or anchorage of the Paris MoU region or before 
leaving the previous port or anchorage if the voyage is expected to take less than 24 hours. The 
report mission is obligated for all vessels that plan to berth at the port. In the report, some 
information is acquired to provide to the port authority, including ship identification, port of 
destination, estimated time of arrival, estimated time of departure, planned duration of the call, 
date of last expanded inspection in the Paris MoU region, etc. The port authority can decide 
whether to inspect the vessel based on the provided information, the historical inspection 
records, and the inspection strategy determined via optimal inspection rate. 
The inspection will normally start with, as a minimum and to the extent applicable, 
examination of the documents in accordance with Annex 10 of the Paris MOU. In addition, the 
PSCO will conduct a general inspection of several areas on board to verify that the overall 
condition of the ship complies with that required by the various certificates. 
If the ship is found to comply, the PSCO will issue a ‘clean’ inspection report (Form A) to 
the master of the ship. In case deficiencies have been identified, the inspection report will 
include a deficiencies found report (Form B) indicating any follow-up actions to be taken to 
rectify the deficiencies indicated. Next, the data of the respective ship and the inspection result 
will be recorded on the central computer database, located in Lisbon, Portugal. 
Furthermore, control on compliance with on-board operational requirements may be 
included in the control procedures, particularly if the PSCO has reason to believe that the crew 
demonstrates insufficient proficiency in that area. 
4) Decision of inspection results 
When the inspection on board is completed, the port authority should decide whether to 
detain the vessel. In the current practice, the detention of a vessel is based on the professional 
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judgment of PSCOs. Normally, the ship will be detained if the deficiencies on a ship are 
sufficiently serious to merit a PSCO returning to the ship to be satisfied that they have been 
rectified before the ship sails. However, this process is highly relied on the ability and 
experience of the PSCOs, and port authorities have to invest a lot to train professional PSCOs, 
otherwise the results may not reliable. 
Under the new decision-making framework in this thesis, this process can be done through 
the proposed BN model. The port authority can apply the ‘Post-NIR’ BN model to estimate the 
detention rate of this vessel. Through comparing the detention rate of this vessel with the 
average detention rate of this particular vessel type, those vessels having an abnormally high 
detention rate should be detained. On the contrary, the vessels that have low detention rate are 
standard and high quality vessels, being assumed to pass the inspection with no doubt. 
 Therefore, the application of BN model not only eases the burden of port authorities on 
training professional PSCOs, but also reduce the pressure of PSCOs on providing reliable 
inspection results.  
In addition, when the port authority decides to detain the vessel, it needs to set the period of 
detention for the vessel. There are a large number of factors influencing the detention time, for 
instance, the number of detainable deficiencies, the severity level of the deficiencies, the 
complexity of the repair, the place for repair at the port, etc. The port authority has its own 
system and principles to determine the detention period for the sub-standard vessels.  
Additionally, if the vessel is detained for multiple detentions, the vessel will be banned. The 
vessel is not allowed to access any port in the region of the Paris MoU for a minimum period. 
Normally, the number of detentions is three in three years. The duration for first ban is up to 3 
months, the second is 12 months, and the third ban would be 24 months or even a permanent 
ban. 
6) Result delivery 
Once the result of the inspection is determined, the PSCO will issue a notice of detention to 
the ship owner. Meanwhile, the PSCO will inform the ship owner that they have the right of 
appeal. The ship owner can choose to appeal to the coastal country, the flag state, or the RO. 
The flag state or RO may then ask the port authority to reconsider its decision to detain the 
vessel. If the outcome of the investigation and appeal is not satisfied, the flag state or the RO 
can send a request for review to the Paris MoU secretariat.  
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The following Table 6.10 summarize the improvements on the current PSC inspection 
practice of this thesis. 
Table 6.10 Improvements on PSC practice 
Stage Improvements 
Step 1: Preparatory 
work 
 Collect and clarify the related information and statistics to 
provide a better foundation for inspection policy decisions 
Step 2: Strategy 
determination 
 The port authority can choose the optimal inspection strategy, i.e. 
the number of inspections for each type of vessels under various 
situations, based on the resources it has through the calculation of 
optimal inspection rate calculation. 
Step 4: Decision of 
inspection results 
 The proposed BN model can help port authority to estimate the 
detention rate and decide the inspection results from a more 
convenient and easier way than the current mechanism.  
 No heavy burden on PSCOs under the new framework.  
 The cost on PSC training are reduced. 
 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS   
This chapter has conducted an empirical study to analyse the theoretical optimal inspection 
rates obtained in Chapter 5. The result reveals the optimal inspection rates of bulk carriers 
under different conditions from a port authority viewpoint. New managerial insights are 
established and verified through an empirical study investigating the inspections happened in 
2015-2017. For example, 1) with the increase of punishment severity, the optimal inspection 
rates present a decreasing trend regardless the vessel conditions. 2) The declining speed of the 
optimal inspection rates slows down with the increase of the punishment severity level. 3) 
Vessel age has little influence on the optimal inspection rates of small bulk carriers. 4) Large 
and old bulk carriers have the highest inspection rates. 5) For young and medium bulk carriers, 
vessel size is a factor of more influential power than vessel age in PSC. The above managerial 
insights can be served as useful information for i) the port authorities when formulating their 
inspection policy regarding the bulk carrier part and ii) the ship owners when minimizing their 
ships detention rate given economic constrains. 
Based on the findings, there are two suggestions for port authorities when formulating their 
inspection policies respectively: 
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 If having sufficient resources for inspection, the port authority can use the calculated 
optimal inspection rate to determine the number of inspected bulk carriers per day.  
 If there are limited inspection resources, port authorities can use the backward 
calculation function to increase the vessel detention time based on the maximum 
number of inspections it can afford per day.  
Meanwhile, a decision-making framework consisting of six steps is proposed to help port 
authorities make decisions during an inspection. The framework incorporates the risk 
assessment BN model and the strategic game model developed in this research, thus making 
the framework more reliable and convincing.  
Further effort will focus on the improvement of the game model, taking into account the 
effect of repair at port due to detention, the severity classification of accidents and 
corresponding accident loss. Data acquisition (i.e. the statistics of total accident loss) presents 
another issue to investigate in the future research agenda.  
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CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this chapter, the proposed models and techniques described in Chapter 3, 4, 5, and 6 are 
briefly summarised and discussed to make a comprehensive demonstration on the influence of 
the new inspection regime of PSC and the optimal decisions of port authorities under current 
conditions. Additionally, the research contributions of this study are revealed, as well as the 
suggestions on the further improvements of the research topic.  
 
7.1 RESEARCH IMPLICATION 
The much-anticipated New Inspection Regime implemented by Paris MoU transformed and 
modernised the PSC inspection system a lot, making it more and more important in preventing 
illegal actions of ship owners and ensuring maritime safety, and even become the last line of 
defence against sub-standard vessels. Despite the fact that new PSC inspection system came 
into force for many years, the emergence of sub-standard increased gradually. In fact, a 
decision-making framework is required to help port authorities to make optimal decisions when 
executing PSC inspections to deal with the potential risks of sub-standard vessels. However, 
findings from the literature have revealed that there are few works focusing this topic. Thus, 
this thesis incorporates the risk assessment tool and the analytical tool to propose a decision-
making framework for port authorities under various situations in new PSC inspection system. 
The research objectives are achieved through three technical parts (because Chapter 6 
utilises a case study to illustrate the game model in Chapter 5, hence these two chapters are 
viewed as a whole part), which is discussed in detail as follows. Meanwhile, the research 
questions put forward in Chapter 1 are also solved. 
 
7.1.1 Discussions of the advanced risk assessment model for PSC inspections under NIR 
using data-driven BN approach 
In Chapter 3, a prediction tool to help port authorities estimate the detention rate under 
different situations since the implementation of NIR is developed. During the process of 
developing risk prediction tool, Q1 and Q2 proposed in Research question part are solved. 
In addition, this chapter also reveals the degree of importance of different risk factors 
influencing PSC inspection results in different periods, i.e. vessel flag, vessel age, DWT for 
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‘Pre-NIR’ period, company performance, and inspection date for ‘Post-NIR’ period. The work 
was assessed and completed by data-driven Bayesian network approach. The data-driven 
Bayesian network approach is a combination of data-driven approach (in this study, TAN 
learning) and the original BN model to induce the risk assessment model through data, not 
expert judgment. This approach is an advanced version of the original BN approach that aims 
to reduce the dependence on human experts and improve the model accuracy. Among the 
various data-driven approaches, TAN learning shows its superiority to deal with the 
construction and learning problem in BN because of its accuracy and competitiveness. 
In this part, two BN models are developed through TAN learning, one is a ‘Pre-NIR’ BN 
model (before the implementation of NIR), the other is a ‘Post-NIR’ model (after the 
implementation of NIR). The purpose of setting two BN models is to display the conditions of 
different periods, which is of vital importance for the later analysis of the influence of NIR on 
the PSC inspection system.  
Different from the traditional BN construction process, a new conceptual methodology to 
construct the PSC inspection model is developed including the following steps in this study.  
1) Data acquisition.  
A dataset containing 72,785 inspection records from 2005-2008 and 49,328 inspection 
records from 2015-2017 extracted from the Paris MoU online inspection system is established. 
As one of the popular vessel types, bulk carriers account for 15% of the total number of PSC 
inspections, and are thus selected as the research target in this study.  
2) Variables identification – Answer to Q1 
The risk variables identified from inspection records are explained with particular reference 
to their state definitions in Chapter 3. For Pre-NIR period, vessel flag, vessel age, DWT, RO, 
inspection type, inspection port and number of deficiencies are the factors that may influence 
detention; for post-NIR period, vessel flag, vessel age, company performance, inspection type, 
inspection port, inspection date and number of deficiencies are the identified ones.  
3) Data-driven network construction – Answer to Q2 
According to the TAN learning, the original data-driven networks for PSC inspections are 
constructed. However, the CPT table would be too large to have enough sampling information 
in the inspection database for the calculation of conditional probabilities. To solve this issue, 
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divorcing approach is utilized and two mediating dummy variables, ‘vessel group’ and 
‘inspection group’, are introduced. Meanwhile, some meaningless and incorrect links in the 
network are modified. Figure 3.6 to Figure 3.10 describe the process of improving the structure 
of the BN.  
4) CPT calculation  
Equation (3-2) and Equation (3-3) provide a way to calculate the conditional probabilities, 
which is known as the gradient descent approach. This three-step calculation process is a 
quantitative approach and the results are shown in Table 3.1 to Table 3.7. Meanwhile, the whole 
information of CPT can be found in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.  
5) Model result 
Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.13 present the final model of ‘Pre-NIR’ period and ‘Post-NIR’ 
period, respectively. The detention rate in general situations estimated by theoretical models is 
in line with the direct calculation from the inspection database.  
The final model proposed in this chapter, Figure 3.13, can be served as the prediction tool 
for port authorities under different conditions since NIR is implemented. Through several real 
inspection cases, this prediction tool is proved to have practical significance for port authorities. 
When a bulk carrier arrives at a port, the port authority can use the proposed prediction tool 
first to conduct a primary screening. If the result is positive, the port can devote less effort and 
resources to it; if the result is negative, the vessel is a high-risk vessel and shall be examined 
carefully under the new inspection system. 
Through the TRI sensitivity analysis, the degree of importance of risk variables are listed 
(Answer to Q2) 
Inspection group > Number of deficiencies > Type of inspection > Vessel group > RO > 
Vessel age (Pre-NIR) 
Number of deficiencies > Inspection group > Vessel group > Company performance > 
Vessel age > Type of inspection (Post-NIR) 
As ‘inspection group’ and ‘vessel group’ are class variables which do not exist in PSC 
inspection records, ‘Number of deficiencies’ is in fact the most important risk factor, no matter 
before or after the implementation of NIR. This result indicates sub-standard performance of 
inspection-related items (Number of deficiencies, type of inspection, etc.) is more likely to lead 
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to detention than unqualified intrinsic attributes of vessels (vessel age, dwt, RO, etc.).  
The novelty of this chapter lies in two aspects, 1) construct a data-driven BN for risk analysis 
and prediction on PSC system for the first time; 2) take company performance into account 
when constructing the risk assessment model for ‘Post-NIR’ period. Further, when analysing 
the optimal inspection policy for port authorities after the implementation of NIR in Chapter 5, 
the results of BN play a crucial role in the game model construction.  
 
7.1.2 Discussions of the influence of the implementation of NIR on PSC inspection system 
Since NIR was implemented in 2011, its influence on the PSC inspection system and 
inspection results is still not clarified in academia. Chapter 4 conducts an analysis to figure out 
the influence of the implementation of NIR on PSC inspection system from both the micro-
level and macro-level perspectives (Answer to Q3). The statistics and information used in this 
chapter come from two sources: one is the results from two proposed BN models in Chapter 3; 
the other is the facts & figures collected from the Paris MoU annual reports in 2005-2017.  
Based on the statistics derived from official annual reports, the changes of PSC inspection 
system from the macro-level perspective are clarified from different aspects. Some important 
and positive findings are presented as follows. 
1) From 2011, the number of inspections and individual inspected vessels continued to 
drop, except 2014, when both indicators increased slightly. 
2) Since NIR was implemented, both the number of inspections and the inspected vessels 
per year remained stable compared to the former inspection system.  
3) The introduction of NIR significantly reduced the deficiency rate and detainable 
deficiency rate in the Paris MoU inspection system.  
4) Since NIR was implemented, the deficiency rate maintained a downward trend, from 
2.662 in 2011 to 2.346 in 2016, especially in 2014, where there was a huge decline.  
5) The detention rate after 2011 was lower and more stable compared to the period before 
NIR.  
 6) The implementation of NIR significantly reduced the burden on the ship owners (from 
1.6 inspections/year to 1.2 inspections/year). 
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7) The implementation of NIR reduced the number of inspections of most vessel types, 
and kept this number at a steady level.  
8) The detention rate of all vessel types dropped, indicating the positive influence on 
detention rate of NIR suited for the major vessel types in the PSC inspection system.  
It is obvious to find that the changes brought by NIR are almost positive, indicating the 
introduction of NIR indeed transforms the PSC inspection system to a large extent and is no 
doubt the biggest change in PSC history.  
Another perspective lies in the micro-level analysis. Based on the proposed models in 
Chapter 3 and the corresponding results, the influence of NIR is explained in four aspects:  the 
change of influence degree of risk factors in different periods, the impact of the new risk factor 
‘company performance’, the prior probability change, and the role change of two factor groups. 
The changes in these aspects are described in detail in section 4.4. Most of the changes are also 
positive like the macro-level analysis.  
1) Since NIR was implemented, the relationships between risk factors and the inspection 
results have become closer and stronger. 
2) Vessel-related risk factors have been paid more attention since the implementation of 
NIR.  
3) The newly added factor, company performance, is viewed as an important risk factor 
that greatly affects the final inspection results. The vessels under high and medium company 
management are highly unlikely to be detained; on the other hand, low and very low ISM 
companies are on the ‘black list’ of all ports within the range of the Paris MoU and have 
greatly increased chances of detention. 
4) The attitudes of port authorities towards vessels under the management of low and very 
low shipping companies are rigorous, much more than the benefits gained from selecting a 
high/medium management company for inspection. 
5) The flag performance of inspected vessels improves a lot and almost all the inspected 
vessels have a white list flag.  
6) The age of inspected vessels from 2011 is becoming younger, indicating the 
implementation of NIR eliminated those low quality old vessels.  
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7) Compared to the previous system, both the high inspection risk and high vessel risk 
vessels will have much higher chances to be detained by port authorities under the new 
inspection system.  
8) Vessels having low vessel-related risks will have a huge reduction in the detention rate 
when accepting inspections, stimulating the ship owners to be more concerned about the 
vessel quality.  
9) Vessel-related risks are no longer an indifferent part compared to inspection-related 
risks and gradually become crucial to the inspection results. 
10) Port authorities are vigilant to all potential risks and will no longer tolerate any types 
of risk 
Generally speaking, the findings and changes brought by NIR provide important insights 
for port authorities and ship owners to understand the improvements of the inspection system, 
e.g. the change of preferred inspection types; the more rigid policy against sub-standard vessels. 
All the signs indicate that NIR has taken port state control to the next level. 
Overall, this chapter displays the influences and changes that the New Inspection Regime 
gave to the whole PSC inspection system for the first time. Since NIR was introduced, the Paris 
MoU has invested many resources to maintain and improve this regime, as well as 
propagandize and generalize this system to the whole world. Through the analysis of the related 
statistics since 2011 and the risk assessment models of the Paris MoU inspection system, it is 
simple to find the NIR was highly praised because it indeed brought many positive changes 
and improved the inspection system a lot. Based on this regime, the potential maritime risks 
related to vessel safety are very likely to be detected when the vessel is undergoing inspection 
at ports.  
 
7.1.3 Discussions of the optimal inspection policy of port authorities after the implementation 
of NIR using risk-based game model 
Under the new PSC inspection regime, one big issue for port authorities is to determine their 
inspection policies. Because of the resources and conditions, an optimal inspection policy is of 
vital importance for port authorities to ensure vessel quality and motivate ship owners. 
Meanwhile, due to the introduction of the company performance index, the ISM Company also 
need to regulate the quality of the vessels under their management now, hence it has become 
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an important factor that may influence the inspection decisions of port authorities and ship 
owners in the current inspection regime. In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, game theory is applied to 
figure out this issue. Combined with the results from the BN, a PSC inspection game model 
under NIR is constructed to clarify the optimal inspection policies for port authorities, aiming 
to provide important insights for coastal countries to deal with illegal ship owners and ISM 
companies. Research questions Q4, Q5 and Q6 are clarified. 
When constructing the game model, several assumptions are made at first, for example, the 
players in the game (port authorities and ship owners) are rational, the vessels are classified 
into standard vessel and sub-standard vessel, the accident losses of the vessel with different 
maintenance effort are the same, and some basic assumptions of the strategic game. According 
to the definition of the strategic game, the parameters in the game model are identified from 
three aspects: players, strategies, and payoffs. It is obvious that there are two players, port 
authorities and ship owners, in the game. The former stakeholder can decide whether to inspect 
the vessel or not, while the latter can choose high or low maintenance effort on their vessels. 
As the most important component to form a game, the payoffs of different players in an 
inspection game are different. For ship owners, the payoffs consist of expected detention cost, 
expected accident loss, inspection cost, and other related costs, while for port authorities, the 
social welfare increase and loss, port charges, and other related costs are important parts. In 
this two-player non-cooperative strategic inspection game, the payoffs under each scenario (or 
strategic profile) is presented in the payoff matrix in Table 5.3, which describes the 
relationships between port authorities and ship owners under NIR (Answer to Q4). Mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium solution for the game model is presented as shown in Equation (5-
8) and Equation (5-9), which is known as the optimal inspection rate for the port authorities 
provided by the game model.  
With the help of the results from the BN, the risks and uncertainties hidden behind the 
inspection games are quantified, which is denoted as the ‘detention rate’ in the game model 
and Nash solution (Answer to Q5). Table 6.7 and Figure 6.3 presents the optimal inspection 
rate under different conditions. The analysis of the results reveals several research implications: 
1) With the increase of punishment severity, the optimal inspection rates experience a 
decreasing trend whatever the vessel condition.  
2) The declining speed of the optimal inspection rates slows down with the increase of the 
punishment severity.  
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3) Vessel age has little influence on the optimal inspection rates of small bulk carriers. 
4) Large and old bulk carriers have the highest optimal inspection rates. 
5) For young and medium bulk carriers, vessel size is a factor of more influential power 
than vessel age in PSC. 
In fact, when formulating the inspection policy, port authorities can use the proposed game 
model and optimal inspection rate formulation for reference. If they have enough resources for 
inspection, the port authority can use the optimal inspection rate to determine the number of 
inspected bulk carriers per day. If there are limited inspection resources, the port authority can 
use the backward calculation function of the proposed solution to improve its policy (increase 
the detention time for the vessel) based on the maximum number of inspections it can afford 
per day. 
In addition, based on the ‘Post-NIR’ BN model and strategic game model proposed in this 
research project, a novel framework is developed for port authorities when making decisions 
during PSC inspections. The decision-making framework can act as an instruction for port 
authorities to improve the performance of PSC inspection system, and then ensure the vessel 
quality and maritime safety under NIR. (Answer to Q6) 
Overall, this chapter provides some useful suggestions for port authorities to make decisions 
under the new PSC inspection system. The optimal inspection rate provided by the game model 
can provide important insights for port authorities to regulate illegal ship owners and sub-
standard vessels. With an eye to the performance of ISM companies, the game model proposed 
in this chapter combines the results of BN, which highlights the novelty of this chapter. 
The following table describes how the research questions of this thesis is solved. 
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Table 7.1 Solve of Research questions 
Q1 Variable identification through PSC inspection records (Section 3.2.2) 
Q2 The relationships between risk variables and inspection results are presented as the 
structure of BN models. (Section 3.3.3 & Section 3.4.3); 
The influencing degree of risk variables on inspection results is obtained via 
sensitivity analysis of the BN models. (Section 3.3.6 & Section 3.4.6) 
Q3 The influence of NIR on PSC inspection system is clarified through a comparison 
analysis between ‘Pre-NIR’ period and ‘Post-NIR’ period. (Chapter 4) 
Q4 The relationship between port authorities and ship owners is demonstrated in 
section 5.1 and illustrated in detail in section 5.3.3. 
Q5 The risks and uncertainties hidden behind the inspection game is quantified through 
the prediction function of BN, presented as the detention rate under different 
situations. (Section 6.2.1) 
Q6 Through incorporating the risk prediction tool (BN) and the optimal inspection 
policy (game model), a new conceptual decision-making framework is proposed to 
improve the current PSC inspection practice and overcome its deficiencies. It is 
useful for port authorities to make optimal decisions currently. (Section 6.4) 
 
7.2 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
This study develops a novel methodology incorporating BN and game theory to provide a 
dynamic prediction tool for port authorities and ship owners, analyse the impact of the 
implementation of NIR on PSC inspection, as well as help port authorities to make decisions 
when regulating inspection policy. Through six chapters’ work, the objectives are achieved and 
several contributions are made not only to academia, but also to the maritime industry.  
1) The factors influencing the inspection results in PSC inspections in two periods (Pre-NIR 
period and Post-NIR period) are identified. Meanwhile, the degree of importance of major risk 
factors are listed based on the analysis on the proposed BN models. 
2) Two BN models reflecting the inspection conditions are proposed based on the data 
collected from the Paris MoU online inspection system. The Post-NIR BN model can serve as 
a prediction tool for port authorities to estimate the detention rate of individual vessels under 
different situations within new inspection system.  
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3) The influence of NIR on the Paris MoU PSC system is clarified from two perspectives: 
micro-level and macro-level. Both perspectives prove that the implementation of NIR have 
positive influence on the whole PSC system, and NIR has definitely transformed the PSC 
inspection system and brought it to the next level.  
4) Combined with the BN, a novel game model is proposed to illustrate the game 
relationship between ship owners and port authorities under NIR. Taking company 
performance into consideration, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution proposes a 
theoretical optimal inspection rate for port authorities, aiming to provide important insights for 
port authorities when regulating inspection policy in the current situation.  
5) Several suggestions are made to port authorities after analysing the optimal inspection 
rate generated from an empirical study. It is proved that the proposed optimal inspection rate 
has important practical significance. 
6) A decision-making framework is proposed to help port authorities when making decisions 
in PSC inspections. 
 
7.3 FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS 
To improve the study, further work should focus on the following aspects: 
1) When constructing the risk assessment model for PSC inspections, the severity of the 
punishment should be considered as an important node, which is represented by ‘detention time’ 
in inspection records. The introduction of this new node can enrich the model and help the 
industry to understand the current condition of the punishment on sub-standard vessels.  
2) The improvement of the game model. Several factors and parameters should be taken 
into account when building the game model, for example, the effect of repair at port due to 
detention, on the accident rate, the severity classification of accidents and corresponding 
accident losses.  
3) Data acquisition work. More statistics related to PSC inspections and maritime accidents 
need to be collected to fulfil the validation and the case study of the model, i.e. the total accident 
loss, and the updated maintenance cost.  
4) The research targets can extend and not be restricted to bulk carrier. A comparison 
between the results of different vessel types can reveal their risk grades. 
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5) Nash equilibrium solution is a basic solution to the game model. More solution types are 
encouraged to provide more accurate and practical optimal inspection rates for port authorities, 
i.e. Stackelberg equilibrium solution. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix One Conditional Probability Table of ‘Pre-NIR’ BN model 
Table Appendix 1.1. CPT of ‘Vessel group’ 
Vessel age Vessel flag RO DWT Low Detention Risk High Detention Risk 
Over20Y Black High High Capesize 0.506161 0.493839 
Over20Y Black High High Handymax 0.436418 0.563582 
Over20Y Black High High Handysize 0.001225 0.998775 
Over20Y Black High High Panamax 0.510926 0.489074 
Over20Y Black High High Small 0.001377 0.998622 
Over20Y Black High Low Capesize 0.544272 0.455728 
Over20Y Black High Low Handymax 0.474572 0.525428 
Over20Y Black High Low Handysize 0.559007 0.440993 
Over20Y Black High Low Panamax 0.481589 0.518411 
Over20Y Black High Low Small 0.001343 0.998657 
Over20Y Black High Medium Capesize 0.477040 0.522960 
Over20Y Black High Medium Handymax 0.539265 0.460735 
Over20Y Black High Medium Handysize 0.001003 0.998997 
Over20Y Black High Medium Panamax 0.545160 0.454840 
Over20Y Black High Medium Small 0.001150 0.998850 
Over20Y Black High Very Low Capesize 0.574570 0.425430 
Over20Y Black High Very Low Handymax 0.544393 0.455607 
Over20Y Black High Very Low Handysize 0.001322 0.998678 
Over20Y Black High Very Low Panamax 0.544796 0.455204 
Over20Y Black High Very Low Small 0.001096 0.998904 
Over20Y Black High Capesize 0.998802 0.001199 
Over20Y Black High Handymax 0.998958 0.001042 
Over20Y Black High Handysize 0.998632 0.001368 
Over20Y Black High Panamax 0.998739 0.001261 
Over20Y Black High Small 0.001264 0.998736 
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Over20Y Black Low Capesize 0.541464 0.458536 
Over20Y Black Low Handymax 0.579570 0.420430 
Over20Y Black Low Handysize 0.001183 0.998817 
Over20Y Black Low Panamax 0.467310 0.532690 
Over20Y Black Low Small 0.001331 0.998669 
Over20Y Black Medium Capesize 0.519371 0.480629 
Over20Y Black Medium Handymax 0.519094 0.480906 
Over20Y Black Medium Handysize 0.001228 0.998772 
Over20Y Black Medium Panamax 0.532309 0.467691 
Over20Y Black Medium Small 0.001462 0.998538 
Over20Y Black Very Low Capesize 0.511952 0.488048 
Over20Y Black Very Low Handymax 0.500780 0.499220 
Over20Y Black Very Low Handysize 0.001644 0.998356 
Over20Y Black Very Low Panamax 0.457193 0.542807 
Over20Y Black Very Low Small 0.001554 0.998447 
Over20Y Grey High Capesize 0.449270 0.550730 
Over20Y Grey High Handymax 0.998573 0.001428 
Over20Y Grey High Handysize 0.998713 0.001287 
Over20Y Grey High Panamax 0.554821 0.445179 
Over20Y Grey High Small 0.998825 0.001175 
Over20Y Grey Low Capesize 0.482980 0.517020 
Over20Y Grey Low Handymax 0.523341 0.476660 
Over20Y Grey Low Handysize 0.000981 0.999019 
Over20Y Grey Low Panamax 0.552643 0.447357 
Over20Y Grey Low Small 0.001159 0.998841 
Over20Y Grey Medium Capesize 0.548354 0.451646 
Over20Y Grey Medium Handymax 0.474055 0.525945 
Over20Y Grey Medium Handysize 0.999057 0.000943 
Over20Y Grey Medium Panamax 0.508330 0.491670 
Over20Y Grey Medium Small 0.998793 0.001208 
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Over20Y Grey Very Low Capesize 0.536479 0.463521 
Over20Y Grey Very Low Handymax 0.517227 0.482773 
Over20Y Grey Very Low Handysize 0.001359 0.998641 
Over20Y Grey Very Low Panamax 0.494512 0.505488 
Over20Y Grey Very Low Small 0.001677 0.998323 
Over20Y White High Capesize 0.998626 0.001374 
Over20Y White High Handymax 0.998769 0.001231 
Over20Y White High Handysize 0.998476 0.001524 
Over20Y White High Panamax 0.998447 0.001553 
Over20Y White High Small 0.998442 0.001558 
Over20Y White Low Capesize 0.495746 0.504254 
Over20Y White Low Handymax 0.464595 0.535405 
Over20Y White Low Handysize 0.496204 0.503796 
Over20Y White Low Panamax 0.486205 0.513795 
Over20Y White Low Small 0.001225 0.998775 
Over20Y White Medium Capesize 0.551792 0.448208 
Over20Y White Medium Handymax 0.539596 0.460404 
Over20Y White Medium Handysize 0.998808 0.001192 
Over20Y White Medium Panamax 0.528448 0.471552 
Over20Y White Medium Small 0.998402 0.001598 
Over20Y White Very Low Capesize 0.500091 0.499909 
Over20Y White Very Low Handymax 0.473962 0.526038 
Over20Y White Very Low Handysize 0.520756 0.479244 
Over20Y White Very Low Panamax 0.421148 0.578852 
Over20Y White Very Low Small 0.001258 0.998742 
0to5Y Black High High Capesize 0.566632 0.433368 
0to5Y Black High High Handymax 0.471802 0.528198 
0to5Y Black High High Handysize 0.495600 0.504400 
0to5Y Black High High Panamax 0.568231 0.431769 
0to5Y Black High High Small 0.439828 0.560172 
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0to5Y Black High Low Capesize 0.539685 0.460315 
0to5Y Black High Low Handymax 0.521961 0.478039 
0to5Y Black High Low Handysize 0.520709 0.479291 
0to5Y Black High Low Panamax 0.449641 0.550359 
0to5Y Black High Low Small 0.522040 0.477960 
0to5Y Black High Medium Capesize 0.479162 0.520838 
0to5Y Black High Medium Handymax 0.483724 0.516276 
0to5Y Black High Medium Handysize 0.500785 0.499215 
0to5Y Black High Medium Panamax 0.491046 0.508955 
0to5Y Black High Medium Small 0.441957 0.558043 
0to5Y Black High Very Low Capesize 0.526667 0.473333 
0to5Y Black High Very Low Handymax 0.530375 0.469625 
0to5Y Black High Very Low Handysize 0.474196 0.525804 
0to5Y Black High Very Low Panamax 0.467143 0.532857 
0to5Y Black High Very Low Small 0.462267 0.537732 
0to5Y Black High Capesize 0.497098 0.502902 
0to5Y Black High Handymax 0.998795 0.001205 
0to5Y Black High Handysize 0.998749 0.001251 
0to5Y Black High Panamax 0.998657 0.001343 
0to5Y Black High Small 0.998996 0.001004 
0to5Y Black Low Capesize 0.493746 0.506254 
0to5Y Black Low Handymax 0.508484 0.491516 
0to5Y Black Low Handysize 0.555844 0.444156 
0to5Y Black Low Panamax 0.448002 0.551998 
0to5Y Black Low Small 0.560544 0.439456 
0to5Y Black Medium Capesize 0.509964 0.490036 
0to5Y Black Medium Handymax 0.493966 0.506033 
0to5Y Black Medium Handysize 0.484747 0.515253 
0to5Y Black Medium Panamax 0.555745 0.444255 
0to5Y Black Medium Small 0.503757 0.496243 
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0to5Y Black Very Low Capesize 0.470815 0.529185 
0to5Y Black Very Low Handymax 0.423796 0.576204 
0to5Y Black Very Low Handysize 0.427791 0.572209 
0to5Y Black Very Low Panamax 0.511001 0.488999 
0to5Y Black Very Low Small 0.503970 0.496030 
0to5Y Grey High Capesize 0.508868 0.491132 
0to5Y Grey High Handymax 0.998761 0.001239 
0to5Y Grey High Handysize 0.998764 0.001236 
0to5Y Grey High Panamax 0.490966 0.509034 
0to5Y Grey High Small 0.998673 0.001327 
0to5Y Grey Low Capesize 0.541796 0.458204 
0to5Y Grey Low Handymax 0.488519 0.511482 
0to5Y Grey Low Handysize 0.453426 0.546574 
0to5Y Grey Low Panamax 0.516532 0.483468 
0to5Y Grey Low Small 0.512979 0.487021 
0to5Y Grey Medium Capesize 0.464614 0.535386 
0to5Y Grey Medium Handymax 0.482553 0.517447 
0to5Y Grey Medium Handysize 0.998691 0.001309 
0to5Y Grey Medium Panamax 0.493251 0.506749 
0to5Y Grey Medium Small 0.486461 0.513539 
0to5Y Grey Very Low Capesize 0.483776 0.516224 
0to5Y Grey Very Low Handymax 0.528588 0.471412 
0to5Y Grey Very Low Handysize 0.474382 0.525618 
0to5Y Grey Very Low Panamax 0.481727 0.518273 
0to5Y Grey Very Low Small 0.998562 0.001438 
0to5Y White High Capesize 0.998605 0.001395 
0to5Y White High Handymax 0.998705 0.001295 
0to5Y White High Handysize 0.999039 0.000961 
0to5Y White High Panamax 0.998843 0.001157 
0to5Y White High Small 0.998463 0.001537 
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0to5Y White Low Capesize 0.452226 0.547773 
0to5Y White Low Handymax 0.498157 0.501843 
0to5Y White Low Handysize 0.428092 0.571908 
0to5Y White Low Panamax 0.512083 0.487917 
0to5Y White Low Small 0.472032 0.527968 
0to5Y White Medium Capesize 0.505572 0.494428 
0to5Y White Medium Handymax 0.515100 0.484900 
0to5Y White Medium Handysize 0.568382 0.431618 
0to5Y White Medium Panamax 0.504945 0.495055 
0to5Y White Medium Small 0.532736 0.467265 
0to5Y White Very Low Capesize 0.456676 0.543324 
0to5Y White Very Low Handymax 0.551240 0.448760 
0to5Y White Very Low Handysize 0.467653 0.532347 
0to5Y White Very Low Panamax 0.461626 0.538374 
0to5Y White Very Low Small 0.488329 0.511670 
10to15Y Black High High Capesize 0.498547 0.501453 
10to15Y Black High High Handymax 0.999041 0.000959 
10to15Y Black High High Handysize 0.531082 0.468918 
10to15Y Black High High Panamax 0.466351 0.533649 
10to15Y Black High High Small 0.486974 0.513026 
10to15Y Black High Low Capesize 0.538057 0.461943 
10to15Y Black High Low Handymax 0.513534 0.486466 
10to15Y Black High Low Handysize 0.521195 0.478805 
10to15Y Black High Low Panamax 0.472977 0.527023 
10to15Y Black High Low Small 0.512607 0.487393 
10to15Y Black High Medium Capesize 0.546693 0.453307 
10to15Y Black High Medium Handymax 0.472477 0.527523 
10to15Y Black High Medium Handysize 0.501000 0.499000 
10to15Y Black High Medium Panamax 0.531949 0.468051 
10to15Y Black High Medium Small 0.428476 0.571524 
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10to15Y Black High Very Low Capesize 0.501797 0.498203 
10to15Y Black High Very Low Handymax 0.510860 0.489140 
10to15Y Black High Very Low Handysize 0.506152 0.493848 
10to15Y Black High Very Low Panamax 0.485230 0.514770 
10to15Y Black High Very Low Small 0.506461 0.493539 
10to15Y Black High Capesize 0.998576 0.001424 
10to15Y Black High Handymax 0.999114 0.000886 
10to15Y Black High Handysize 0.998704 0.001296 
10to15Y Black High Panamax 0.998943 0.001057 
10to15Y Black High Small 0.999005 0.000995 
10to15Y Black Low Capesize 0.525703 0.474297 
10to15Y Black Low Handymax 0.542037 0.457963 
10to15Y Black Low Handysize 0.544487 0.455512 
10to15Y Black Low Panamax 0.554161 0.445839 
10to15Y Black Low Small 0.510337 0.489663 
10to15Y Black Medium Capesize 0.483290 0.516710 
10to15Y Black Medium Handymax 0.560303 0.439697 
10to15Y Black Medium Handysize 0.497507 0.502493 
10to15Y Black Medium Panamax 0.520582 0.479418 
10to15Y Black Medium Small 0.545295 0.454705 
10to15Y Black Very Low Capesize 0.532768 0.467232 
10to15Y Black Very Low Handymax 0.544874 0.455126 
10to15Y Black Very Low Handysize 0.505890 0.494110 
10to15Y Black Very Low Panamax 0.569973 0.430027 
10to15Y Black Very Low Small 0.491321 0.508679 
10to15Y Grey High Capesize 0.543605 0.456395 
10to15Y Grey High Handymax 0.998876 0.001124 
10to15Y Grey High Handysize 0.998497 0.001503 
10to15Y Grey High Panamax 0.998897 0.001103 
10to15Y Grey High Small 0.998828 0.001171 
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10to15Y Grey Low Capesize 0.438238 0.561762 
10to15Y Grey Low Handymax 0.515554 0.484446 
10to15Y Grey Low Handysize 0.506032 0.493968 
10to15Y Grey Low Panamax 0.467327 0.532673 
10to15Y Grey Low Small 0.452261 0.547739 
10to15Y Grey Medium Capesize 0.533832 0.466168 
10to15Y Grey Medium Handymax 0.998630 0.001370 
10to15Y Grey Medium Handysize 0.998891 0.001109 
10to15Y Grey Medium Panamax 0.483286 0.516714 
10to15Y Grey Medium Small 0.516806 0.483194 
10to15Y Grey Very Low Capesize 0.511030 0.488970 
10to15Y Grey Very Low Handymax 0.491322 0.508678 
10to15Y Grey Very Low Handysize 0.509913 0.490087 
10to15Y Grey Very Low Panamax 0.546176 0.453824 
10to15Y Grey Very Low Small 0.499749 0.500251 
10to15Y White High Capesize 0.998764 0.001236 
10to15Y White High Handymax 0.998480 0.001520 
10to15Y White High Handysize 0.998856 0.001144 
10to15Y White High Panamax 0.998962 0.001038 
10to15Y White High Small 0.998622 0.001378 
10to15Y White Low Capesize 0.546209 0.453791 
10to15Y White Low Handymax 0.560882 0.439118 
10to15Y White Low Handysize 0.001247 0.998753 
10to15Y White Low Panamax 0.530591 0.469409 
10to15Y White Low Small 0.529009 0.470991 
10to15Y White Medium Capesize 0.581359 0.418641 
10to15Y White Medium Handymax 0.568720 0.431280 
10to15Y White Medium Handysize 0.998775 0.001225 
10to15Y White Medium Panamax 0.497082 0.502918 
10to15Y White Medium Small 0.517365 0.482635 
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10to15Y White Very Low Capesize 0.497770 0.502230 
10to15Y White Very Low Handymax 0.472753 0.527247 
10to15Y White Very Low Handysize 0.565863 0.434137 
10to15Y White Very Low Panamax 0.439963 0.560037 
10to15Y White Very Low Small 0.522295 0.477705 
15to20Y Black High High Capesize 0.514493 0.485507 
15to20Y Black High High Handymax 0.462981 0.537019 
15to20Y Black High High Handysize 0.566093 0.433907 
15to20Y Black High High Panamax 0.528398 0.471602 
15to20Y Black High High Small 0.503993 0.496007 
15to20Y Black High Low Capesize 0.575465 0.424535 
15to20Y Black High Low Handymax 0.488846 0.511154 
15to20Y Black High Low Handysize 0.482407 0.517593 
15to20Y Black High Low Panamax 0.497981 0.502019 
15to20Y Black High Low Small 0.521280 0.478720 
15to20Y Black High Medium Capesize 0.454674 0.545326 
15to20Y Black High Medium Handymax 0.582944 0.417056 
15to20Y Black High Medium Handysize 0.454308 0.545692 
15to20Y Black High Medium Panamax 0.475279 0.524721 
15to20Y Black High Medium Small 0.494224 0.505776 
15to20Y Black High Very Low Capesize 0.492945 0.507056 
15to20Y Black High Very Low Handymax 0.576767 0.423233 
15to20Y Black High Very Low Handysize 0.522366 0.477634 
15to20Y Black High Very Low Panamax 0.511211 0.488789 
15to20Y Black High Very Low Small 0.569226 0.430774 
15to20Y Black High Capesize 0.517820 0.482180 
15to20Y Black High Handymax 0.998639 0.001361 
15to20Y Black High Handysize 0.998867 0.001133 
15to20Y Black High Panamax 0.998660 0.001340 
15to20Y Black High Small 0.999086 0.000914 
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15to20Y Black Low Capesize 0.504463 0.495537 
15to20Y Black Low Handymax 0.505465 0.494535 
15to20Y Black Low Handysize 0.477150 0.522850 
15to20Y Black Low Panamax 0.491531 0.508469 
15to20Y Black Low Small 0.514412 0.485588 
15to20Y Black Medium Capesize 0.455049 0.544951 
15to20Y Black Medium Handymax 0.440783 0.559217 
15to20Y Black Medium Handysize 0.998895 0.001105 
15to20Y Black Medium Panamax 0.467009 0.532991 
15to20Y Black Medium Small 0.001323 0.998677 
15to20Y Black Very Low Capesize 0.439175 0.560825 
15to20Y Black Very Low Handymax 0.443549 0.556452 
15to20Y Black Very Low Handysize 0.523307 0.476693 
15to20Y Black Very Low Panamax 0.472542 0.527458 
15to20Y Black Very Low Small 0.503639 0.496361 
15to20Y Grey High Capesize 0.475912 0.524088 
15to20Y Grey High Handymax 0.998778 0.001222 
15to20Y Grey High Handysize 0.998991 0.001009 
15to20Y Grey High Panamax 0.998612 0.001388 
15to20Y Grey High Small 0.001276 0.998724 
15to20Y Grey Low Capesize 0.472986 0.527014 
15to20Y Grey Low Handymax 0.525542 0.474458 
15to20Y Grey Low Handysize 0.535102 0.464898 
15to20Y Grey Low Panamax 0.559704 0.440296 
15to20Y Grey Low Small 0.525466 0.474534 
15to20Y Grey Medium Capesize 0.469900 0.530100 
15to20Y Grey Medium Handymax 0.998980 0.001020 
15to20Y Grey Medium Handysize 0.504219 0.495780 
15to20Y Grey Medium Panamax 0.484983 0.515017 
15to20Y Grey Medium Small 0.494845 0.505155 
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15to20Y Grey Very Low Capesize 0.535978 0.464022 
15to20Y Grey Very Low Handymax 0.449547 0.550453 
15to20Y Grey Very Low Handysize 0.498878 0.501122 
15to20Y Grey Very Low Panamax 0.552445 0.447555 
15to20Y Grey Very Low Small 0.487671 0.512330 
15to20Y White High Capesize 0.998669 0.001331 
15to20Y White High Handymax 0.998944 0.001056 
15to20Y White High Handysize 0.998735 0.001265 
15to20Y White High Panamax 0.998757 0.001243 
15to20Y White High Small 0.999013 0.000987 
15to20Y White Low Capesize 0.482941 0.517059 
15to20Y White Low Handymax 0.511710 0.488290 
15to20Y White Low Handysize 0.462059 0.537941 
15to20Y White Low Panamax 0.560295 0.439705 
15to20Y White Low Small 0.547264 0.452736 
15to20Y White Medium Capesize 0.505111 0.494889 
15to20Y White Medium Handymax 0.556827 0.443173 
15to20Y White Medium Handysize 0.511153 0.488847 
15to20Y White Medium Panamax 0.483683 0.516317 
15to20Y White Medium Small 0.460821 0.539179 
15to20Y White Very Low Capesize 0.485914 0.514086 
15to20Y White Very Low Handymax 0.456901 0.543099 
15to20Y White Very Low Handysize 0.430519 0.569480 
15to20Y White Very Low Panamax 0.490706 0.509294 
15to20Y White Very Low Small 0.454168 0.545832 
5to10Y Black High High Capesize 0.563230 0.436770 
5to10Y Black High High Handymax 0.505653 0.494347 
5to10Y Black High High Handysize 0.440018 0.559982 
5to10Y Black High High Panamax 0.503455 0.496545 
5to10Y Black High High Small 0.492448 0.507552 
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5to10Y Black High Low Capesize 0.494184 0.505816 
5to10Y Black High Low Handymax 0.472352 0.527648 
5to10Y Black High Low Handysize 0.527356 0.472644 
5to10Y Black High Low Panamax 0.458931 0.541069 
5to10Y Black High Low Small 0.451886 0.548114 
5to10Y Black High Medium Capesize 0.520759 0.479241 
5to10Y Black High Medium Handymax 0.436984 0.563016 
5to10Y Black High Medium Handysize 0.448729 0.551271 
5to10Y Black High Medium Panamax 0.474434 0.525566 
5to10Y Black High Medium Small 0.516272 0.483728 
5to10Y Black High Very Low Capesize 0.486962 0.513038 
5to10Y Black High Very Low Handymax 0.580543 0.419457 
5to10Y Black High Very Low Handysize 0.528309 0.471691 
5to10Y Black High Very Low Panamax 0.478332 0.521668 
5to10Y Black High Very Low Small 0.541163 0.458837 
5to10Y Black High Capesize 0.998546 0.001454 
5to10Y Black High Handymax 0.999013 0.000987 
5to10Y Black High Handysize 0.998856 0.001144 
5to10Y Black High Panamax 0.525954 0.474046 
5to10Y Black High Small 0.998838 0.001162 
5to10Y Black Low Capesize 0.470390 0.529610 
5to10Y Black Low Handymax 0.496039 0.503961 
5to10Y Black Low Handysize 0.546972 0.453028 
5to10Y Black Low Panamax 0.473791 0.526209 
5to10Y Black Low Small 0.511218 0.488782 
5to10Y Black Medium Capesize 0.568984 0.431016 
5to10Y Black Medium Handymax 0.427974 0.572026 
5to10Y Black Medium Handysize 0.461970 0.538030 
5to10Y Black Medium Panamax 0.497268 0.502732 
5to10Y Black Medium Small 0.501734 0.498266 
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5to10Y Black Very Low Capesize 0.528275 0.471725 
5to10Y Black Very Low Handymax 0.502837 0.497163 
5to10Y Black Very Low Handysize 0.544233 0.455767 
5to10Y Black Very Low Panamax 0.455283 0.544717 
5to10Y Black Very Low Small 0.480791 0.519209 
5to10Y Grey High Capesize 0.492491 0.507510 
5to10Y Grey High Handymax 0.999020 0.000980 
5to10Y Grey High Handysize 0.998717 0.001283 
5to10Y Grey High Panamax 0.460686 0.539314 
5to10Y Grey High Small 0.998769 0.001232 
5to10Y Grey Low Capesize 0.476762 0.523238 
5to10Y Grey Low Handymax 0.561636 0.438363 
5to10Y Grey Low Handysize 0.505199 0.494801 
5to10Y Grey Low Panamax 0.440672 0.559328 
5to10Y Grey Low Small 0.485221 0.514779 
5to10Y Grey Medium Capesize 0.484090 0.515910 
5to10Y Grey Medium Handymax 0.998644 0.001355 
5to10Y Grey Medium Handysize 0.999093 0.000907 
5to10Y Grey Medium Panamax 0.558847 0.441153 
5to10Y Grey Medium Small 0.998731 0.001269 
5to10Y Grey Very Low Capesize 0.545163 0.454837 
5to10Y Grey Very Low Handymax 0.518013 0.481987 
5to10Y Grey Very Low Handysize 0.497028 0.502972 
5to10Y Grey Very Low Panamax 0.557708 0.442292 
5to10Y Grey Very Low Small 0.998792 0.001208 
5to10Y White High Capesize 0.998652 0.001348 
5to10Y White High Handymax 0.998643 0.001357 
5to10Y White High Handysize 0.998739 0.001261 
5to10Y White High Panamax 0.431190 0.568810 
5to10Y White High Small 0.998809 0.001191 
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5to10Y White Low Capesize 0.484700 0.515300 
5to10Y White Low Handymax 0.536964 0.463036 
5to10Y White Low Handysize 0.998792 0.001208 
5to10Y White Low Panamax 0.499555 0.500445 
5to10Y White Low Small 0.453327 0.546673 
5to10Y White Medium Capesize 0.571370 0.428630 
5to10Y White Medium Handymax 0.478630 0.521370 
5to10Y White Medium Handysize 0.420012 0.579988 
5to10Y White Medium Panamax 0.523754 0.476246 
5to10Y White Medium Small 0.998459 0.001541 
5to10Y White Very Low Capesize 0.550783 0.449217 
5to10Y White Very Low Handymax 0.449154 0.550846 
5to10Y White Very Low Handysize 0.469060 0.530940 
5to10Y White Very Low Panamax 0.470361 0.529639 
5to10Y White Very Low Small 0.511081 0.488919 
 
Table Appendix 1.2. CPT of ‘Inspection group’ 
Port of inspection Type of inspection Number of deficiencies Low Detention Risk High Detention Risk 
Belgium Expanded Inspection 4to9 0.998672 0.001328 
Belgium Expanded Inspection More than 10 0.001474 0.998526 
Belgium Expanded Inspection 0 0.998588 0.001412 
Belgium Expanded Inspection 1to3 0.998693 0.001307 
Belgium Initial Inspection 4to9 0.998886 0.001114 
Belgium Initial Inspection More than 10 0.508011 0.491989 
Belgium Initial Inspection 0 0.998982 0.001018 
Belgium Initial Inspection 1to3 0.998892 0.001108 
Belgium More detailed Inspection 4to9 0.998702 0.001298 
Belgium More detailed Inspection More than 10 0.001630 0.998370 
Belgium More detailed Inspection 0 0.998878 0.001122 
Belgium More detailed Inspection 1to3 0.998792 0.001208 
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France Expanded Inspection 4to9 0.999023 0.000977 
France Expanded Inspection More than 10 0.001228 0.998772 
France Expanded Inspection 0 0.999027 0.000973 
France Expanded Inspection 1to3 0.999051 0.000949 
France Initial Inspection 4to9 0.998572 0.001428 
France Initial Inspection More than 10 0.998878 0.001122 
France Initial Inspection 0 0.998584 0.001416 
France Initial Inspection 1to3 0.999035 0.000965 
France More detailed Inspection 4to9 0.998629 0.001371 
France More detailed Inspection More than 10 0.001292 0.998708 
France More detailed Inspection 0 0.998896 0.001104 
France More detailed Inspection 1to3 0.998563 0.001437 
Germany Expanded Inspection 4to9 0.998665 0.001335 
Germany Expanded Inspection More than 10 0.001290 0.998710 
Germany Expanded Inspection 0 0.998803 0.001197 
Germany Expanded Inspection 1to3 0.998840 0.001160 
Germany Initial Inspection 4to9 0.998675 0.001325 
Germany Initial Inspection More than 10 0.565841 0.434159 
Germany Initial Inspection 0 0.998481 0.001519 
Germany Initial Inspection 1to3 0.998880 0.001120 
Germany More detailed Inspection 4to9 0.998734 0.001266 
Germany More detailed Inspection More than 10 0.001332 0.998668 
Germany More detailed Inspection 0 0.998962 0.001038 
Germany More detailed Inspection 1to3 0.998836 0.001164 
Italy Expanded Inspection 4to9 0.998855 0.001145 
Italy Expanded Inspection More than 10 0.001201 0.998799 
Italy Expanded Inspection 0 0.998706 0.001294 
Italy Expanded Inspection 1to3 0.998868 0.001132 
Italy Initial Inspection 4to9 0.998760 0.001240 
Italy Initial Inspection More than 10 0.514740 0.485260 
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Italy Initial Inspection 0 0.998763 0.001237 
Italy Initial Inspection 1to3 0.998552 0.001448 
Italy More detailed Inspection 4to9 0.998876 0.001124 
Italy More detailed Inspection More than 10 0.000955 0.999045 
Italy More detailed Inspection 0 0.998663 0.001337 
Italy More detailed Inspection 1to3 0.999127 0.000873 
Netherlands Expanded Inspection 4to9 0.998806 0.001194 
Netherlands Expanded Inspection More than 10 0.001520 0.998480 
Netherlands Expanded Inspection 0 0.998828 0.001172 
Netherlands Expanded Inspection 1to3 0.998811 0.001189 
Netherlands Initial Inspection 4to9 0.998627 0.001373 
Netherlands Initial Inspection More than 10 0.511498 0.488502 
Netherlands Initial Inspection 0 0.998754 0.001246 
Netherlands Initial Inspection 1to3 0.998768 0.001232 
Netherlands More detailed Inspection 4to9 0.998799 0.001201 
Netherlands More detailed Inspection More than 10 0.001244 0.998756 
Netherlands More detailed Inspection 0 0.998664 0.001336 
Netherlands More detailed Inspection 1to3 0.998896 0.001104 
Spain Expanded Inspection 4to9 0.998686 0.001314 
Spain Expanded Inspection More than 10 0.001059 0.998941 
Spain Expanded Inspection 0 0.998519 0.001481 
Spain Expanded Inspection 1to3 0.998380 0.001620 
Spain Initial Inspection 4to9 0.998973 0.001027 
Spain Initial Inspection More than 10 0.998712 0.001288 
Spain Initial Inspection 0 0.998492 0.001508 
Spain Initial Inspection 1to3 0.999004 0.000996 
Spain More detailed Inspection 4to9 0.998865 0.001135 
Spain More detailed Inspection More than 10 0.001362 0.998638 
Spain More detailed Inspection 0 0.998654 0.001346 
Spain More detailed Inspection 1to3 0.998589 0.001411 
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UK Expanded Inspection 4to9 0.998635 0.001365 
UK Expanded Inspection More than 10 0.001125 0.998875 
UK Expanded Inspection 0 0.998738 0.001262 
UK Expanded Inspection 1to3 0.998528 0.001472 
UK Initial Inspection 4to9 0.998838 0.001162 
UK Initial Inspection More than 10 0.001164 0.998836 
UK Initial Inspection 0 0.998960 0.001040 
UK Initial Inspection 1to3 0.998645 0.001355 
UK More detailed Inspection 4to9 0.998618 0.001382 
UK More detailed Inspection More than 10 0.001296 0.998704 
UK More detailed Inspection 0 0.998956 0.001044 
UK More detailed Inspection 1to3 0.998536 0.001464 
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Appendix Two Conditional Probability table of ‘Post-NIR’ BN model 
 
Table Appendix 2.1. CPT of ‘Vessel flag’ 
White Grey Black Black High 
0.966385  0.015013  0.010865  0.007737  
 
 
Table Appendix 2.2. CPT of ‘Vessel age’ 
0to5Y 5to10Y 10to15Y 15to20Y Over20Y 
0.263269 0.388449 0.187637 0.105098 0.055547 
 
 
Table Appendix 2.3. CPT of ‘Inspection date’ 
Y2015 Y2016 Y2017 
0.298343 0.408941 0.292717 
 
 
Table Appendix 2.4. CPT of ‘Port of inspection’ 
Belgium Canada France Germany Greece Italy Netherlands Spain UK 
0.060129 0.165029 0.078810 0.076657 0.088918 0.118866 0.147362 0.154592 0.109636 
 
 
Table Appendix 2.5. CPT of ‘Inspection type’ 
Initial Inspection Expanded Inspection More detailed Inspection 
0.344691 0.223446 0.431863 
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Table Appendix 2.6. CPT of ‘Company performance’ 
Vessel flag Vessel age High Medium Low Very low 
White 0to5Y 0.103702 0.784361 0.094985 0.016952 
White 5to10Y 0.066715 0.803925 0.093230 0.036130 
White 10to15Y 0.068996 0.664588 0.186930 0.079486 
White 15to20Y 0.067643 0.558777 0.260890 0.112690 
White Over20Y 0.032213 0.502782 0.213373 0.251632 
Grey 0to5Y 0.023868 0.958627 0.008714 0.008791 
Grey 5to10Y 0.030190 0.884997 0.030198 0.054615 
Grey 10to15Y 0.158135 0.481331 0.158143 0.202390 
Grey 15to20Y 0.009966 0.638256 0.192568 0.159209 
Grey Over20Y 0.009629 0.665282 0.051950 0.273140 
Black 0to5Y 0.008606 0.973096 0.009149 0.009149 
Black 5to10Y 0.010770 0.967459 0.010963 0.010808 
Black 10to15Y 0.012665 0.216921 0.106974 0.663440 
Black 15to20Y 0.012667 0.296666 0.096159 0.594508 
Black Over20Y 0.070320 0.373660 0.212134 0.343886 
Black (High) 0to5Y 0.222641 0.291587 0.243652 0.242120 
Black (High) 5to10Y 0.236069 0.238210 0.254883 0.270839 
Black (High) 10to15Y 0.245896 0.247057 0.268285 0.238762 
Black (High) 15to20Y 0.010848 0.010934 0.489779 0.488439 
Black (High) Over20Y 0.010541 0.010705 0.656032 0.322722 
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Table Appendix 2.7. CPT of ‘Number of deficiencies’ 
Inspection type Vessel group None 1to3 4to9 Morethan10 
Initial Inspection High Detention Risk 0.515492 0.386232 0.083816 0.014460 
Initial Inspection Low Detention Risk 0.667770 0.282785 0.039361 0.010084 
Expanded Inspection High Detention Risk 0.100674 0.287451 0.328104 0.283771 
Expanded Inspection Low Detention Risk 0.292678 0.401085 0.255760 0.050477 
More detailed Inspection High Detention Risk 0.186452 0.349807 0.263075 0.200666 
More detailed Inspection Low Detention Risk 0.485976 0.300957 0.186952 0.026114 
 
Table Appendix 2.8. CPT of ‘Vessel group’ 
Vessel flag Vessel age Company performance High Detention Risk Low Detention Risk 
White 0to5Y High 0.004537 0.995463 
White 0to5Y Medium 0.003798 0.996202 
White 0to5Y Low 0.003864 0.996136 
White 0to5Y Very low 0.995783 0.004217 
White 5to10Y High 0.003800 0.996200 
White 5to10Y Medium 0.003854 0.996146 
White 5to10Y Low 0.995554 0.004446 
White 5to10Y Very low 0.997017 0.002983 
White 10to15Y High 0.004118 0.995882 
White 10to15Y Medium 0.003207 0.996793 
White 10to15Y Low 0.002873 0.997127 
White 10to15Y Very low 0.995912 0.004088 
White 15to20Y High 0.003671 0.996329 
White 15to20Y Medium 0.003101 0.996899 
White 15to20Y Low 0.997281 0.002719 
White 15to20Y Very low 0.996162 0.003838 
White Over20Y High 0.003510 0.996490 
White Over20Y Medium 0.003958 0.996042 
White Over20Y Low 0.995615 0.004385 
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White Over20Y Very low 0.995895 0.004105 
Grey 0to5Y High 0.002980 0.997020 
Grey 0to5Y Medium 0.003945 0.996055 
Grey 0to5Y Low 0.512477 0.487523 
Grey 0to5Y Very low 0.500577 0.499423 
Grey 5to10Y High 0.002929 0.997071 
Grey 5to10Y Medium 0.003520 0.996480 
Grey 5to10Y Low 0.004595 0.995405 
Grey 5to10Y Very low 0.003786 0.996214 
Grey 10to15Y High 0.003465 0.996535 
Grey 10to15Y Medium 0.002854 0.997146 
Grey 10to15Y Low 0.003975 0.996025 
Grey 10to15Y Very low 0.995828 0.004172 
Grey 15to20Y High 0.523022 0.476978 
Grey 15to20Y Medium 0.004802 0.995198 
Grey 15to20Y Low 0.003686 0.996315 
Grey 15to20Y Very low 0.003316 0.996684 
Grey Over20Y High 0.568076 0.431924 
Grey Over20Y Medium 0.003902 0.996098 
Grey Over20Y Low 0.996155 0.003845 
Grey Over20Y Very low 0.996345 0.003655 
Black 0to5Y High 0.530280 0.469720 
Black 0to5Y Medium 0.004126 0.995874 
Black 0to5Y Low 0.466315 0.533685 
Black 0to5Y Very low 0.477942 0.522058 
Black 5to10Y High 0.536626 0.463374 
Black 5to10Y Medium 0.003894 0.996106 
Black 5to10Y Low 0.543236 0.456764 
Black 5to10Y Very low 0.536676 0.463324 
Black 10to15Y High 0.476661 0.523339 
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Black 10to15Y Medium 0.004508 0.995492 
Black 10to15Y Low 0.004687 0.995313 
Black 10to15Y Very low 0.004645 0.995355 
Black 15to20Y High 0.452878 0.547122 
Black 15to20Y Medium 0.003347 0.996653 
Black 15to20Y Low 0.004677 0.995323 
Black 15to20Y Very low 0.996187 0.003813 
Black Over20Y High 0.003228 0.996772 
Black Over20Y Medium 0.004600 0.995400 
Black Over20Y Low 0.995975 0.004025 
Black Over20Y Very low 0.996992 0.003008 
Black (High) 0to5Y High 0.537779 0.462221 
Black (High) 0to5Y Medium 0.467681 0.532319 
Black (High) 0to5Y Low 0.492068 0.507932 
Black (High) 0to5Y Very low 0.535406 0.464595 
Black (High) 5to10Y High 0.562635 0.437364 
Black (High) 5to10Y Medium 0.543569 0.456431 
Black (High) 5to10Y Low 0.495379 0.504621 
Black (High) 5to10Y Very low 0.439403 0.560597 
Black (High) 10to15Y High 0.526571 0.473429 
Black (High) 10to15Y Medium 0.470854 0.529146 
Black (High) 10to15Y Low 0.504326 0.495674 
Black (High) 10to15Y Very low 0.521695 0.478305 
Black (High) 15to20Y High 0.478636 0.521364 
Black (High) 15to20Y Medium 0.447775 0.552225 
Black (High) 15to20Y Low 0.004422 0.995578 
Black (High) 15to20Y Very low 0.004809 0.995191 
Black (High) Over20Y High 0.568038 0.431962 
Black (High) Over20Y Medium 0.430261 0.569739 
Black (High) Over20Y Low 0.996922 0.003078 
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Black (High) Over20Y Very low 0.997018 0.002983 
 
Table Appendix 2.9. CPT of ‘Inspection group’ 
Inspection port Date No. of deficiencies Inspection type High Risk Low Risk 
Belgium Y2015 None Initial inspection 0.003112  0.996889  
Belgium Y2015 None Expanded inspection 0.003529  0.996471  
Belgium Y2015 None More detailed inspection 0.003545  0.996455  
Belgium Y2015 1to3 Initial inspection 0.004226  0.995774  
Belgium Y2015 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.003712  0.996288  
Belgium Y2015 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003831  0.996169  
Belgium Y2015 4to9 Initial inspection 0.004555  0.995445  
Belgium Y2015 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.004455  0.995545  
Belgium Y2015 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.003935  0.996065  
Belgium Y2015 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.003987  0.996013  
Belgium Y2015 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996410  0.003590  
Belgium Y2015 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995239  0.004761  
Belgium Y2016 None Initial inspection 0.003619  0.996381  
Belgium Y2016 None Expanded inspection 0.537436  0.462564  
Belgium Y2016 None More detailed inspection 0.003569  0.996431  
Belgium Y2016 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003277  0.996723  
Belgium Y2016 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.002981  0.997019  
Belgium Y2016 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.004125  0.995875  
Belgium Y2016 4to9 Initial inspection 0.004153  0.995847  
Belgium Y2016 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003210  0.996790  
Belgium Y2016 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.003872  0.996128  
Belgium Y2016 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.445086  0.554914  
Belgium Y2016 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996818  0.003183  
Belgium Y2016 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995947  0.004054  
Belgium Y2017 None Initial inspection 0.004233  0.995767  
Belgium Y2017 None Expanded inspection 0.003668  0.996332  
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Belgium Y2017 None More detailed inspection 0.003986  0.996014  
Belgium Y2017 1to3 Initial inspection 0.004758  0.995242  
Belgium Y2017 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.004749  0.995251  
Belgium Y2017 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.004473  0.995527  
Belgium Y2017 4to9 Initial inspection 0.002894  0.997106  
Belgium Y2017 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003572  0.996428  
Belgium Y2017 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.004771  0.995229  
Belgium Y2017 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.440615  0.559385  
Belgium Y2017 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996363  0.003637  
Belgium Y2017 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995390  0.004610  
Canada Y2015 None Initial inspection 0.003824  0.996176  
Canada Y2015 None Expanded inspection 0.004661  0.995339  
Canada Y2015 None More detailed inspection 0.003514  0.996486  
Canada Y2015 1to3 Initial inspection 0.004399  0.995601  
Canada Y2015 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.003777  0.996223  
Canada Y2015 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.004762  0.995238  
Canada Y2015 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003139  0.996861  
Canada Y2015 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003854  0.996145  
Canada Y2015 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.003110  0.996890  
Canada Y2015 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.507885  0.492115  
Canada Y2015 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.995626  0.004374  
Canada Y2015 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.996840  0.003161  
Canada Y2016 None Initial inspection 0.003803  0.996197  
Canada Y2016 None Expanded inspection 0.003431  0.996569  
Canada Y2016 None More detailed inspection 0.004342  0.995658  
Canada Y2016 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003657  0.996343  
Canada Y2016 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.003227  0.996773  
Canada Y2016 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003711  0.996289  
Canada Y2016 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003180  0.996820  
Canada Y2016 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003163  0.996836  
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Canada Y2016 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.004109  0.995892  
Canada Y2016 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.513746  0.486254  
Canada Y2016 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996225  0.003775  
Canada Y2016 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.996366  0.003634  
Canada Y2017 None Initial inspection 0.004455  0.995545  
Canada Y2017 None Expanded inspection 0.005165  0.994835  
Canada Y2017 None More detailed inspection 0.004651  0.995349  
Canada Y2017 1to3 Initial inspection 0.004850  0.995150  
Canada Y2017 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.003360  0.996640  
Canada Y2017 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003589  0.996411  
Canada Y2017 4to9 Initial inspection 0.004132  0.995868  
Canada Y2017 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003907  0.996093  
Canada Y2017 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.003274  0.996727  
Canada Y2017 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.445746  0.554254  
Canada Y2017 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996828  0.003172  
Canada Y2017 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995762  0.004238  
France Y2015 None Initial inspection 0.004048  0.995952  
France Y2015 None Expanded inspection 0.003568  0.996432  
France Y2015 None More detailed inspection 0.004357  0.995643  
France Y2015 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003242  0.996758  
France Y2015 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.004127  0.995873  
France Y2015 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003087  0.996913  
France Y2015 4to9 Initial inspection 0.004376  0.995624  
France Y2015 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003241  0.996759  
France Y2015 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.002795  0.997205  
France Y2015 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.558207  0.441793  
France Y2015 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996800  0.003200  
France Y2015 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995654  0.004346  
France Y2016 None Initial inspection 0.002913  0.997087  
France Y2016 None Expanded inspection 0.003117  0.996883  
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France Y2016 None More detailed inspection 0.004079  0.995921  
France Y2016 1to3 Initial inspection 0.002993  0.997007  
France Y2016 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.002895  0.997105  
France Y2016 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003730  0.996270  
France Y2016 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003998  0.996002  
France Y2016 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.004945  0.995055  
France Y2016 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.003875  0.996125  
France Y2016 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.460867  0.539133  
France Y2016 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996052  0.003948  
France Y2016 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995445  0.004555  
France Y2017 None Initial inspection 0.004500  0.995500  
France Y2017 None Expanded inspection 0.003801  0.996199  
France Y2017 None More detailed inspection 0.005311  0.994689  
France Y2017 1to3 Initial inspection 0.004438  0.995562  
France Y2017 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.003922  0.996078  
France Y2017 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.004918  0.995082  
France Y2017 4to9 Initial inspection 0.444324  0.555676  
France Y2017 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.004218  0.995782  
France Y2017 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.004560  0.995440  
France Y2017 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.495239  0.504762  
France Y2017 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996885  0.003114  
France Y2017 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.996153  0.003847  
Germany Y2015 None Initial inspection 0.004030  0.995970  
Germany Y2015 None Expanded inspection 0.003720  0.996280  
Germany Y2015 None More detailed inspection 0.003878  0.996122  
Germany Y2015 1to3 Initial inspection 0.004235  0.995765  
Germany Y2015 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.003217  0.996783  
Germany Y2015 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003421  0.996579  
Germany Y2015 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003402  0.996598  
Germany Y2015 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.995625  0.004375  
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Germany Y2015 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.003404  0.996596  
Germany Y2015 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.453446  0.546554  
Germany Y2015 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.995929  0.004071  
Germany Y2015 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995503  0.004496  
Germany Y2016 None Initial inspection 0.004115  0.995885  
Germany Y2016 None Expanded inspection 0.003026  0.996974  
Germany Y2016 None More detailed inspection 0.003939  0.996061  
Germany Y2016 1to3 Initial inspection 0.004582  0.995418  
Germany Y2016 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.005360  0.994640  
Germany Y2016 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.004060  0.995940  
Germany Y2016 4to9 Initial inspection 0.004008  0.995992  
Germany Y2016 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.996644  0.003356  
Germany Y2016 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.003861  0.996139  
Germany Y2016 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.493506  0.506493  
Germany Y2016 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996097  0.003903  
Germany Y2016 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995420  0.004580  
Germany Y2017 None Initial inspection 0.003226  0.996774  
Germany Y2017 None Expanded inspection 0.004467  0.995533  
Germany Y2017 None More detailed inspection 0.004489  0.995511  
Germany Y2017 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003593  0.996407  
Germany Y2017 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.004088  0.995912  
Germany Y2017 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003261  0.996739  
Germany Y2017 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003920  0.996081  
Germany Y2017 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.996516  0.003484  
Germany Y2017 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.996230  0.003770  
Germany Y2017 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.484598  0.515402  
Germany Y2017 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996492  0.003508  
Germany Y2017 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.997077  0.002923  
Greece Y2015 None Initial inspection 0.003171  0.996828  
Greece Y2015 None Expanded inspection 0.003988  0.996012  
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Greece Y2015 None More detailed inspection 0.004304  0.995696  
Greece Y2015 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003937  0.996063  
Greece Y2015 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.004157  0.995843  
Greece Y2015 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.004558  0.995442  
Greece Y2015 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003324  0.996676  
Greece Y2015 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003916  0.996084  
Greece Y2015 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.004311  0.995689  
Greece Y2015 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.561434  0.438566  
Greece Y2015 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.995858  0.004142  
Greece Y2015 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995822  0.004178  
Greece Y2016 None Initial inspection 0.003714  0.996286  
Greece Y2016 None Expanded inspection 0.004652  0.995348  
Greece Y2016 None More detailed inspection 0.004262  0.995738  
Greece Y2016 1to3 Initial inspection 0.005111  0.994889  
Greece Y2016 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.003968  0.996032  
Greece Y2016 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.004324  0.995676  
Greece Y2016 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003597  0.996403  
Greece Y2016 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.002867  0.997133  
Greece Y2016 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.004206  0.995794  
Greece Y2016 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.511858  0.488142  
Greece Y2016 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.997151  0.002849  
Greece Y2016 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.467093  0.532907  
Greece Y2017 None Initial inspection 0.003454  0.996546  
Greece Y2017 None Expanded inspection 0.004543  0.995457  
Greece Y2017 None More detailed inspection 0.003311  0.996688  
Greece Y2017 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003857  0.996143  
Greece Y2017 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.003981  0.996019  
Greece Y2017 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.004211  0.995789  
Greece Y2017 4to9 Initial inspection 0.004324  0.995676  
Greece Y2017 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003366  0.996634  
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Greece Y2017 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.003025  0.996975  
Greece Y2017 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.461432  0.538568  
Greece Y2017 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996726  0.003274  
Greece Y2017 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995970  0.004029  
Italy Y2015 None Initial inspection 0.004109  0.995891  
Italy Y2015 None Expanded inspection 0.004759  0.995241  
Italy Y2015 None More detailed inspection 0.003341  0.996659  
Italy Y2015 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003757  0.996243  
Italy Y2015 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.002981  0.997019  
Italy Y2015 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003659  0.996341  
Italy Y2015 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003786  0.996214  
Italy Y2015 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.996957  0.003043  
Italy Y2015 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.995685  0.004315  
Italy Y2015 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.476410  0.523590  
Italy Y2015 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996170  0.003830  
Italy Y2015 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995739  0.004261  
Italy Y2016 None Initial inspection 0.003553  0.996447  
Italy Y2016 None Expanded inspection 0.004660  0.995340  
Italy Y2016 None More detailed inspection 0.003241  0.996759  
Italy Y2016 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003751  0.996249  
Italy Y2016 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.003296  0.996704  
Italy Y2016 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.004040  0.995960  
Italy Y2016 4to9 Initial inspection 0.004738  0.995262  
Italy Y2016 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003959  0.996041  
Italy Y2016 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.004701  0.995299  
Italy Y2016 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.506178  0.493822  
Italy Y2016 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996145  0.003855  
Italy Y2016 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995801  0.004199  
Italy Y2017 None Initial inspection 0.003664  0.996336  
Italy Y2017 None Expanded inspection 0.003189  0.996811  
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Italy Y2017 None More detailed inspection 0.003587  0.996413  
Italy Y2017 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003376  0.996624  
Italy Y2017 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.003278  0.996722  
Italy Y2017 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003255  0.996745  
Italy Y2017 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003444  0.996556  
Italy Y2017 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.996004  0.003996  
Italy Y2017 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.004040  0.995960  
Italy Y2017 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.484736  0.515264  
Italy Y2017 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996580  0.003421  
Italy Y2017 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995777  0.004223  
Netherlands Y2015 None Initial inspection 0.003774  0.996226  
Netherlands Y2015 None Expanded inspection 0.004955  0.995045  
Netherlands Y2015 None More detailed inspection 0.003583  0.996417  
Netherlands Y2015 1to3 Initial inspection 0.005318  0.994682  
Netherlands Y2015 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.004007  0.995993  
Netherlands Y2015 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003715  0.996285  
Netherlands Y2015 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003709  0.996291  
Netherlands Y2015 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003163  0.996837  
Netherlands Y2015 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.004276  0.995724  
Netherlands Y2015 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.554601  0.445399  
Netherlands Y2015 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.995449  0.004551  
Netherlands Y2015 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995835  0.004165  
Netherlands Y2016 None Initial inspection 0.003253  0.996746  
Netherlands Y2016 None Expanded inspection 0.003566  0.996435  
Netherlands Y2016 None More detailed inspection 0.004713  0.995287  
Netherlands Y2016 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003597  0.996403  
Netherlands Y2016 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.005138  0.994862  
Netherlands Y2016 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.004411  0.995589  
Netherlands Y2016 4to9 Initial inspection 0.004709  0.995291  
Netherlands Y2016 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003701  0.996299  
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Netherlands Y2016 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.004005  0.995995  
Netherlands Y2016 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.003219  0.996781  
Netherlands Y2016 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996249  0.003751  
Netherlands Y2016 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995352  0.004648  
Netherlands Y2017 None Initial inspection 0.003621  0.996379  
Netherlands Y2017 None Expanded inspection 0.004879  0.995121  
Netherlands Y2017 None More detailed inspection 0.004316  0.995684  
Netherlands Y2017 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003735  0.996265  
Netherlands Y2017 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.004371  0.995628  
Netherlands Y2017 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.002932  0.997069  
Netherlands Y2017 4to9 Initial inspection 0.004090  0.995910  
Netherlands Y2017 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003900  0.996100  
Netherlands Y2017 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.004105  0.995895  
Netherlands Y2017 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.003591  0.996409  
Netherlands Y2017 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996908  0.003092  
Netherlands Y2017 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.996321  0.003679  
Spain Y2015 None Initial inspection 0.003381  0.996619  
Spain Y2015 None Expanded inspection 0.003012  0.996988  
Spain Y2015 None More detailed inspection 0.003356  0.996644  
Spain Y2015 1to3 Initial inspection 0.004245  0.995755  
Spain Y2015 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.004013  0.995987  
Spain Y2015 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.004999  0.995001  
Spain Y2015 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003946  0.996054  
Spain Y2015 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003243  0.996757  
Spain Y2015 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.003220  0.996780  
Spain Y2015 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.558074  0.441926  
Spain Y2015 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.995809  0.004191  
Spain Y2015 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.996274  0.003726  
Spain Y2016 None Initial inspection 0.003787  0.996213  
Spain Y2016 None Expanded inspection 0.004016  0.995984  
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Spain Y2016 None More detailed inspection 0.004230  0.995770  
Spain Y2016 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003490  0.996510  
Spain Y2016 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.004097  0.995903  
Spain Y2016 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003407  0.996593  
Spain Y2016 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003384  0.996616  
Spain Y2016 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003463  0.996537  
Spain Y2016 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.003359  0.996641  
Spain Y2016 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.511028  0.488972  
Spain Y2016 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.995572  0.004428  
Spain Y2016 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.996374  0.003626  
Spain Y2017 None Initial inspection 0.002904  0.997096  
Spain Y2017 None Expanded inspection 0.003140  0.996860  
Spain Y2017 None More detailed inspection 0.004077  0.995923  
Spain Y2017 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003251  0.996749  
Spain Y2017 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.003153  0.996847  
Spain Y2017 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.004403  0.995597  
Spain Y2017 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003718  0.996282  
Spain Y2017 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.003452  0.996548  
Spain Y2017 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.002967  0.997033  
Spain Y2017 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.529706  0.470294  
Spain Y2017 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.995537  0.004463  
Spain Y2017 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.995494  0.004506  
UK Y2015 None Initial inspection 0.003929  0.996071  
UK Y2015 None Expanded inspection 0.004734  0.995266  
UK Y2015 None More detailed inspection 0.003081  0.996920  
UK Y2015 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003331  0.996669  
UK Y2015 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.004501  0.995499  
UK Y2015 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003963  0.996037  
UK Y2015 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003667  0.996333  
UK Y2015 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.996620  0.003380  
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UK Y2015 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.003359  0.996641  
UK Y2015 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.528948  0.471052  
UK Y2015 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996939  0.003061  
UK Y2015 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.996657  0.003343  
UK Y2016 None Initial inspection 0.003120  0.996880  
UK Y2016 None Expanded inspection 0.003366  0.996634  
UK Y2016 None More detailed inspection 0.004119  0.995881  
UK Y2016 1to3 Initial inspection 0.004365  0.995635  
UK Y2016 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.003230  0.996770  
UK Y2016 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003753  0.996247  
UK Y2016 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003699  0.996301  
UK Y2016 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.995960  0.004040  
UK Y2016 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.003015  0.996985  
UK Y2016 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.452298  0.547702  
UK Y2016 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.995633  0.004367  
UK Y2016 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.996003  0.003997  
UK Y2017 None Initial inspection 0.003586  0.996414  
UK Y2017 None Expanded inspection 0.005043  0.994957  
UK Y2017 None More detailed inspection 0.004027  0.995973  
UK Y2017 1to3 Initial inspection 0.003075  0.996925  
UK Y2017 1to3 Expanded inspection 0.004313  0.995687  
UK Y2017 1to3 More detailed inspection 0.003981  0.996019  
UK Y2017 4to9 Initial inspection 0.003638  0.996362  
UK Y2017 4to9 Expanded inspection 0.995778  0.004222  
UK Y2017 4to9 More detailed inspection 0.004144  0.995856  
UK Y2017 Morethan10 Initial inspection 0.004030  0.995970  
UK Y2017 Morethan10 Expanded inspection 0.996008  0.003992  
UK Y2017 Morethan10 More detailed inspection 0.996477  0.003523  
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Table Appendix 2.10. CPT of ‘Detention’ 
Vessel group Inspection group Yes No 
High Detention Risk High Detention Risk 0.587624  0.412375  
High Detention Risk Low Detention Risk 0.062388  0.937612  
Low Detention Risk High Detention Risk 0.172431  0.827569  
Low Detention Risk Low Detention Risk 0.004550  0.995450  
 
 
